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Note: This outline was prepared jointly with Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Clarence TeSelle Professor of Law,
University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, FL and Daniel L. Simmons, Professor of Law,
University of California Davis, Davis CA. We are deeply indebted to Professor Larry Zelenak, Duke
University School of Law, for his assistance in synopsizing the provisions of the Earnings Assistance and
Relief Tax Act of 2008, the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008, and the Housing
Assistance Tax Act of 2008. All of his work was axiomatically perfect, and he is not to blame for any
inaccuracies that we introduced in rewriting it and for any of our offensive commentary (including
headlines and footnotes).
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understandthe significance
of the most importantjudicialdecisions and administrativerulings and regulationspromulgated
by the Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Departmentduring the most recent twelve months
- and sometimes a little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or
outrageous.Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be discussed
in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read them all the way through; just the
basic topic and fundamental principles are highlighted. Amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code generally are not discussed except to the extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2)
they have led to administrativerulings and regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued
rulings and regulationsotherwise covered by the outline, or (4) they provide Dan and Marty the
opportunity to mock our elected representatives. The outline focuses primarily on topics of
broadgeneral interest (to the three of us, at least) - income tax accountingrules, determination
of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate and
partnership taxation, exempt organizations, and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily
with qualifiedpension andprofit sharingplans, and generally does not deal with international
taxation or specialized industries, such as banking, insurance, and financial services. Please
read this outline at your own risk; we take no responsibilityfor any misinformation in it, whether
occasioned by our advancing ages or our increasing indifference as to whether we get any
particularitem right.Any mistakes in this outline are Marty's responsibility; any political bias
or offensive language is Ira's;and any useful information is Dan's.
I.

ACCOUNTING
A.
Accounting Methods
1.
Notice 2007-88, 2007-46 I.R.B. 993 (10/19/07). This Notice requests
comments regarding a proposal to change the process by which taxpayers obtain the consent of
the Commissioner to change a method of accounting. It describes the automatic and
nonautomatic consent processes, and suggests they be replaced with a system under which a

taxpayer requests "standard consent,.... specific consent," or "letter ruling consent," and
describes these processes.
2.
Accountant's persistent omission of a step in the computation of the
LIFO value of inventories required a change of accounting method to correct. On appeal,
held that the Commissioner's interpretation of the applicable regulation is "entitled to
controlling weight." Huffman v. Commissioner, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1078 (6th Cir. 4/4/08),
aff'g 126 T.C. 322 (2006). Generally, corrections to the taxpayer's inventory accounting method
constitute a change of accounting method. Furthermore, correction of a systematic erroneous
method of calculating inventories on a recurring basis, without a change in the overall inventory
method, constitutes a change of accounting method rather than the correction of a computational
error. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that correction to an inventory method employed by
the accountant for S corporation automobile dealerships that reached an erroneous result over a
10- to 20-year period by omitting a computational step required by Reg. § 1.472-8, related to the
link-chain, dollar-value method of pricing LIFO inventories, constituted an accounting method
change that requires a § 481 adjustment, and was not simply the correction of a mistake in
arithmetic. This was an accounting method change because the original method caused
understatements and overstatements in the LIFO value of inventories but did not result in the
permanent omission of gross income.
The Sixth Circuit (Judge Rogers) affirmed the holding of the
*
Tax Court. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(a) provides that "[a] change in the method of accounting
includes a change in the overall plan of accounting for gross income or deductions or a change in the
treatment of any material item used in such overall plan;" Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(c) specifically
provides that "a change in the treatment of any material item used in the overall plan for identifying
or valuing items in inventory is a change in method of accounting;" and Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(a)
provides that a "material item" is "any item that involves the proper time for the inclusion of the
item in income or the taking of a deduction." According to Judge Rogers "' [t]he essential
characteristic of a "material item" is that it determines the timing of income or deductions."'
(Quoting Knight-RidderNewspapers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781, 798 (11th Cir. 1984).) "In
this case, the change from the accountant's erroneous method to the proper dollar-value, link-chain
method does just that."
Judge Rogers added that his conclusion was bolstered by the
a
fact that the case involved interpretation of a regulation - whether the correction of a specific
accounting error constitutes a "change in method of accounting," as that phrase is defined in the
regulations. He reasoned that in "dealing with the interpretation of rules of inclusion and exclusion
that are "creatures" of the Treasury Department's own making," the IRS's interpretation of the
regulation is "controlling" where the interpretation reflects a "fair and considered judgment" and is
not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." The Commissioner's interpretation of
what constituted a "'change in method of accounting' (and therefore not 'mathematical' or
'computational' error) is [not] 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,' and the
Commissioner's interpretation is accordingly entitled to controlling weight."
3.
Judge Haines writes a treatise on defective claims to automatic
consent to change an accounting method. Capital One Financial Corp. v. Commissioner, 130
T.C. No. 11 (5/22/08). Following the enactment in 1997 of § 1272(a)(6)(C)(ii), which provides
that credit card late-fee receipts create or increase original issue discount rather than constituting
an income item when they accrued under the all events test, the taxpayer claimed to have
received the IRS's consent to change its accounting method, pursuant to an automatic consent

procedure, by filing Form 3115 with its 1998 tax return. However, the taxpayer did not change
its accounting method for 1998 and 1999. In the Tax Court, the taxpayer sought to retroactively
change its method for 1998 and 1999. Judge Haines, held that § 446(e) prohibited the taxpayer
from retroactively changing its treatment of income from credit card late-fees for years 1998 and
1999 from the current-inclusion method to the method under § 1272(a)(6)(C)(iii) that requires
late-fee receipts to create or increase original issue discount, even though the OlD method was
mandatory under the statute, because the taxpayer did not file a Form 3115 to notify the IRS of
the change of accounting method with its 1997 return. Because the Form 3115 was not timely
filed and did not specifically mention "late fees," automatic consent had not been granted. "[A]
taxpayer forced to change its method of accounting under section 448 must still file a Form 3115
with its return for the year of change. [Reg. § 1.448-1(h)(2)] If the Form 3115 is not filed timely,
a taxpayer forced off the cash method must comply with the requirements of [Reg. § 1.4461(e)(3)] in order to secure the consent of the Commissioner. Reg. § 1.448-1 (h)(4). Pursuant to
[Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(3)], a taxpayer requesting to change its method of accounting is required to
file a Form 3115 during the year in which it intends to make the change."
4.
A little more help for the housing industry buried in more important
proposed changes to changes in methods of accounting for long-term contracts. REG120844-07, Rules for Home Construction Contracts, 73 F.R. 45180 (8/4/08). Currently, a
taxpayer that uses the percentage-of-completion method, the exempt-contract percentage of
completion method, that elects the 10-percent method or special alternative minimum taxable
income method, or that adopts or elects a cost allocation method of accounting (or changes to
another method of accounting with the IRS's consent) must apply the method(s) consistently for
all similarly classified contracts until the taxpayer obtains consent under § 446 to change to
another method of accounting. Prop. Reg. § 1.460-4(g) would provide that taxpayer-initiated
change in method of accounting will be permitted only on a cut-off basis, i.e., for contracts
entered into on or after the year of change, only for changes from a permissible percentage of
completion to another permissible percentage of completion method for long-term contracts for
which percentage of completion is required and for changes from a cost allocation method of
accounting that complies with the cost allocation rules of Reg. § 1.460-5 to another cost
allocation method of accounting that complies with those rules. All other taxpayer-initiated
changes in method of accounting under § 460 would be made with a § 48 1(a) adjustment. Prop.
Reg. §§ 1.460-6(c)(3)(vii) and 1.460-6(d)(2)(iv) would provide that in determining the
hypothetical underpayment or overpayment of tax for any year as part of the look-back
computation, § 481 (a) adjustments would be taken into account in the tax year or years they are
reported. The taxpayer would use amounts reported under its old method for the years the old
method was used and would use amounts reported under its new method for the years the new
method was used, netted against the amount of any § 481(a) adjustments under Prop. Reg.
§ 1.460-6(c)(3)(vii) and Prop. Reg.§ 1.460-6(d)(2)(iv). As a result, a look-back computation
would not be required upon contract completion simply because the taxpayer changed its method
of accounting. But, a look-back computation would be required upon contract completion if
actual costs or the contract price differ from the estimated amounts notwithstanding the fact that
a change in method of accounting occurred. Prop. Reg. § 1.460-3(b)(2) would expanded what is
considered a townhouse or rowhouse, for purposes of the home construction contract exemption
in § 460(e) to include an individual condominium unit, and expand the types of contracts eligible
for the home construction contract exemption by providing that a contract for the construction of
common improvements is considered a contract for the construction of improvements to real

property directly related to the dwelling unit(s) and located on the site of such dwelling unit(s),
even if the contract is not for the construction of any dwelling unit. The amendments to the
regulations will be effective when finalized.
5.
You've got to be really, really busy trading to be in the trade or
business of being a stock trader. Holsinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-191 (8/11/08).
The taxpayer was not eligible for mark-to-market treatment of securities under § 475(f) because
he was not a "trader" in securities. Whether a person is a "trader" rather than an investor depends
on a number of nonexclusive factors: (1) the taxpayer's intent, (2) the nature of the income to be
derived from the activity, and (3) the frequency, extent, and regularity of the taxpayer's securities
transactions. "For a taxpayer to be a trader the trading activity must be substantial, which means
frequent, regular, and continuous enough to constitute a trade or business." Activities constitute
a trade or business where (1) "[t]he taxpayer's trading is substantial, and (2) the taxpayer seeks to
catch the swings in the daily market movements and to profit from these short-term changes
rather than to profit from the long-term holding of investments." [emphasis added] In the
relevant years, 2001 and 2002, the taxpayer executed approximately 289 trades in 2001 on 63
days and 372 trades on 110 days, respectively. Judge Vasquez found it "doubtful whether the
trades were conducted with the frequency, continuity, and regularity indicative of a business."
Judge Vasquez found further that the taxpayer did not seek to catch the swings in the daily
market movements. He rarely bought and sold on the same day, and a significant amount of his
holdings was held for more than 31 days. Accordingly, he was an investor, not a trader.
6.
New and improved automatic consent procedures for changes of
accounting methods. Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-36 I.R.B. 587 (8/ /08). This revenue procedure
provides automatic consent procedures for a wide variety of accounting method changes. Rev.
Proc. 2002-9, 2002-1 C.B. 327, as modified and clarified, is clarified, modified, amplified, and
superseded.
B.
Inventories
C.
Installment Method
D.
Year of Inclusion or Deduction
1.
Thirty-five percent is not substantial here, even though it might be
elsewhere in the Code. Nelson v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 5 (2/28/08) Section 451(d)
permits a cash method farmer who normally reports income from the sale of his crops in the year
following crop production to elect to defer treating as income crop insurance proceeds received
in a year until a following year. The taxpayers, who routinely reported only 65 percent of income
realized form the sale of crops in the year of sale and 35 percent the following year [which the
IRS stipulated was an acceptable accounting method], were not permitted to defer reporting 100
percent the proceeds of crop insurance until the following year. The Court (Judge Swift) applied
Rev. Rul. 74-145, 1974-1 C.B. 113, which allowed deferred of recognition of crop insurance
proceeds under § 451(d) to a farmer who, under his normal method of accounting for crop
income, deferred to the following year not all but more than 50 percent of his crop income, a
percentage which the ruling referred to as a "substantial portion" of the farmer's annual crop
income, and concluded that because the taxpayers did not normally defer a substantial portion of
their crop income - 35 percent not being "substantial" for this purpose - §451(d) was
inapplicable.
2.
Auto parts remanufacturer can't anticipate return of "cores" and
accrue only price net of future rebates. Bigler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-133
(5/19/08). The taxpayer's S corporation (BBB) remanufactured automobile alternators and

starters and sold the remanufactured parts to retailers. For each remanufactured part purchased,
the customers were entitled to return a core for a credit equal to a core price listed on the invoice.
Because there was no time limit on returning a core, at the close of the year BBB did not know
how many cores would be returned, and when the cores would be returned. BBB essentially
accrued only the invoiced amounts net of the anticipated credit for return of the cores. The Tax
Court (Judge Vasquez) agreed with the IRS that BBB was required to accrue the gross amount of
the invoiced price of the parts. "After the sale the amount stated was fixed, and BBB had the
right to collect the entire amount stated on the invoice. The fact that BBB might have to credit
the customer at some point in the future does not mean that income has not accrued. Thus the all
events test was satisfied for the entire amount of the invoice."
*
In an earlier case involving remanufactured auto parts, Judge
Chiechi wrote a treatise on taxpayer's impermissible use of LIFO inventory. Consolidated
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 1 (7/20/98), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 249 F.3d
1231 (10th Cir. 5/8/01).
II.
BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.
Income
1.
Share the company's name and credit with "friends," then pay tax on
the friends' income. Industrial Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc. v. Commissioner T.C.
Memo. 2008-84 (4/3/08). The taxpayer corporation's principal shareholder and officer qualified
the company to perform electrical contracting services in the State of Florida. Through various
arrangements Stewart and Lance Penny, who could not obtain the requisite contractor's license,
became minority shareholders of the taxpayer and performed services in the name of the
taxpayer company. The Pennys obtained supplies on the company credit and employed workers
in the company name. However, numerous checks for services and contracts performed by the
Pennys were not recorded on the company's books, but cashed directly by the Pennys. These
amounts were not reported as income on the company's return. The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez)
found that this arrangement was undertaken with the company's support. The company had
knowingly made its credit and license available to the Pennys to enable them to perform work.
Thus, the court concluded that the amounts paid to the Pennys represented income to the
company. The court also sustained fraud penalties for the understatement of income.
2.
Muskat v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1606 (D. N.H., 4/2/08).
The District Court denied taxpayer's claim for refund on the ground that $1,000,000 paid to
corporate CEO and 37% shareholder as payment under a non-competition agreement was in fact
payment for personal goodwill. The taxpayer's age and lack of interest in competing was not
enough to convince the court that the non-competition provision in the agreement was in effect a
purchase of goodwill.
3.
The IRS changes position on the tax treatment of rebates. Rev. Rul.
2005-28, 2005-19 I.R.B. 997 (4/25/05). This ruling holds that a payment made by a seller to a
purchaser, the purpose and intent of which is to reach an agreed-upon net selling price, is treated
as an adjustment to the sales price rather than a deduction item. Therefore, Medicaid rebates
incurred by a pharmaceutical manufacturer are purchase price adjustments that are subtracted
from gross receipts in determining gross income.
0
Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23, which held that an
automobile manufacturer's rebates paid to retail customers are deductible as ordinary and necessary

business expenses under § 162, is suspended in part because the issue is being reconsidered by the
IRS.
a.
Medicaid rebates paid by pharmaceutical company reduce
gross receipts. Rev. Rul. 2008-26, 2008-21 I.R.B. 985 (5/9/08), clarifying and superseding Rev.
Rul. 2005-28, 2005-1 C.B. 997. Under the Medicaid reimbursement program pharmaceutical
manufacturers pay a rebate to state Medicaid agencies to reduce the cost of prescription medicine
purchased through state programs. The IRS ruled that these payments are a reduction of sales
price that reduces gross receipts rather than ordinary business expenses, but the ruling notes that
"This holding is limited to Medicaid Rebates that a pharmaceutical manufacturer pays pursuant
to the Medicaid Rebate Program established by the Act."
0
The ruling also noted:
Whether a rebate of the type described in Rev. Rul. 76-96 is an ordinary and
necessary business expense or, alternatively, is an adjustment to the sales price in
calculating gross receipts, is an issue under reconsideration. Therefore, pending
the Service's reconsideration of the issue and publication of subsequent guidance,
the Service will not apply, and taxpayers may not rely on, the conclusion of Rev.
Rul. 76-96 that rebates made by the manufacturer are ordinary and necessary
business expenses deductible under § 162.
4.
"Taxation * * * is eternally lively; it concerns nine-tenths of us more
directly than either smallpox or golf, and has just as much drama in it; moreover, it has
been mellowed and made gay by as many gaudy, preposterous theories." - H.L. Mencken,
"The Dismal Science," Smart Set, June 1922, at 42. Monk v. Commissioner T.C. Memo.
2008-64 (3/17/08). For many years, the taxpayer had reported his interest in a Baltimore bar,
called Chuck's Place, as a sole proprietorship on his tax returns. His name was on the bar's
liquor license, his name on the bar's checking account, and he was recognized by Maryland as
the bar's lottery agent. During the course of an audit, the taxpayer's accountant ascertained that
the true economic relationship between the taxpayer and the operator of the bar was a lease that
provided for a set monthly rent and an allocation of maintenance and repair expenses; the
taxpayer did not share in profits or bear any risk of operating losses. The reason the arrangement
was structured as it appeared to be was that the bar operator, an old friend of the taxpayer's
believed that his 40-year-old felony conviction would prevent a liquor license and state lottery
agency from being issued to him, so the taxpayer filed the paperwork for him.
0
The Tax Court (Judge Haines) held that an arrangement that
was in substance a valid oral lease of real property to the true operator of the bar business and should
be should be treated as such, even though the taxpayer appeared to be the owner of the business on
all of the relevant documentation. "[W]here there is written documentation which contradicts the
reality of a situation, we disregard the documents to properly tax the person actually earning the
income. ... '[I]n a labor-intensive business with no employees, there is a strong suggestion that the
individuals performing the labor own the business."' (quoting Malone v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo.
2005-69 (2005)).
*
The court observed, "[t]hough we assert no expertise in
Maryland administrative law, it seems unlikely that either Monk or Maney will benefit from the
position on the true ownership of Chuck's Place that they have taken in this case when Maryland
authorities learn of it, further bolstering their credibility on this point."

0
Judge Haines demonstrated his wit and literacy by including
the quotation from Mencken in the opening paragraph of his opinion.
5.
Employer housing in Alice Springs, Australia doesn't qualify for
exclusion for gross income. Middleton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-150 (6/11/08). The
taxpayer was employed by TRW, Inc. to work at the Joint Defense Space Research Facility/Joint
Defense Space Communication System (joint defense facility), located at the Pine Gap Air Force
base near Alice Springs. As a condition of employment he taxpayer was required to live in
employer provided housing in Alice Springs. The housing was in a residential neighborhood. No
work was performed for TRW in the housing. Following its prior decision on similar facts in
Hargrove v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-159, the Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) held that the
value of the housing is not eligible for exclusion from gross income under § 119. The court also
rejected the taxpayer's claim that the housing was an excludible allowance under § 912, which
excludes foreign area allowances provided to certain civilian officers and employees of the U.S.
government.
6.
The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3022(a)(1), removes from
treatment as tax preferences for alternative minimum tax purposes interest from exempt facility
bonds where 95% or more of the proceeds of the issue are used to provide qualified residential
rental projects, qualified mortgage bonds, and qualified veterans' mortgage bonds. Tax exempt
interest on these instruments also is removed from corporate AMT adjustments in determining
adjusted current earnings.
0
A rental project is qualified under § 142(d) if either 20
percent or more of the project's units are occupied by persons whose gross income is 50 percent or
less of the area median gross income, or 40 percent or more of the units are occupied by persons
whose income is 60 percent or less of the area median gross income.
*
A bond qualifies as a qualified mortgage bond under § 143(a)
if it is part of an issue all of the proceeds of which are used to finance owner-occupied residences for
first-time home owners with a purchase price not exceeding 90 percent of the average area purchase
price.
*
A bond is a qualified veterans' mortgage bond under § 143(b)
if it is part of an issue 95 percent of which is used to provide residences for veterans.
B.
Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
1.
Tarter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-320 (10/25/07). The taxpayer
was denied deductions for his employee benefits and payroll taxes, outside services, equipment
rental, and depreciation for his business of pouring concrete foundations and flatwork for
residential projects because he failed to meet the burden of countering the IRS's claim that these
items had been included in cost of goods sold by the taxpayer. Accuracy-related penalties were
sustained.
2.
At long last, the long-promised tangible property proposed
regulations are out. REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 71 F.R. 48590 (8/21/06). The Treasury Department
published comprehensive proposed regulations dealing with the capitalization of amounts paid or
incurred to acquire or produce real or personal property, including transaction costs, and to
distinguish repairs from improvements subject to capitalization.
The proposed regulations
excepted from capitalization expenditures for property that had a useful life of one year or less,
but did not have any de minimis rule (although the preamble stated that the absence of a de
minimis rules would not change the current practice of permitting agreements between taxpayers

and IRS examining agents not to select assets with minimal cost for review). The proposed
regulations adopted a "unit-of-property" concept for purposes of distinguishing repairs from
improvements. Amounts paid that materially increase the value of a unit of property must be
capitalized, as must be amounts paid that substantially prolong economic useful life. The
proposed regulations included a repair allowance system that would permit expenditures on each
class of property up to a specified percentage of cost to be deducted as repairs, with any excess
required to be capitalized; the percentage is to be determined based on the principle that a
taxpayer will spend 50 percent of cost on repairs over the MACRS recovery period.
a.

The old proposed rules capitalized too much -

at least

according to commentators. New regulations are proposed for the acquisition, production,
or improvement of tangible personal property. REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 73 F.R. 12838
(3/7/08). New proposed regulations withdraw and replace the 2006 proposed regulations under
§ 263 regarding the acquisition, production or improvement of tangible personal property [REG168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to
Tangible Property, 71 F.R. 48590 (8/21/06)]. The new proposed regulations retain many of the
provisions of the 2006 proposed regulations, including the proposed format changes in which
§ 1.263(a)-i provides general rules for capital expenditures, § 1.263(a)-2 provides rules for
amounts paid for the acquisition or production of tangible property, and § 1.263(a)-3 provides
rules for amounts paid for the improvement of tangible property. However, these new proposed
regulations provide many additional rules. The new proposed regulations define material and
supplies so to treat as deductible (1) the cost of any property with a useful life that does not
exceed one year and (2) any item that cost not more than $100. They add a book-conformity de
minimis rule, a safe-harbor for routine maintenance, and an optional simplified method for
regulated taxpayers. The proposed regulations modify the provisions in the first version
regarding a unit of property and restorations. The new proposed regulations do not provide for a
detailed repair allowance rule, but do provide for future I.R.B. guidance regarding industryspecific repair allowance methods.
*

Acquisition

and

Production Costs.

These

proposed

regulations [Reg. § 1.263(a)-2] would expressly provide that a taxpayer must capitalize amounts
paid to acquire or produce a unit of real or personal property (as determined under Prop. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3(d)(2)), including leasehold improvement property, land and land improvements,
buildings, machinery and equipment, and furniture and fixtures." Amounts paid to create intangible
interests in land would be treated as capital expenditures. The preamble specifically invites
comments on this provision. Transaction costs to facilitate the acquisition of property also are
expressly required to be capitalized, even if the property is not acquired. [Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d)(3)]
Amounts paid to defend or protect title to property must be capitalized.
*
Selling Expenses. The proposed regulations [Prop. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-I(d)] provide for the capitalization of selling expenses as an offset against sales proceeds
(except in the case of dealers).
*
Investigation Costs. Although expenditures to produce or
acquire tangible property, including expenses incurred to facilitate the acquisition, must be
capitalized, the proposed regulations would provide an exception for pre-decisional investigative
costs with respect to the acquisition of real property, similar to the provisions applicable to
investigating the acquisition of intangible property that are treated as deductible business expansion
costs.

Employee Compensation and Overhead. Except as required
0
by § 263A, employee compensation and overhead are not treated as transaction costs facilitating the
acquisition of property, unless the taxpayer elects to so treat them. [Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)2(d)(3)(D)]
Materials and Supplies. As under current provisions, Prop.
*
Reg. § 1.162-3 would allow a deduction for non-incidental materials and supplies in the year the
property is consumed, and allow a deduction for incidental material and supplies in the year the
expenditure is incurred. Materials and supplies include tangible property that is (i) not a unit of
property or acquired as part of a unit of property, or (ii) tangible property that is a unit of property
with (a) an economic useful life to the taxpayer of not more than 12-months, or (b) that costs not
more than $100 (an embedded de minimis rule). Taxpayers would be allowed an election to
capitalize the cost of each item of material or supply. The de minimis rule also applies to property
produced by the taxpayer, but items used in the production of other property remain subject to the
uniform capitalization rules of § 263A. Prop. Reg. § 1.263A-1(b)(14). Rotable spare parts (parts
installed temporarily in a unit of property) would be treated as used, and therefore deductible, in the
year the part is disposed of.
*
Financial Accounting De Minimis Rules. The proposed
regulations [Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d)(4)] would allow a taxpayer to deduct expenditures to acquire
or produce property (other than property produced for resale) if the taxpayer expenses the cost on a
certified audited financial statement (or certain financial statements filed with regulatory agencies)
pursuant to an accounting procedure adopted by the taxpayer that treats as expenses amounts paid
for property costing less than a specified dollar amount, as long as the aggregate amount deducted
does not materially distort the taxpayer's income for purposes of § 446. A safe-harbor would provide
that the deductions will not distort income if the amounts deducted under the second de minimis
rule, plus deductions for materials and supplies, i.e., amounts deducted under the first de minims
rule, are do not exceed the lesser of 0.1 percent of the taxpayer's gross receipts or 2 percent of the
taxpayer's total depreciation and amortization expense reflected in its financial statement.
*
Unit of Property. Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(d)(2). The unit of
property concept is central to the proposed regulations' requirement that improvements to a unit of
property must be capitalized. The unit of property standards in the 2008 proposed regulations differ
substantially from the standards in the 2006 proposed regulations. A building and its structural
components (as defined in Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2)) would be treated as a unit of property. However,
fixtures attached to a building that pursuant to a cost segregation study are depreciated as tangible
personal property, rather than real property, are separate units of property. For property other than
buildings, all the components that are functionally interdependent comprise a single unit of property.
Components of property are functionally interdependent if the placing in service of one component
is dependent on the placing in service of the other component. However, a component that is
recorded on the taxpayer's books as having a different economic useful life or which is in a different
class of property for MACRS depreciation would be treated as separate unit of property. Thus, for
example, all of the component parts of a railroad locomotive constitute a single unit of property, as
does a truck trailer and its tires (unless the taxpayer the taxpayer's financial statements treat them as
separate property). A special rule applies to "plant property," which is a functionally integrated
collection of equipment and machinery used to perform an industrial process; each component (or
group of components) that performs a discrete and major function or operation within the
functionally interdependent machinery or equipment constitutes a separate unit of property.

*
Capitalize Improvements. Expenditures to improve a unit of
property must be capitalized. Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(d)(1). Amounts expended for repairs and
maintenance of tangible property would be deductible if they are not required to be capitalized under
Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3. Prop. Reg. § 1.162-4. Expenditures that improve tangible property, and that
are required to be capitalized, include expenditures that:
(1)
Result in a "betterment" to a unit of property (replacing the
term "material increase in value" used in the original proposal);
(2)
Restore a unit of property; or
(3)
Adapt the unit of property to a new or different use.
*
Betterment. Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(f). An expenditure would
result in a betterment of a unit of property if it (1) ameliorates a material condition or defect that
existed prior to acquisition of the property or arose during production of the property, (2) results in a
material addition to a unit of property, or (3) results in a material increase in capacity. Determination
of whether an expenditure results in a betterment is factual and requires a comparison of the
condition of the property immediately prior to the circumstance necessitating the expenditure (or the
condition of property the last time the taxpayer corrected for normal wear and tear) with the
condition of the property after the expenditure.
*
Restoration. Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(g). An expenditure
would be capitalized as a restoration if it (1) replaces a component for which the taxpayer has
deducted a loss, (2) replaces a component the adjusted basis of which has been accounted for in
realizing gain or loss on a sale or exchange of the component, (3) repairs damage for which the
taxpayer has deducted a casualty loss under § 165, (4) returns the property to its ordinary operating
condition after the property as fallen into a state of disrepair and is no longer functional, (5) results in
rebuilding the property to a like-new condition at the end of its economic useful life (not MACRS
recovery period) to the taxpayer, or (6) is for the replacement of a major component or structural part
of the unit of property. Replacement of a major component or structural part occurs if the cost is
more than 50 percent of the replacement cost of the property or the replacement compromises more
than 50 percent of the physical structure of the property and the replacement does not occur during
the MACRS recovery period for the property.
*
New Use. Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(h). A unit of property
would be treated as adapted to a new or different use if the adaptation is not consistent with the
taxpayer's "intended ordinary use of the unit of property at the time originally placed in service by
the taxpayer."
*
Rehabilitation doctrine is no more. Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)3(d)(4) would eliminate the judicially created rehabilitation doctrine by providing that, "Repairs and
maintenance that do not directly benefit or are not incurred by reason of an improvement are not
required to be capitalized under section 263(a), regardless of whether they are made at the same time
as an improvement." But the proposed regulations provide that if otherwise deductible repairs
benefit or are incurred by reason of an improvement, the cost of the repairs must be capitalized under
§ 263A.
*
Routine MaintenanceSafe Harbor.Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(e)
would provide a safe harbor from the capitalization requirement for "the recurring activities that a
taxpayer expects to perform as a result of the taxpayer's use of the unit of property to keep the unit
of property in its ordinarily efficient operating condition." The safe harbor would apply to activities
that the taxpayer reasonably expects to perform more than once during the class life of the property,
as determined under the MACRS alternative depreciation schedule of § 168(g). Routine

maintenance includes maintenance with respect to and the use of rotable spare parts. Routine
maintenance excludes activities that follow a basis recovery event similar to the items that are
described as restorations.
9
Repairs. Prop. Reg. § 1.162-4 would allow as a deductible
repair any costs that are not required to be capitalized under Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3.
Repair Allowance. The 2006 proposed
0
regulations would have provided a comprehensive elective repair allowance rule under which all
amounts paid for materials and labor during the taxable year to repair, maintain, or improve
tangible property for which depreciation is computed under § 168 would be deductible under
§ 162 to the extent they did not exceed the "repair allowance amount," determined separately for
each MACRS property class. The new proposed regulations do not provide any such rule, but
Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(j) permits taxpayers to use a repair allowance method that would be
subsequently published in either the Federal Register or the Internal Revenue Bulletin,
suggesting that such rules will be forthcoming.
0
Examples. The new proposed regulations are full of examples
that seem to cover most of the litigated cases and rulings addressing capitalization versus repair. The
examples are necessary to understand the substantive provisions, which, although intended to
provide clarity, are not so clearly applied.
3.
Lease termination expenses are deductible and not capitalized into the
basis of an acquired building. ABC Beverage Corp. v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008__.,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65783 (N.D. Mich. 8/27/08). After settlement of a dispute over
past due rent and the purchase price under a purchase option in the lease contract, the taxpayer
acquired a property it was leasing from the landlord. In a refund claim, the taxpayer asserted that
$6.25 million of its $11 million payment for back rent, a lease termination payment, and the
purchase price, and it capitalized $2.75 million into the basis of the building. (The taxpayer's
calculation was based on what it considered the minimum purchase price under the option
agreement.) The IRS asserted that under § 167(c)(2) the entire basis is allocated to acquisition of
the fee interest, and that no part of the acquisition cost is therefore available as a deduction for
termination of the lease. Following what it considered to be the law of the circuit, the court
followed Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. IRS, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948) and allowed the
deduction. The court held that § 167(c)(2), which provides that upon acquisition of a property
subject to a lease no basis is allocated to the lease, did not apply in the case of an acquisition of a
property by the tenant. In that case the leasehold interest and the fee interest are merged. The
District Court rejected the reasoning of the contrary holding in Union Carbide Foreign Sales
Corp. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 423 (2000).
4.
Not all the "green in" the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 is federal money The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Division C,
§ 318, extends the deduction allowed by § 198 for environmental remediation expenses (which
might otherwise be capital expenditures) to expenditures through 2009. To qualify, a site must be
certified by the appropriate State environmental agency to be an area at or on which there has
been a release (or threat of release) or disposal of a hazardous substance; sites that are identified
on the national priorities list under CERCLA do not qualify.
a.
The Act, § 322 also extends the incentives for investment in the
District of Columbia to expenditures in 2009.
C.
Reasonable Compensation

I.
The IRS takes a swipe at deducting generous executive severance
packages. Rev. Rul. 2008-13, 2008-10 I.R.B. 518 (2/21/08). Section 162(m)(1) limits the
deduction for compensation paid to a covered employee [as defined in § 162(m)(3)] by a public
company to $1 million unless under § 162(m)(4)(C) the compensation is based on meeting
performance goals. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(v) provides that compensation does not fail to be
qualified performance-based compensation merely because the plan allows the compensation to
be payable upon death, disability, or change of ownership or control. The IRS ruled that
compensation is not excepted from the $1 million deduction limitation as "remuneration payable
solely on account of attainment of one or more performance goals" under § 162(m)(4)(C) if in
addition to providing for payment upon attainment of a performance goal, the plan or agreement
also provides that the compensation will be paid, without regard to whether the performance goal
has been attained, if either: (1) the employee's employment is involuntarily terminated by the
corporation without cause or the employee terminates his or her employment for good reason, or
(2) the employee retires. Neither termination without "cause" or for "good reason" nor
retirement is listed as a permissible payment event under Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(v). Involuntary
termination without "cause" or voluntary termination for "good reason" (e.g., a reduction in title
or base salary) might result from the employees failure to meet performance goals. Thus the
compensation is not "remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more
performance."
This ruling is not effective for existing arrangements or for
performance periods beginning on or before 1/1/09.
2.
Interim CEO is not "an outside director." Rev. Rul. 2008-32, 2008-27
I.R.B. 6 (6/16/08). Section 162(m)(4)(C) allows deductible compensation in excess of the
$1,000,000 limitation of § 162(m) if the compensation is based on performance goals and
approved by a compensation committee of the board of directors which is made up of two or
more outside directors. The IRS ruled that that a member of the board of directors who served as
interim CEO during a search for the permanent CEO is not qualified to serve as an outside
director on the compensation committee.
3.
The price of a bail-out includes limitations on compensation.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 301(a), adding § 162(m)(5). The limit
on deductible compensation is reduced to $500,000 for the CEO, CFO, plus the three highest
paid employees of an employer for the tax year in which more than $300 million of troubled
assets are acquired under the "troubled assets relief program" (TARP") under the bail-out act.
The limitation includes deferred deductions for compensation to a covered executive for services
during an applicable employer taxable year. Note that the limitation is not limited to
corporations, but covers any employer who sells troubled assets under TARP.
4.
And the rip-cord is pulled on golden parachutes that are replaced by
a tarp. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 301(b), adding new § 280G(e).
The deduction disallowance and 20 percent excise tax imposed on golden parachute payments
(compensation contingent on a take-over exceeding three times an executive's average
compensation in the preceding five years) is extended to severance payments by reason of
involuntary discharge from an employer participating in the troubled assets relief program.
D.
Miscellaneous Deductions
1.
The IRS never seems able to catch up with movements in the price of
gasoline. Rev. Proc. 2006-49, 2006-47 I.R.B. 936 (11/1/06). The optional standard mileage rate
for business use of automobiles for 2007 is 48.5 cents per business mile. The optional standard

mileage rate for medical and moving expenses is 20 cents per mile. The statutory rate for
charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents per mile.
The IRS keeps chasing increases in the price of gasoline. Rev.
a.
Proc. 2007-70, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1162 (11/27/07), superseding Rev. Proc. 2006-49, 2006-47 I.R.B.
936. The optional standard mileage rate for business use of automobiles for 2008 increases to
50.5 cents per business mile. The depreciation component of the mileage rate is 21 cents. The
optional standard mileage rate for medical and moving expenses goes down to 19 cents per mile.
The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents per mile.
The IRS responds to high gasoline prices. Announcement 2008b.
63, 2008-28 I.R.B. 114 (6/24/08), modifying Rev. Proc. 2007-70. The [RS announced that the
business mileage rate for the second half of 2008 will be 58.5 cents per mile - an increase of 8
cents per mile - and that the medical/moving rate will also increase by 8 cents per mile to 27
cents per mile.
2.
Captive insurance subsidiary of one corporation doesn't provide
insurance, but the captive subsidiary of an affiliated group does. Rev. Rul. 2008-8, 2008-5
I.R.B. 340 (1/15/08). Under the facts of situation 1 of this ruling "Protected Cell Company" (a
form of entity known as a protected cell company, a segregated account company or segregated
portfolio company) is formed by X, a domestic corporation, in jurisdiction A to provide
insurance against professional liability risks. All of the capital of Protected Cell Company is
provided by X. Protected Cell Company only insures X's risks and collects premiums from X.
Protected Cell Company establishes multiple accounts, or cells, each of which has its own name
and is identified with a specific participant, but which are not treated as separate entities. In
situation 2, Y Corporation forms a protected cell company, Cell Y to insure professional liability
of Y's twelve subsidiaries, which operate independently on a decentralized basis. The IRS ruled
that there is no risk shifting between X and its wholly owned protected cell company and thus
the payments to the protected cell company are not deductible insurance premiums. In the Y cell
company situation, because risks and premiums are pooled among the various subsidiaries the
arrangement does involve risk shifting and the premiums are treated as deductible insurance
premiums.
a.
Compare, Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-2 C.B. 4 (6/17/05). Guidance
to clarify that the elements of risk shifting and risk distribution must be present for an
arrangement to be considered insurance for federal income tax purposes, citing Helvering v. Le
Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). Four situations are set forth. The first three situations were held to
be "not insurance" and they involved an unrelated person receiving premiums to insure the risk
of a single taxpayer that operated a large fleet of automotive vehicles in the courier transport
business, including (in Situation 3) 12 single-member LLCs of approximately equal size owned
by the same person which are classified as disregarded entities. In situation 4, each of those
LLCs elected to be classified as an association, and the arrangement was considered to be
"insurance."
The interest deduction for a bank with tax-exempt interest income is
3.
limited. PSB Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. No. 15 (11/1/07). Peoples Bank and
Peoples Investment Company were wholly owned members of a consolidated group filing
consolidated returns whose widely held parent company is PSB Holdings. The Bank and the
Investment Company held tax-exempt securities. Some of the Investment Company's tax-exempt
securities were purchased by the Bank and transferred to the Investment Company as

contributions to capital. Other tax-exempt securities were purchased directly by Investment
Company. Only Bank claimed deductions for interest expense.
°
Section 265(a)(2) disallows deductions for interest on
indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations. In the case of a bank, § 265(b),
adopting a fungibility approach, provides that interest subject to the § 265(a)(2) limitation is the
portion of the amount of interest that bears the same ratio to total interest as "the taxpayer's average
adjusted bases . . . of tax exempt obligations," bears to the average adjusted bases of all of the
taxpayer's assets. While § 265(a)(2) under this formula disallows 100 percent of a bank's interest
attributable to tax-exempt obligations, § 291(e), enacted prior to § 265(b), disallows 20 percent of a
bank's interest attributable to tax-exempt obligations, determined under the same formula as
§ 265(b)(2). See § 291(e)(1)(B)(ii). Section 291(e) applies to interest expense attributable to taxexempt obligations acquired before August 8, 1986, the date § 265(b) was enacted. However, the
twenty percent reduction of § 291(e) (rather than the 100 percent reduction of § 265(a)(2)) continues
to apply to tax-exempt obligations of small issuers. All of the taxpayer's exempt-obligations were
qualified small issues.
*
The IRS argued that for purposes of determining Bank's
interest deduction under the allocation formulas of §§ 265(b)(2) and 291 (e)(1)(B), the numerator of
the allocation formula should include tax-exempt obligations held by Investment Company because
Bank included the basis of its Investment Company stock in the denominator. Focusing on the "text"
of the allocation formula, the Tax Court concluded that the numerator included only tax-exempt
obligations held by the taxpayer, here, the bank alone. (Bank itself included in the numerator taxexempt obligations purchased by Bank and transferred to Investment Company.) The Tax Court
rejected the contrary holding of Rev. Rul. 90-44, 1990-1 C.B. 54, stating that a revenue ruling, while
representing an interpretation based on experience and informed judgment, is not entitled to the
same deference as regulations under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
4.
The Third Circuit cans Alcoa's claim of right doctrine benefits. Alcoa,
Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 11/28/07). Alcoa's production of aluminum products
produced substantial waste which Alcoa included as an increase in its cost of goods sold. Under
heightened environmental clean-up standards enacted in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), and others, Alcoa was forced to
incur substantial environmental remediation expense to clean up several of its manufacturing
sites. Alcoa deducted these expenses in 1993 then filed a $12 million claim for refund in the
District Court. Alcoa cleverly argued that its 1993 expenses should have been included in its cost
of goods sold in manufacturing operations for the years 1940-1987. Its reduced cost of goods
sold for those years generated excess income, received under a claim of right, which it was
forced to return in the form of the deductible environmental remediation expenses incurred in
1993. Alcoa then claimed under § 1341 that, rather than taking the deduction in 1993 for the
expense, that it was entitled to a return of the taxes paid in 1940-1987 on its increased gross
income resulting from the under-inclusion of disposal costs in its cost of goods sold. The Third
Circuit concluded that Alcoa's obligation to return gross income in the form of increased
remediation expenses "did not arise from the same circumstances, terms, and conditions as the
initial failure to spend additional funds on environmental clean-up. Rather, the obligations were
created by new circumstances, terms, and conditions, namely, by an intervening change in
environmental legislation." Thus, there is no nexus between the income asserted to have been
received under a claim of right, and the expenditure claimed as a refund of that income. The

Court ultimately concluded that the § 1341 benefits were not available "because Alcoa's
expenditure of funds in 1993 was not the restoration of particular moneys to the rightful owner
and did not arise from the same circumstances, terms, and conditions as Alcoa's original
acquisition of the income."
a.
Mitigation proves slippery for Pennzoil as well. PennzoilQuaker Co. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1/8/08), rev'g 62 Fed. Cl. 689 (2004).
Quaker State, later acquired by Pennzoil, was sued by suppliers in a class action for price fixing
resulting in a large settlement payment to the suppliers. Pennzoil originally claimed the
settlement payments as a deduction on its 1995 and 1996 tax returns, which was not challenged
by the IRS. On amended returns, Pennzoil claimed a refund of taxes paid in prior years under
§ 1341 on the theory that it received overstated gross income in the earlier years because the
lower prices paid to suppliers understated its cost of goods sold, which income was restored by
virtue of the settlement payment. The Court of Federal Claims, 62 Fed. Cl. 689 (2004), allowed
the refunds, but the Federal Circuit reversed and held for the government. The Circuit Court held
that the settlement payments failed the "same circumstances test" because the earlier income and
the settlement payments were not complementary in terms of the theory of deductibility, the
taxpayer's tax treatment, and the underlying transactions. In the prior years the taxpayer's
treatment of the original payments to suppliers as cost of goods sold was not an item included in
income. The court thus concluded that, "There is thus a disconnect between the purported item
included in gross income (understatement of COGS) and the item restored (a negotiated lump
sum payment to settle a lawsuit). This problem is intractable: COGS cannot be deducted, and
settlement payments are not included in gross income." The court also concluded that there was
no restoration of an item previously included in gross income to the same party on account of the
same transaction or series of transactions. Finally, the court concluded alternatively that the
inventory exception of § 1341(b)(2) precludes § 1341 relief for a refunded item that was
included in gross income because of a sale of inventory.
b.
And yet another circuit slaps down a taxpayer's claim for the
application of § 1341. Texaco v. United States, 528 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 6/13/08). Between 1973
and 1981, Texaco sold crude oil and refined petroleum products at prices that exceeded the price
ceilings set by federal petroleum price regulations. As a result of subsequent Department of
Energy administrative proceedings, Texaco was required to pay $1,250,000,000 plus interest.
Texaco claimed a refund based on the application of § 1341, in lieu of simply deducting the
amount paid on its tax return for the year of the payment. The court (Judge Callahan) held that
§ 1341 was not available, because § 1341(b)(2) specifically provides that the relief provision
does not apply to refunds and allowances with respect to inventory sold in prior years.
0
Although the court found that the plain meaning of
§ 1341 (b)(2) precluded Texaco's claim to its benefits, the court added that if there was some
ambiguity it would have deferred to the IRS's position in Rev. Rul. 2004-17, 2004-1 C.B. 516,
which, although it involved different facts (the ruling held that § 1341 does not apply to
environmental remediation expenditures arising from prior years' manufacturing operations),
includes the statement: "Section 1341 (b)(2) provides that § 1341 (a) does not apply to any deduction
allowable with respect to an item included in gross income by reason of the sale or other disposition
of the taxpayer's stock in trade (or other property of a kind that would have been included in the
taxpayer's inventory if on hand at the close of the prior taxable year) or property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business." The court
noted that the Ninth Circuit accords revenue rulings Skidmore deference, under which agency

rulings "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."
[Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)].
5.
A sole proprietor can create deductible medical plans by hiring a
spouse. Frahm v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-351 (11/27/07). A taxpayer farmer (who
reported farming income on Schedule F) claimed deductions under § 162(a) (ordinary and
necessary business expense) for health insurance premiums on plans for his sole employee, his
spouse. The employee health plans and medical reimbursement plans included coverage for the
employee's spouse, the sole-proprietor. For the years at issue, deductions under § 162(l) for
health insurance premiums paid by a sole-proprietor were limited. The Tax Court (Judge
Chiechi) held that all premiums paid by the taxpayer for the employee health benefit plans that
covered the employee's spouse were deductible.
a.
But you have to follow proper form to create the employee
benefit. Eyler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-350 (11/27/07). The taxpayer operated a
business that had one full-time employee, the taxpayer's spouse. The Tax Court (Judge Cheichi)
rejected the taxpayer's claim that the taxpayer's health insurance policy under which the
taxpayer was the primary beneficiary was part of an unwritten benefit's plan established for the
taxpayer's sole employee. The court noted the lack of any credible evidence that the health
insurance premiums paid directly by the taxpayer were a contribution to a health benefit plan for
the taxpayer's employee. The taxpayer was allowed by the IRS to deduct the insurance
premiums under § 162(l) up to the applicable percentage allowed for 2003, which was 60
percent.
b.
The IRS disagrees with its web site and affirms deductibility of
medical plan premiums for an S corporation shareholder. Notice 2008-1, 2008-2 I.R.B. 251
(12/13/07). Contrary to advice posted in the IRS web site last year, the IRS has indicated that a
two percent shareholder-employee of a Subchapter S corporation is entitled to deduct under
§ 162(l) accident and health insurance premiums paid or reimbursed by the S corporation. This is
an above-the-line deduction. Following Rev. Rul. 91-26, 1991-1 C.B. 184, an S corporation is
treated as maintaining a medical care coverage plan if the corporation makes premium payments
on behalf of a two percent shareholder-employee (and the employee's spouse and dependents),
or the two percent shareholder-employee pays the premiums and on furnishing proof of payment
is reimbursed by the S corporation. The notice adds that in order for the employee to deduct the
premiums under § 162(), the S corporation must report premiums paid as wages to the employee
on a Form W-2 for the year of payment, and the employee must report the premiums as gross
income.
6.
Notice 2008-40, 2008-14 I.R.B. 725 (3/11/08). The notice provides
guidance to supplement Notice 2006-52, 2006-1 C.B. 1175, with respect to certification of the
installation in commercial buildings of energy efficient equipment for purposes of the § 179D
deduction. The notice addresses allocation of the deduction in the case of government buildings,
describes the requirements for approved software for calculating energy use and cost, and
provides requirements for the interim energy efficient lighting rule of Notice 2006-52.
7.
IRS determines who gets run over by the disallowed portion of leased
driver's meal expenses. Rev. Rul. 2008-23, 2008-18 I.R.B. 852 (4/14/08). In TransportLabor
Contract/Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 461 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2006), the court held that a
leasing company that provided employee truck drivers to clients was not subject to the § 274(n)
50 percent limitation on deduction of expense for meals because the leasing company had a

reimbursement arrangement with its clients under § 274(e)(3) that exempted the leasing
company from the limitation. § 274(n)(2). The ruling provides three situations to explain who
gets the § 274(n) haircut.
Situation 1: The limitation applies to the leasing company
*
where the driver accounts to it for meals and incidental expenses and the leasing company sends a
lump-sum bill to the client.
0
Situation 2: The limitation applies to the client where the
driver accounts to the leasing company for meal and incidental expenses, the leasing company pays
the driver, receives payment on a lump sum bill from the client, but then accounts to the client for
the meal and incidental expenses by forwarding the driver's substantiation, which is accepted by the
client who also acknowledges that the substantiated meal and incidental expenses are paid under a
reimbursement arrangement with the leasing company and are subject to the § 274(n) limitation.
*
Situation 3: The limitation applies to the client where the
driver submits substantiation to the client who forwards copies to the leasing company. The leasing
company pays the driver, including reimbursed meals and incidentals, and sends the client a bill that
indicates reimbursed meals referring to the driver's substantiation submitted to the client. The client
acknowledges that its payments to the leasing company equal to the reimbursement of the driver's
meals and incidental expenses is paid under a reimbursement arrangement with the leasing company
and is subject to the § 274(n) limitation.
*
Undoubtedly the most important fact in situations 2 and 3 that
shifts the burden of the § 274 limitation is the client's acknowledgement that the limitation applies to
limit its deduction. Thus, the ruling seems to permit employee leasing companies to negotiate
application of the limitation, leaving the issue open only with respect to the uninformed.
8.
REG-106897-08, Qualified Nonpersonal Use Vehicles, 73 F.R. 32500
(6/6/08). The Treasury has published Prop. Reg. §§ 1.132-5 and 1.274-5. A qualified
nonpersonal use vehicle, defined in § 274(i) as a vehicle because of its nature is not likely to be
used for personal purposes beyond a de minimis amount, is not subject to the substantiation
requirements of § 274(d), and the use of a qualified nonpersonal use vehicle is treated as a
working condition fringe. The proposed regulations would treat a clearly marked public safety
vehicle used by a government worker as a qualified nonpersonal use vehicle even though, unlike
the existing regulations, the user is not employed by a police or fire department.
9.
Frozen on the ship, and frozen out of half of his meal deductions.
Kurtz v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2008-111 (4/22/08). Section 274(n)(2)(E) exempts from the
50-percent limitation on deductions for meal expenses any expenses for food or beverages
"required by any Federal law to be provided to crew members of a commercial vessel." Judge
Cohen ruled that § 274(n)(2)(E) did not apply to meal expenses incurred by the taxpayer as an
independent contractor on the crew of a commercial fishing boat in the Bering Sea, because
federal law does not require commercial fishing boats to provide meals to crew members.
t0.
Have you documented that your own cell phone is used for business
rather than personal purposes? Tash v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2008-120 (4/29/08).
Among the many deductions claimed by a lawyer that Judge Haines disallowed was the
deduction claimed for his cellular telephone, because "[t]he record did not indicate whether
petitioner used his cellular telephone for business and/or personal calls."
11.
Wouldn't it just have been easier to cut rates in October 2004? No.
Was it because that's what the French-looking Vietnam War veteran was proposing? No, it
was a replacement for the FSC/ETI export subsidies. Section 102 of the American Jobs

Creation Act of 2004 added new Code § 199, which provides a magical 9 percent deduction of a
percentage of taxable income attributable to domestic manufacturing activities.
a.
Proposed regulations. REG-105847-05, Income Attributable to
Domestic Production Activities: Deduction, 70 F.R. 67220 (11/4/05). The Treasury has
published massive [224 pages] proposed regulations [§§ 1.199-1 through -8] relating to the
deduction for U.S. manufacturing income under § 199. The "shrinking back" concept of taking
the deduction for only the value of the beans in a cup of brewed coffee, or for the value of the
U.S.-manufactured shoelaces on a pair of foreign-manufactured sneakers is much discussed.
b.
Finally, final regulations! Final § 199 regulations are out and
are 247 pages long, but that is only 137 pages in Lexis and 55 pages in the Federal Register.
T.D. 9263, Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities, 71 F.R. 31268 (6/1/06). You
have to be addlepated if you expect a summary.
c.
Only a masochist would bother to read these regulations unless
billable hours were involved. T.D. 9381, TIPRA Amendments to Section 199, 73 F.R. 8798
(2/15/08), corrected,73 F.R. 16518 (3/28/08). The IRS has promulgated a raft of amendments of
the already incomprehensible § 199 regulations.
d.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 502(b),
treats compensation to actors, production personnel, directors and producers for film-making
services in the U.S. as W-2 compensation for purposes of the § 199 deduction.
e.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B],
Act § 401, would freeze the § 199 domestic manufacturing deduction for oil and gas producers at
6 percent, rather than increasing to 9 percent in 2010 as scheduled under current law.
12.
"No man's life, liberty or property is safe while the legislature is in
session." But the legislators' "away from home" deductions are safe. REG-1 19518-07,
Travel Expenses of State Legislators, 73 F.R. 16797 (3/31/08). Prop. Reg. § 1.162-24
incorporates the holdings of Rev. Rul. 82-33, 19982-1 C.B. 28, which will be obsoleted when the
proposed regulations are finalized. Further, Prop. Reg. § 1.162-24 would provide that a taxpayer
becomes a state legislator on the day the taxpayer is sworn into office and ceases to be a state
legislator on the day following the day on which the taxpayer's term in office ends. A legislature
is in session when the members of the legislature are expected to attend and participate as an
assembled body of the legislature. Legislative days include a day on which the legislator's
attendance at a meeting of a committee of the legislature is formally recorded.
13.
The tax Code comes to the rescue of endangered species. The
Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008, amended §175 applies to extend
current deductibility to expenses incurred after December 31, 2008 by farmers to achieve sitespecific management actions pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973.
14.
Some folks in the heartland might not like this provision. Section
461(j), added by the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008 and effective
for years beginning after 12/31/09, limits the deductibility of farming losses in any year in which
the taxpayer receives either (1) a direct or counter-cyclical payment under Title I of the Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (or any payment in lieu of such a payment), or (2) any
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan. The allowable farm loss is limited to the greater of
(1) $300,000 ($150,000 in the case of a married taxpayer filing a separate return) or (2) the
taxpayer's total net farm income for the five preceding taxable years. Disallowed losses may be
carried forward indefinitely. For partnerships and S corporations, § 4610) applies at the partner
or shareholder level.

15.
Rev. Proc. 2008-59, 2008-41 I.R.B. (9/25/08). Updates per-diem rates that
may be claimed without substantiation for travel after October 1, 2008. Allowable per diem rates
are at www.g sa.gtov.
16.
Yearout Mechanical & Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
2008-217 (9/24/08). Taxpayer was a construction company that expanded into high-tech
buildings during boom years in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Due to its financial position and the
difficulty of reliably obtaining rental equipment, taxpayer entered into rental equipment leases
with its shareholders. The Tax Court (Judge Gale) rejected the Commissioner's assertion that
rental payments under long-term lease contracts, which also contained actual use provisions,
were excessive and allowed the taxpayer's deductions for the rental payments. The court found
that the unique nature of equipment required for "clean room" construction and the general
business climate in which the taxpayer operated established a business reason for the unique
leasing arrangements. The court also refused to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner
under § 7491.
17.
Worthless stock is not theft, even though it may feel like it. Electronic
Picture Solutions, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-212 (9/8/08). The corporate taxpayer
purchased publicly traded Novatek stock through a California broker. The SEC filed a civil
complaint alleging massive fraud on Novetek investors. The taxpayer claimed a theft loss under
§ 165(a) (instead of a capital loss for worthless securities). In denying the deduction the court
(Judge Thornton) observed that under California law that a purchaser of securities on the open
market cannot support a claim of theft because there is no privity between the perpetrator and the
victim.
Since we are not willing to pay school teachers a living wage, let's give
18.
them a tax break worth less than $2 a week at their tax brackets. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division C], Act § 203,extended through 2009 the § 62(a)(2)(D)
above-the-line deduction for up to $250 paid by an eligible educator for books, supplies,
computer equipment (including software), other equipment, and supplementary materials used
by the eligible educator in the classroom.
E.
Depreciation & Amortization
1.
Using the tax code for subsidies where direct action has failed: Firstyear depreciation recovery for specified Gulf Opportunity Zone extension property. Notice
2007-36, 2007-17 I.R.B. 1000 (3/29/07). This notice provides guidance with respect to the 50
percent original first year deprecation deduction provided under § 1400N(d). A 50 percent first
year depreciation allowance is provided for property placed in service in the so-called GO Zone.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, § 120, adding Code § 1400N(d)(6), extends the
place in service date for GO Zone extension property to 12/31/10. GO Zone extension property
is property the substantial use of which is on one or more portions of the GO Zone (listed in the
notice) and which is either nonresidential real property or residential rental property, or personal
property that is used in such real property and is installed within 90 days of the date the building
is placed in service. Otherwise, property eligible for the 50 percent first year depreciation must
have been placed in service by 12/31/07, or 12/31/08, for qualified nonresidential real property
and residential rental property. The notice also explains the requirement that original use of the
property must commence with the taxpayer.
GO Zone depreciation recapture, or not, for like-kind
a.
exchanges and involuntary conversions. Notice 2008-25, 2008-9 I.R.B. 484 (2/11/08). Section
1400N(d)(5) requires recapture of tax benefits for GO Zone property that ceases to be GO Zone

property. If GO Zone property is transferred by a taxpayer in a like-kind exchange or as a result
of an involuntary conversion and the replacement property is GO Zone property in the taxpayer's
hands, there is no recapture. If GO Zone property is transferred by a taxpayer in a like-kind
exchange or as a result of an involuntary conversion and the replacement property is not GO
Zone property in the taxpayer's hands and is not substantially used in the GO Zone or in the
active conduct of a trade or business by the taxpayer in the GO Zone, there is recapture. If GO
Zone property is transferred by a taxpayer in a like-kind exchange or as a result of an involuntary
conversion and the replacement property is not GO Zone property in the taxpayer's hands but is
substantially used in the GO Zone and in the active conduct of a trade or business by the
taxpayer in the GO Zone, there is no recapture. But, if the replacement property subsequently
ceases to be substantially used in the GO Zone or in the active conduct of a trade or business by
the taxpayer in the GO Zone, there is recapture.
b.
The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3082(b), extends the
date for commencing construction of self-produced property. Formerly the 50 percent
depreciation allowance was available for Gulf Opportunity Zone property only if the taxpayer
began construction of the property before January 1, 2008. The 2008 act deletes the January 1,
2008 date, but retains all other deadlines.
c.
Rev. Proc. 2008-54, 2008-38 I.R.B. 722 (8/29/08). The IRS has
provided guidance for reporting the increased first year expensing allowance of § 179 and the 50
percent first year depreciation deduction that have been extended through 2008 for pass-through
entities with years spanning two calendar years, and for taxpayers claiming GO Zone and Kansas
Disaster Area capital recovery. For taxable years beginning in 2008, the § 179 expense
allowance is increased to $250,000 (up from $125,000) and the phase out begins at $800,000 (up
from $500,000). The 50 percent first year depreciation allowance applies to property acquired
after 2007 and placed in service before 2009. Under the revenue procedure, a partnership with a
tax year beginning in 2008 and ending in 2009 is subject to the $125,000 § 179 limit for property
placed in service during that taxable year. A calendar year partner or S corporation shareholder
is subject to the $250,000 limit for property placed in service by the partner or shareholder
during 2008, plus the partner or shareholder's allocable share of partnership or S corporation
§ 179 deductions for the partnership or S corporation year ending in 2008.
2.
Rev. Proc. 2008-22, 2008-12 I.R.B. 658 (3/13/08). For cars subject to the
limitations of § 280F placed in service in 2008, to which the 50-percent additional first year
depreciation does not apply, the limit is $2,960 for the first year, $4,800 for the second year,
$2,850 for the third year, and $1,775 for each succeeding year; for trucks and vans placed in
service in 2008 the limit is $3,160 for the first year, $5,100 for the second year, $3,050 for the
third year, and $1,875 for each succeeding year; for cars placed in service in 2008, to which the
50-percent additional first year depreciation applies, the limit is $10,960 for the first year, $4,800
for the second year, $2,850 for the third year, and $1,775 for each succeeding year; for trucks
and vans placed in service in 2008, to which 50-percent additional first year depreciation applies,
the limit is $11,160 for the first year, $5,100 for the second year, $3,050 for the third year, and
$1,875 for each succeeding year.
3.
The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, P.L. 110-185, reinstated the first
year 50 percent depreciation allowance of § 168(k) for property placed in service in 2008.
a.
The IRS says that the old regulations still apply. I.R. 2008-58
(4/11/08). The IRS has indicated that Reg. § 1.168(k)-1, promulgated under the earlier provision,
will apply to bonus depreciation claimed for 2008. The IRS promises new guidance regarding

additional issues raised under the current provision and covering increased first year deductions
under § 179 (watch for the 2009 version of this outline).
4.
Automatic deemed election for fifteen-year amortization of start-up
expenditures. T.D. 9411, Elections Regarding Start-up Expenditures, Corporation
Organizational Expenditures, and Partnership Organizational Expenses, 73 F.R. 38910 (7/08/08).
The Treasury has promulgated Temporary Regulations regarding elections to amortize start up
expenditures under § 195, corporate organizational expenses under § 248, and partnership
organizational expenses under § 709. The Temporary Regulations reflect changes in the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 increasing the amortization period from 60 months to 15
years. In addition, under Temp. Reg. § 1.195-iT, a taxpayer is deemed to have elected to
amortize start-up expenditures for the taxable year in which the active trade or business to which
the expenditures relate begins, but may forgo the deemed election "by clearly electing to
capitalize its start-up expenditures on a timely filed Federal income tax return (including
extensions) for the taxable year in which the active trade or business to which the expenditures
relate begins." Either way, the election is irrevocable and applies to all start-up expenditures
related to the active trade or business. A change in the characterization of an item as a start-up
expenditure is a change in an accounting method, subject to § 446 consent of the IRS and § 481
adjustments, if the taxpayer treated the item consistently for two or more taxable years. Similar
rules apply to corporate and partnership organizational expenses. Temp. Regs. §§ 1.248-IT,
1.709-iT. The Temporary Regulations apply to expenditures paid or incurred after 9/8/2008, but
taxpayers may apply the rules to expenses paid or incurred after 10/22/04 if statute of limitations
expired for year for which election is deemed made.
5.
Folks in the Bluegrass region of the heartland like this provision. The
Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008 provides that for 2009 through
2013, a three-year § 168 cost recovery period applies to a race horse that is two years old or
younger at the time that it is placed in service.
6.
Stimulating deductions. Rev. Proc. 2008-54, 2008-38 I.R.B. 722
(8/29/08). This revenue procedure provides guidance regarding amendments in the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008 to § 168(k) allowing a 50-percent additional first year depreciation for
certain new property acquired and placed in service during 2008 and to § 179 increasing the
dollar limitations for expensing depreciable property for taxable years beginning in 2008.
Specifically, the revenue procedure clarifies:
(1) How the Stimulus § 179 deduction interacts with the increased § 179 amounts provided under
§1400N(e) for certain § 179 GO Zone property.
(2) How the Stimulus additional first year depreciation deduction interacts with the GO Zone
additional first year depreciation deduction for GO Zone property.
(3) How the Stimulus § 179 deduction interacts with the increased §179 amounts applicable to the
Kansas disaster area.
(4) How the Stimulus additional first year depreciation deduction interacts with the 50-percent
additional first year depreciation deduction applicable to the Kansas disaster area.
The IRS and the Treasury Department also intend to amend Reg. §1.179-5(c)
to permit taxpayers to make a § 179 election without IRS consent on an amended return for taxable
years beginning after 2007.
7.
Farm machinery is treated as five-year recovery property. Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 505(a), amending § 168(e)(3)(B). Farm machinery,
the original use of which commences with the taxpayer, and which is placed in service in 2009,
is treated as five-year recovery property for MACRS. The provision does not apply to a grain

bin, ginning equipment, fences or other land improvements.
a.
And something for the race fans. Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 317, extends seven-year recovery for motorsports facilities
defined in § 168(i)(15) to property placed in service in 2009.
b.
And for the film lovers. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008, Act § 502(b), extends the expensing option of § 181 for qualified film and television
production to costs incurred in production commencing before January 1, 2010. In the case of
production costs exceeding $15 million ($20 million for production in low income communities
or in areas of distress [will this result in more episodes of The Wire]), the first $15 million (or
$20 million) of production costs may be expensed.
8.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 305(a),
amending § 168(e)(3)(E), extends fifteen-year amortization for qualified leasehold improvement
property (improvements constituting § 1250 property made more than three years after a
nonresidential building is placed in service) and qualified restaurant property (more than 50% of
square footage devoted to food preparation and seating) placed in service before January 1, 2010.
9.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Division B, § 308, adds
§ 168(m) to provide a 50 percent first year depreciation allowance of the adjusted basis of
qualified reuse and recycling property acquired after August 31, 2008, which is reuse and
recycling property with at least a five year useful life the original use of which commences with
the taxpayer. The allowance is available under the AMT.
10.
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through
2009 § 179E permits, which allows a taxpayer to elect to treat 50 percent of the cost of any
"qualified advanced mine safety equipment" as a current expense.
F.
Credits
1.
This telephone booth does not shelter income. Sita v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-363 (12/10/07). This is another Alpha Telcom telephone equipment
investment shelter where the taxpayer claimed depreciation deductions and disabled access
credits under §44 on the purchase of seven pay phones for $5,000 each. See Arevalo v.
Commissioner, 469 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2006). The taxpayer was provided with legal title to pay
phones under an equipment purchase agreement that described telephone equipment but did not
identify the pay phones subject to the purchase or their locations. The agreement included a
service agreement under which Alpha Telcom selected the pay phone locations, installed and
serviced the phones, and collected the revenue. Alpha Telcom filed for bankruptcy in the year
the taxpayer purchased the phone equipment and was the subject of a civil action by the SEC for
selling unregistered securities. Judge Haines denied the taxpayer's claim for disabled access
credits because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that he maintained an eligible small business
that operated a place of public accommodation or were a common carrier of voice transmission
services. The court also denied depreciation deductions because the taxpayer did not obtain the
benefits and burdens of ownership with respect to the pay phones.
2.
T.D. 9401, Alternative Simplified Credit Under Section 41(c)(5), 73 FR
34185 (6/17/08). Treasury issued Temp. Reg. §§ 1.41-6T, -8T, and -9T, which contain rules for
calculating § 41 research credits under the alternative simplified research credit provided by
§ 41 (c)(5) enacted in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. Although the research credit
expired after 2007, if past history is any indication of future behavior, Congress will re-extend
the credit - in all likelihood retroactively. The 2006 Act added a third, "simplified", method for
calculating the credit. Under § 41(c)(5) the credit may be determined as equal to 12 percent of

qualified research expenditures as exceeds 50 percent of the average qualified research
expenditures for the previous three years, or 6 percent of qualified research expenditures if the
taxpayer does not have qualified research expenditures in each of the previous three years.
3.
The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3081, provides for an
increase in available § 38 credits for increased research activity in lieu of the § 168(k) 50 percent
first year allowance. For property placed in service after March 31, 2008, a corporation may
elect to forego the additional deduction under § 168(k) and increase the research credit or
minimum tax credit limitation of §§ 38(c) and 53(c) (AMT credits are limited to the excess of
regular tax over tentative tax) by 20 percent of the bonus depreciation amount. The increase in
credits may provide refundable credits against regular tax liability. For eligible property the
bonus depreciation amount is the amount of increased depreciation deductions available under
§ 168(k). The bonus depreciation amount is limited to the lesser of $30 million or six percent of
the sum of research credit carryforwards from years beginning after January 1, 2006 and
minimum tax credits attributable to adjusted minimum tax for years after January 1, 2006.
Depreciation for eligible property for both regular tax and AMT purposes is computed under the
straight line method. This provision is included in a section of the act entitled "Revenue
Provisions."
a.
Corporate taxpayers need spreadsheet net present value
analysis to figure out this election. The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3081,
provides for an increase in available § 38 credits for increased research activity in lieu of the
§ 168(k) 50 percent first year allowance for property placed in service in 2008. [See, II.E.3.,
above.] For property placed in service after March 31, 2008, a corporation may elect to forego
the additional deduction under § 168(k) and increase the research credit or minimum tax credit
limitation of §§ 38(c) and 53(c) (AMT credits are limited to the excess of regular tax over
tentative tax) by 20 percent of the bonus depreciation amount. The increase in credits may
provide refundable credits against regular tax liability. For eligible property the bonus
depreciation amount is the amount of increased depreciation deductions available under §168(k).
The bonus depreciation amount is limited to the lesser of $30 million or six percent of the sum of
research credit carryforwards from years beginning after January 1, 2006 and minimum tax
credits attributable to adjusted minimum tax for years after January 1, 2006. Depreciation for
eligible property for both regular tax and AMT purposes is computed under the straight line
method. This provision is included in a section of the act entitled "Revenue Provisions."
0
This amendment allows corporate (but not individual)
taxpayers to elect to accelerate the AMT credit and the research credit in lieu of claiming bonus
depreciation.
b.
Jesus Chrysler? And the Pork takes a drive in a new car powered by corn. The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3081, also provides that "an
applicable partnership" may elect to be treated as making a deemed tax payment in the amount
of the least of (1) the bonus depreciation that would be allowed if an election were in effect for
the partnership, (2) the amount of the partnership's research credit for the year, or (3) $30
million (reduced by any deemed payment for a prior taxable year). An applicable partnership is
"a domestic partnership that was formed on August 3, 2007, and will produce in excess of
675,000 automobiles during the period beginning on January 1, 2008, and ending on June 30,
2008." There must be a lot of qualified partnerships out there. 0
4.
The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3022(b), provides that for
housing placed in service after 12/31/07, the low-income housing tax credit of § 42 and the

rehabilitation credit of § 47 will offset alternative minimum tax liability. Before the amendment,
these credits were included along with general business credits were limited to an amount not in
excess of the taxpayer's regular tax liability over the tentative minimum tax. Sections
38(b)(4)(B)(ii) and (v) are amended to treat the tentative minimum tax as zero for purposes of
determining the allowable low-income housing and rehabilitation credits.
5.
We guess that the intent of this one is to bring food prices down. The
Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008 reduces the § 40 alcohol fuels
credit amount for ethanol production from 51 cents per gallon to 45 cents per gallon for 2009 and
2010, subject to a delayed effective date if ethanol production and importation do not reach
7,500,000,000 in 2008.
6.
How many tax lawyers know what "lignocellulosic"
and
"hemicellulosic" matter are? Section 40(b)(6), added by the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and
Horticulture Act of 2008, adds the cellulosic biofuel producer credit as a new component of the
§40 alcohol fuels credit. Generally, the amount of the credit is $1.01 for each gallon of qualified
production after 12/31/08 and before 1/1/13. If a cellulosic biofuel is alcohol, the amount of the
credit is reduced by the amount of credit allowable under other parts of §40. Cellulosic biofuel is
liquid fuel which is derived from any renewable lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter;
examples of such matter include dedicated energy crops, wood, plants, grasses, animal wastes,
and municipal solid waste.
7.
Helping reservists by helping their employers. Why not just have
Uncle Sam increase their pay while on active duty? Section 45P, added as part of the general
business credit by the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, creates a new
credit for a "small business employer" (defined as an employer with an average of less than 50
employees on business days during the year) that pursuant to a written plan provides "eligible
differential wage payments" to every "qualified employee" (defined as a person who has been
employed by the taxpayer for the 91-day period immediately preceding the period for which the
differential wage payment is made). "Differential wage payments" are defined (by crossreference to § 3401(h)(2)) as payments made while a qualified employee of the employer is on
active duty with the United States military for a period of more than 30 days, which represent all
or some of the wages that the employee would have received from the employer if the employee
were performing services for the employer. Credit-eligible differential wage payments are
limited to $20,000 per employee per year. The credit amount is 20 percent of credit-eligible
payments. Section 280C(a) provides that the employer is not entitled to a business expense
deduction for the portion of its wage expense that is equal to the amount of its credit under §45P.
The credit is not available with respect to payments made after 12/31/09.
8.
The tax Code is enlisted to fight terrorists trying to make fertilizer
bombs. Section 450, added as part of the general business credit by the Heartland, Habitat,
Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008, provides a credit equal to 30 percent of "qualified
chemical security expenditures" (including expenditures on employee security training, and on a
wide range of security devices) incurred by an "eligible agricultural business." The amount of
the credit (not the amount of credit-eligible expenditures) with respect to any one facility is
limited to $100,000 (with the ceiling reduced by the total amount of credits allowed with respect
to that facility over the five preceding years), and the total annual credit per taxpayer per year
(again, not total credit-eligible expenditures) is limited to $2,000,000. "Eligible agricultural
businesses" are those that sell pesticides or certain fertilizers at retail to farmers and ranchers,
and those which manufacture, formulate, distribute or aerially apply pesticides or certain

fertilizers. The taxpayer's deductible business expense must be reduced by the amount of the
credit claimed under §450. The credit is not available with respect to expenditures paid or
incurred after 12/31/12.
9.
Credits for saving the spotted owl, or is it to increase the amount of
timber that the Forest Service can sell off at bargain prices? Sections 54A and 54B, added by
the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008, create a credit for holders of
qualified forestry conservation bonds (QFCBs). A QFCB is a bond issued by a State or a
§501(c)(3) organization to finance a "qualified forestry conservation project" (which is defined
as the acquisition of land adjacent to United States Forest Service land, subject to the
requirement that at least half of the acquired land must be transferred to the Forest Service at no
net cost, and several other requirements). The national limitation on QFCBs is $500 million,
with allocations among qualified projects to be determined by the Treasury Department. All the
available project proceeds of a QFCB must be used within the three-year period beginning on the
date of issuance, except that unspent proceeds may be used within 90 days from the end of the
three-year period to redeem bonds. The holder of a QFCB is entitled to a credit determined by
multiplying the face amount of the holder's bond by the credit rate of the bond, with the credit
rate having been determined by the Treasury Department at issuance; the credit rate is to be the
rate necessary to permit the issuance of QFCBs without discount and without interest cost to the
issuer. A recipient of the credit must include the amount of the credit in gross income as interest.
10.
The low-income housing credit gets better temporarily. The Housing
Assistance Tax Act of 2008 made numerous changes in the low-income housing credit. (1) To
qualify for the 70-percent credit base [new housing that is not federally subsidized],
rehabilitation expenditures must equal or exceed the greater of (1) 20 percent of the adjusted
basis of the building being rehabilitated, or (2) $6,000 (indexed for post-2008 inflation) per lowincome unit in the building being rehabilitated. (2) The 70-percent credit increases to a 91percent credit base, and the 30-percent credit base [housing that is either existing or federally
subsidized] increases to a 39-percent credit base, in the case of buildings (a) located in specified
types of high-cost areas, and (b) designated by a State Housing credit agency as requiring the
larger credit in order to be financially feasible. (3) For buildings placed in service after 7/30/08,
neither (a) direct or indirect federal loans bearing interest rates below the AFR, nor (b) certain
assistance provided under the HOME Investment Partnerships Act or the Native American
Housing Assistance and Self Determination Act of 1996, are treated as federal subsidies that
reduce the credit from 70 percent to 30 percent; tax exemption of bond interest under § 103
continues to reduce the credit percentage. (4) For non-federally subsidized buildings placed in
service after 7/30/08 and before 12/31/13, the actual credit percentage will not be less than 9
percent. (5) The annual per-resident credit allocated to each state housing credit agency is
temporarily increased to $2.20 for calendar years 2008 and 2009. (6) The election post a bond to
avoid recapture has been replaced by an extension of the statute of limitations until three years
after the taxpayer notifies the IRS of any noncompliance with the low-income housing credit
rules resulting from a disposition.
11.
Notice 2008-68, 2008-34 I.R.B. 418 (8/21/08). The notice provides
guidance on the fuel cell credit and microturbine credit. The notice covers technical requirements
for claiming the credit computation issues, and extension of the credit to a lessor.
12.
T.D. 9401, Alternative Simplified Credit Under Section 41(c)(5), 73 FR
34185 (6/17/08). Treasury issued Temp. Reg. §§ 1.41-6T, -8T, and -9T, which contain rules for
calculating § 41 research credits under the alternative simplified research credit provided by

§ 41(c)(5) enacted in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. Although the research credit
expired after 2007, if past history is any indication of future behavior, Congress will re-extend
the credit - in all likelihood retroactively. The 2006 Act added a third, "simplified", method for
calculating the credit. Under § 41(c)(5) the credit may be determined as equal to 12 percent of
qualified research expenditures as exceeds 50 percent of the average qualified research
expenditures for the previous three years, or 6 percent of qualified research expenditures if the
taxpayer does not have qualified research expenditures in each of the previous three years.
13.
The "temporary" research credit that never sunsets is extended again.
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, [Division C] § 301, extended the § 41
credit for increased research activities for amounts paid or incurred through December 31, 2009.
The Act also increased the § 41(c)(5) alternative simplified credit to 14 percent for years ending
after December 31, 2008, and amended § 41(c) to provide that the an election to claim the
§ 41(c)(4) alternative incremental credit shall not apply to years beginning after December 31,
2008.
14.
Indian credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
the § 45A Indian Employment Credit for taxable years beginning
§
314,
extended
[Division C],
on or before December 31, 2009.
is.
Marketing credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
extended the § 45D New Markets Tax Credit through 2009, permitting up to 3.5 billion in
qualified equity investments for that calendar year.
16.
Schoolhouse credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 provides that the § 1397E Qualified Zone Academy Bond Credit does not apply to any
bond issued after October 3, 2008, but added new § 54E, which provides a virtually identical
credit for, and authorizes issuance of, up to $400 million of new qualified zone academy bonds
issued after October 3, 2008 and before 2010.
Katrina Employee credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
17.
of 2008 extended the Work Opportunity Credit through Aug. 28, 2009 for certain employees
hired in the core disaster area of Hurricane Katrina. The credit for Katrina employees hired to a
new place of employment outside of the core disaster area was not extended.
18.
Historic New Orleans credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 extended §1400N(h) through December 31, 2009. Section 1400N(h), was added by
the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, to increase the 10 percent credit § 47 rehabilitation to 13
percent, and the 20 percent credit to 26 percent, for qualified expenditures incurred on or after
August 28, 2005, and before January 1, 2009, with respect to structures and buildings located
within the Katrina-related Gulf Opportunity Zone.
19.
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division C]
contains other credit provisions:
Section 302, extends the § 45D credit for equity investment in
a.
qualified active low-income community business.
Section 316, extends the Railroad Track Maintenance Credit of
b.
§ 45G to expenditures made in 2009 and allows the credit for AMT purposes.
c.
Section 320 extends the rehabilitation credit through 2009.
G.
Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
Safer mines credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
1.
2008, Act § 310, extended through 2009 the $10,000 § 45N credit for expenses incurred in
training "qualified mine rescue team employees."

2.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 311, extends the
§ 179E 50 percent expensing provision for mine safety equipment to include equipment place in
service before January 1, 2010.
H.
Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs
1.
A sale and purchase can constitute a wash sale even if the ownership
of the stock and securities involved in one of the two legs of the transaction is indirect, as
long as the taxpayer is the beneficial owner of the stock or securities involved in both legs
of the transaction. Rev. Rul. 2008-5, 2008-3 I.R.B. 271 (12/20/07). This ruling held that if a
taxpayer realizes a loss on the sale of stock or securities and causes his or her IRA or Roth IRA
to purchase substantially identical stock or securities within the period beginning 30 days before
the date of the sale and ending 30 days after that date, the loss on the sale of the stock or
securities is disallowed under § 1091. Pursuant to § 1091(d), the individual's basis in the IRA or
Roth IRA is not increased. The ruling relies on Security FirstNational Bank v. Commissioner,
28 B.T.A. 289 (1933), as authority that a stock repurchase through a trust controlled by the
taxpayer is subject to the loss limitation rule of § 1091.
2.
Bynum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-14 (1/28/08). The Tax Court
(Judge Foley) held that cash payments by an individual for start-up expenses and routine
business expenses of his controlled corporation were capital contributions and not deductible as
business bad debts. The taxpayer had no debtor-creditor relationship with his incorporated
businesses and there was no enforceable obligation of the corporations to make fixed payments
of principal or interest.
3.
Proposed regulations that threatened the ordinary loss treatment of
bank loans are withdrawn. REG-109367-06. Section 1221(a)(4) Capital Asset Exclusion for
Accounts and Notes Receivable (4/22/08). Prop. Reg. § 1.1221-1 (e) (2006) would have provided
that notes or receivables would be treated as capital assets outside of the § 1224(a)(4) exclusion
if the notes were acquired for more than a de minimis consideration in addition to services or
inventory property. Commentators raised concern with respect the ordinary loss treatment of
devalued notes issued for mortgage loans, contrary to the position in cases such as Burbank
Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 999 (1963), acq. sub nom. United Assocs., Inc.,
1965-1 C.B. 3, aff'd in part and rev'd in parton other grounds, 335 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1964). In
withdrawing the proposed regulations the IRS announced that it would not challenge reporting
positions consistent with existing case law treating bank loans as ordinary loss assets.
4.
When Congress gives the IRS authority to promulgate procedures,
the deadlines stick. Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d
2008-1697 (9th Cir. 4/10/08). The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, enacted on
3/9/02, amended § 172 to allow a five year carryback of net operating losses for 2001 and 2002
tax years. The Act authorized the IRS to prescribe procedures to claim adjustments with respect
to returns filed for 2001. In Rev. Proc. 2002-40, 2002-1 C.B. 1096, the IRS provided that
taxpayers were required to change their 2001 reporting positions before 10/31/02. The court
denied the taxpayer's claim for refund based on amended returns filed on 1/7/03, attempting to
apply the 5-year carryback allowed in the 2002 Act rather than the 2-year carryback of the
taxpayer's 2001 NOLs originally reported and allowed. The court held that the specific grant of
authority provided in § 172(j) authorized the revenue procedure, which was entitled to deference
under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).

5.
Duh! Stock that is still trading is not worthless yet. Rendall v.
F.3d
1221 (10th Cir. 8/5/08), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2006-174. The taxpayer lent
Commissioner, 535
$2 million to a publicly traded company that he had founded. The loan was secured by stock of
the company held by the lender, Merrill Lynch. The loan proceeds were used to partially fund
construction of a plant in Canada to extract crude oil from oil shale. In 1997 the corporation
declared bankruptcy in Canada and the United States. Merrill Lynch sold a portion of the
taxpayer's pledged stock to satisfy the debt. The company arranged to sell most of its assets, but
retained rights to certain of its patented technologies. At the close of the 1997 tax year the
company stock was traded over-the-counter for $3 per share. The court affirmed the Tax Court
holding denying a deduction in 1997 for worthless debt. The court agreed with the Tax Court's
conclusion that at the end of 1997 the taxpayer had not met the standard for treating the debt as
worthless, which it described as "fixed by identifiable events that form the basis of reasonable
grounds for abandoning any hope of recovery."
0
A debt owed to the taxpayer by a bankrupt corporation, that
possibly was insolvent and which had agreed to sell all of its operating assets, was not worthless
where the stock was still trading for $3 per share and the corporation still owned numerous
technologies, patents, office space, a research facility, and land and continued to employ a team of
engineers. "'Where a debtor company continues to operate as a going concern the courts have often
concluded that its debts are not worthless for tax purposes despite the fact that it is technically
insolvent."' (quoting Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner,620 F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir. 1980)).
0
The court also rejected the taxpayer's claim that it realized no
gain on the disposition of its pledged stock. The taxpayer argued that Merrill Lynch sold the stock
without permission and that any income should be taxed to Merrill Lynch which obtained the stock
by theft. The court also upheld the Tax Court's allocation of basis to the sold shares on a FIFO basis.
6.
Ordinary gain and loss on sale of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Preferred Stock. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 301, contains an
off-code provision allows an applicable financial institution to treat losses on the sale of Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac preferred stock held on September 6, 2008, as ordinary losses. The EESA
allows the Secretary to treat transferred basis stock as held on the requisite date. Applicable
financial institutions are defined in § 582(c)(2) and include banks, savings banks, a small
business investment company, and a business development corporation. The EESA also allows
depository institutions to treat losses as ordinary.
I.
At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1.
Seeing through entity boundaries, an equipment leasing LLC is
treated as part of the same economic unit as a radiological services limited partnership.
Candelaria v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 2d 852 (W.D. Tex. 10/5/07). Reg. § 1.469-4(c)(2)
provides activities that constitute an appropriate economic unit may be treated as a single
activity under the facts and circumstances. Reg. § 1.469-4(d) provides that a rental activity may
not be grouped with a trade or business unless either the rental activity or the trade or business is
insubstantial in relation to the other. The taxpayer was a principal in an LLC formed to lease
imaging equipment to a related limited partnership that provided radiological services. The
ownership of the two entities was not identical, but the owners of the LLC owned identical
interests in the general partner of the limited partnership. The gross receipts of the leasing LLC,
which only leased equipment to the limited partnership, was between three and eleven percent
(depending on the taxpayer's or the IRS' position) of the combined gross receipts of the two
entities. The District Court granted summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that the two

entities constituted a single economic unit under the regulation's facts and circumstances test,
and that the activities of the leasing LLC were insubstantial next to the trade or business income
of the limited partnership. The taxpayer was permitted to treat losses from the leasing company
as active business losses.
2.
This deficit restoration obligation was not at-risk. Hubert Enterprises v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-46 (2/28/08), on remand from 230 Fed. Appx. 526 (6th Cir.
4/27/07). The taxpayer held 99 of 100 units of a Wyoming LLC that purchased equipment
financed with recourse debt. The taxpayer amended the LLC agreement to provide a requirement
for restoration of a deficit capital account on liquidation of the LLC in order to pay creditors and
restore the positive balance of a member's capital account. Relying on the ultimate liability
standard of Emershaw v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1991), the Tax Court (Judge
Laro) held that the taxpayer had no personal liability because repayment of any deficit was
contingent on liquidation of the LLC and no creditor had a right to force a liquidation under state
law.
3.
Due process does not protect this tax attorney's pre-1986 real estate
investments from the passive activity loss rules. Ziegler v. Commissioner 101 A.F.T.R.2d
2008-2711 (2d Cir. 6/26/08). The Second Circuit, in a summary opinion, affirmed the Tax
Court's decision (T.C. Memo. 2007-166 (6/27/07)), rejecting Stephen Ziegler's argument that
application of the passive activity loss rules to investment real estate purchased in 1984, two
years before the effective date of § 469, was a retroactive application of the law constituting a
taking under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Tax Court had observed that
tax legislation is not a promise and that the taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue
Code. The Circuit Court added that application of § 469 is not an unconstitutional taking under
the Fifth Amendment because the taxpayer did not have a property right to the tax benefits
affected by enactment of § 469.
4.
Let's consider changing the requirements for grouping activities
under § 469. Notice 2008-64, 2008-31 I.R.B. 268 (8/4/08). Reg. § 1.469-4(c)(1) provides rules
for grouping trade or business activities and rental activities into a single activity for purposes of
applying the passive activity loss limitations of § 469. Grouping several activities into a single
activity might be an advantage if the taxpayer can establish him or herself as a material
participant in the group of activities. On the other hand, since disposition of an activity permits
deduction of unused losses from the activity, a large grouping may be disadvantageous. The IRS
is seeking comments on a proposal to require taxpayers to provide a written statement indicating
whether one or more trade or business activities are grouped as a single activity or as separate
activities. The statement would be required to be filed with a return for the first taxable year in
which a grouping is made, in any year the taxpayer adds new activities to a grouping, whenever
a taxpayer disposes of an activity from an existing grouping, or when it is determined that
existing groupings are inappropriate under the regulations. Statements would be required to be
filed only in years when there are changes in a taxpayer's grouping of activities. Failure to file
the required statements would cause each of the taxpayer's activities to be treated as a separate
activity. Comments are requested by 11/4/08. The proposal would be effective on the date that
final guidance is published.
5.
A closing agreement does not override the passive activity loss rules.
Shelton v. United States, 102 AFTR2d 2008(Fed. Cl. 9/23/08). The taxpayers entered into
a closing agreement in a partnership audit that provided that, "Any losses disallowed under this
agreement are suspended under I.R.C. § 465. Such suspended losses may be used to offset the

taxpayers' pro rata share of any income earned by the partnership and/or other income in
accordance with the operation of I.R.C. § 465." The taxpayer asserted that the closing agreement
allowed deduction of suspended loss in a year that at-risk amounts are increased, regardless of
the passive activity loss limitation of § 469. The Claims Court (Judge Miller) held on summary
judgment that § 469 always applies after the limitation of § 465 is overcome and that any
absence of a reference to § 469 in the closing agreement does not eliminate its application.
III.

INVESTMENT GAIN
A.
Capital Gain and Loss
I.
The ever-expanding deemed sale or exchange concept limits ordinary
loss deductions. REG-101001-05, Abandonment of Stock and Other Securities, 72 F.R. 41468
(7/30/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.165-5(i) would provide that a security that has been abandoned is
treated as a wholly worthless security. To abandon a security, a taxpayer must permanently
surrender and relinquish all rights in the security and receive no consideration in exchange for it.
Thus, if the abandoned security (other than a security in an affiliated corporation subject to
§ 165(g)(3)) is a capital asset, the resulting loss is a capital loss incurred on the last day of the
taxable year. All the facts and circumstances determine whether the transaction is properly
characterized as an abandonment or other type of transaction, such as an actual sale or exchange,
contribution to capital, dividend, or gift. These proposed regulations will be effective after the
date of publication of final regulations.
a.
Finalized in the blink of an eye. T.D. 9386, Abandonment of
Stock or Other Securities, 73 F.R. 13124 (3/12/08). The proposed regulations were adopted as
final regulations, without change, and are effective for any abandonment of stock or other
securities after 3/12/08.
Lottery players continue to exhibit unbridled optimism in face of
2.
persistent losses. Womack v. Commissioner, 510 F.3d 1295 (1 1th Cir. 12/19/07). Yet another
Court of Appeals has joined the uniform parade of Courts of Appeals holding that proceeds from
the sale of rights to payments from a winning state lottery produce ordinary income, not capital
gain. Judge Martin wrote that "Lottery Rights are a clear case of a substitute for ordinary
income." The court further concluded that "Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212
(1988), did not circumscribe the substitute for ordinary income doctrine."
3.
Despite repeated tries, insurance agency termination payments
continue to be denied capital gains treatment. Trantina v. United States. 512 F.3d 567 (9th
Cir. 1/9/08). The taxpayer was a State Farm insurance agent, who sold policies exclusively for
State Farm as an independent contractor, operating his own agency, developing clients, hiring
employees, and paying expenses. Upon retirement, the taxpayer returned all of State Farm's
property to it, but transferred no identifiable assets of his own, and he received a "termination
payment." The insurance policies he had written were assigned to a successor agent. The
taxpayer argued that he realized a capital gain on the transfer to State Farm of his insurance
agency agreement [the 'Corporate Agreement"]. The Ninth Circuit (Judge Bybee) denied the
taxpayer capital gain treatment with respect to the termination payment. He transferred no assets
that owned.
A precondition to realizing a long-term capital gain is the ownership of a capital
asset. Yet under the express terms of Trantina's Corporate Agreement with State
Farm, Trantina simply had no property that could be sold or exchanged. ... To
quote the district court, '[t]he suggestion that the Corporate Agreement is itself an
asset, when it declares that all assets pertaining to Plaintiffs' insurance agency

belong to State Farm, is paradoxical.' Trantina, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. It is
likewise paradoxical to suggest that the Corporate Agreement was an asset when
the agreement itself stated that it could not be sold or otherwise exchanged....
Instead, the better view of the termination payments is that they were made
pursuant to, not in exchange for, the Corporate Agreement.
The entire termination payment was ordinary income. The facts and analysis were substantially
similar to those in Baker v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2003).
4.
The Tax Court makes it a little bit more difficult to claim that it's
shareholder goodwill, not corporate goodwill, that was sold. Solomon v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2008-102 (4/16/08). A corporation (Solomon Colors), of which the taxpayers (father and
son) were dominant shareholders, sold one of its lines of business to a competitor. In connection
with the sale, the shareholder-employees entered into covenants not to compete. Conflicting
provisions in the documentation of the transaction variously described certain payments received
by the shareholders as consideration for their ownership interest in the customer list for the line
or business and as consideration for their entering into covenants not to compete. The court
(Judge Laro) rejected the IRS's argument that the corporation had distributed an undivided
interest in the customer list the shareholders as a dividend immediately prior to the sale (which
would have resulted in corporate level gain under § 311 (a) as well as dividend income - then
taxable at ordinary income rates - to the shareholders. He also rejected the taxpayer's argument
that, like in Martin Ice Cream Co: v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189 (1998), the payments were
consideration for the sale of goodwill owned by the shareholders (which would have been taxed
as capital gains). Martin Ice Cream was distinguished because the court found that the value of
Solomon Colors was not attributable to the quality of service and customer relationships
developed by the shareholders. Because the corporation's business was processing,
manufacturing, and sale of a product, rather than the provision of services, it did not depend
entirely on the goodwill of its employee-shareholders for its success. Furthermore, unlike in
Martin Ice Cream, the shareholders in Solomon were not named as the sellers of any asset but
were included in the sale in their individual capacities solely to effect the covenants not to
compete. Finally, that the shareholders were not required to enter into employment or consulting
agreements made it unlikely that the buyer was purchasing their personal goodwill. Accordingly,
Judge Laro found the payments to be entirely consideration for the shareholders' covenants not
to compete.
5.
Ar"Well, there's thirteen hundred and fifty two guitar pickers in
Nashville."rJX T.D. 9379, Time and Manner for Electing Capital Asset Treatment for Certain
Self-Created Musical Works, 73 F.R. 7464 (2/28/08); REG-153589-06, Time and Manner for
Electing Capital Asset Treatment for Certain Self-Created Musical Works, 73 F.R. 7503
(2/28/08). Temp. Reg. § 1.1221-3T provides procedures regarding time and manner for making
an election to treat the sale or exchange of a musical composition or copyright in a musical work
created by the taxpayer (or received by the taxpayer from the work's' creator in a transferred
basis transaction) as the sale or exchange of a capital asset pursuant to § 122 1(b)(3). The election
must be made on the tax return file on or before the due date (including extensions) of the return
for the taxable year of the sale or exchange. An election is revocable with the IRS's consent.
6.
You have to tell the creditor who holds pledged stock to sell the highbasis stock first. Rendall v. Commissioner, 535 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 8/5/08). The debtor
taxpayer recognized gain upon a sale by a creditor of stock he taxpayer had pledged to secure the
debt. The IRS properly applied the FIFO principle in Reg. § 1.1012-1(c)(2) to determine the

taxpayer's gain upon the sale by the creditor of only a portion of the stock the taxpayer had
pledged to secure the debt, because no designation had been made as required to identify another
block as the stock that was sold.
7.
New rules for determining basis in securities. Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], Act § 403, amends § 1012 to create new rules for
determining the basis of securities acquired after December 31, 2010. The FIFO or other
conventions for determining the basis of securities when sold must be applied on an account-byaccount basis. Thus, with respect to a taxpayer who holds the same stock in more than one
account, determining the basis of sold securities from any account will be determined from the
basis of securities in that account. In addition, § 1012(d) provides for averaging the basis of
stock acquired in a dividend reinvestment plan. Stock in a dividend reinvestment plan is treated
as held in a separate account for purposes of determining basis.
a.
No more fooling the IRS about basis. Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], § 403, adding § 6045(g), requires brokers to report the
customer's basis in a "covered security" and whether gain or loss is long-term or short-term, in
addition to the existing requirement that the broker report gross sales proceeds. In general, the
customer's basis is to be reported on a first-in first-out method, unless an average basis method
is permissible (stock acquired in a reorganization where basis can't be identified). Covered
securities include securities acquired through an account with the broker or transferred to the
broker from another account on or after an applicable date. The applicable date for stocks is
January 1, 2011, for stocks under the average basis method, January 1, 2012, and of any other
security, January 1, 2013 or such later date as specified by the Secretary. Under § 6045A, a
taxpayer transferring securities to a broker will be required to report information required by
regulations necessary to permit the broker to meet its reporting requirements. Section 6045B
requires the issuer of any security to report information describing any organizational action that
affects the basis of the security.
B.
Interest
C.
Section 121
1.
An FLP turns on the taxpayer and bites for income tax purposes.
Farah v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-369 (12/19/07). The sale of a vacant parcel of land
adjacent to the taxpayer's principal residence can qualify for the § 121 exclusion if (1) the
taxpayer owned and used the vacant land as part of his principal residence; (2) the taxpayer sells
the principal residence within two years before or 2 years after the sale of the vacant land; and
(3) the requirements of § 121 have otherwise been met. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(3)(i). In this case,
however, Judge Haines held that the sale of a vacant parcel adjacent to the taxpayers' principal
residence and used as part of the yard of the principal residence did not qualify because the
adjacent parcel was owned by a family limited partnership that included taxpayers' children. As
for the sale of the dwelling unit, after exhaustive consideration of all of the facts and
circumstances, Judge Haines found that the residence sold was indeed the taxpayers' principal
residence even though it was a residence other than the one the address of which was used on the
taxpayers' tax returns, driver's licenses, vehicle registrations and voter registrations, and at
which they regularly received mail.
2.
More tax breaks for exiting home ownership. The Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 amended § 121 to extend the $500,000 ceiling for
excludable gain on the sale of a principal residence to a sale by an unmarried surviving spouse, if
the sale occurs not later than two years after the death of the deceased spouse, and the surviving

spouse and the deceased spouse would have qualified for the $500,000 ceiling immediately
before the death of the deceased spouse. For all taxpayers other than married couples filing joint
returns and qualifying surviving spouses, the ceiling on excludable gain remains $250,000.
Note that if the house was community property or jointly0
owned, this provision allows "double-dipping" on the exclusion because there had been a basis stepup under § 1014 in whole or in part.
Here's a little tax-based financial help for the CIA that's not hidden
3.
as a $600 toilet seat. The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 modified
the two-out-of-five years principal residence rule in § 121 in several respects. First, with respect
to the § 121 (d)(9) suspension of the five year period for CIA and NSA personnel who are moved
to a new duty station, the requirement that the new duty station is outside the United States was
removed. Second the provision was made permanent. New § 121(d)(12) extends the benefit of
the suspension of the running of the five-year period to Peace Corps volunteers and to Peace
Corps employees on "qualified official extended duty."
Ouch, the Realtors® in vacation resort areas aren't going to like this
4new rule. Will the real estate lobby have enough clout to get it retroactively revoked? The
Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008 added § 121 (b)(4), which provides that gain on the sale of
a personal residence is not excluded from gross income to the extent the gain is allocated to
periods of "nonqualified use" of the residence. In general, periods of nonqualified use include
any periods in which the property is not used as the principal residence of the taxpayer or the
taxpayer's spouse or former spouse. There are exceptions: (1) use prior to 1/1/09 is not
unqualified use; (2) use after the last date that the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse used the
property as a principal residence is not unqualified use; (3) use while the taxpayer or the
taxpayer's spouse is serving (for up to an aggregate period of ten years) on qualified official
extended duty (as defined in § 121(d)(9) [military, CIA or NSA]) is not nonqualified use; (4) use
during any other period of temporary absence (for up to an aggregate period of two years) is not
nonqualified use, if the absence is due to change of employment, health conditions, or other
unforeseen circumstances specified by regulations.
The amount of gain not excluded by reason of § 121(b)(4) is
*
determined by allocating gain to periods of nonqualified use based on the ratio of aggregate periods
of nonqualified use to the total time the taxpayer owned the property. If any portion of a taxpayer's
gain on the sale of a principal residence is attributable to post-5/6/97 depreciation (and thus not
eligible for exclusion under § 121 by reason of § 121(d)(6)), that gain is not taken into account in
determining the allocation of gain to periods of nonqualified use.
RENTAL PROPERTY EXAMPLE: Suppose a taxpayer buys
•
a property on January 1, 2009, for $500,000, and uses it as a rental property for one year, claiming
$15,000 of depreciation deductions (reducing the property's basis to $485,000). On January 1, 2010,
the taxpayer converts the property to his personal residence. On January 1, 2013, the taxpayer ceases
to use the property as his personal residence. On January 1, 2014, the taxpayer sells the property for
$600,000. Pursuant to § 121(d)(6), the $15,000 of gain attributable to the depreciation deductions is
not excluded from gross income. The remaining $100,000 of gain is excluded, except to the extent it
is attributable to periods of nonqualified use. The year of rental use is a period of nonqualified use,
but the year after the taxpayer moves out is not. The one-year period of nonqualified use is twenty
percent of the taxpayer's five-year period of ownership, so twenty percent ($20,000) of the $100,000
is allocated to the period of nonqualified use and thus is not eligible for exclusion under § 121. The
other $80,000 is excluded from gross income.

0
VACATION HOME EXAMPLE: In addition to denying
nonrecognition to gain attributable to periods the residence was held for rental, § 121(b)(4) denies
the exclusion for gains attributable to the period the residence was a secondary residence of vacation
home. To illustrate, suppose a taxpayer again buys a property on January 1, 2009, for $500,000, and
uses it solely as a vacation home for 12 years. On January 1, 2021, the taxpayer converts the
property to his principal residence. On January 1, 2024, the taxpayer sells the property for $800,000.
The twelve years of vacation use is a period of nonqualified use that is eighty percent of the
taxpayer's fifteen-year period of ownership, so eighty percent ($240,000) of the $300,000 is
allocated to the period of nonqualified use and thus is not eligible for exclusion under § 121. The
other $60,000 is excluded from gross income.
D.
Section 1031
1.
Have you heard about how you can do § 1031 like-kind exchanges of
vacation homes? Don't drink that Kool-Aid! And renting it out for a few weeks just before
the exchange does not work. Moore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-134 (5/30/07). The
taxpayer exchanged land with a mobile home, which the taxpayer used as a vacation residence,
for another vacation property, and claimed the transaction qualified for nonrecognition under
§ 1031 because both vacation properties were acquired and held with the expectation that they
would appreciate and thus were "investment" property. The court (Judge Halpern) held that the
exchange did not qualify. The mere expectation that property will appreciate does not establish
investment intent if the taxpayer uses the property as a residence. There was no evidence that
taxpayer made either property available for rent or held either property primarily for sale at a
profit.
a.
The IRS provides a safe harbor for vacation home swappers,
but it is a small - very small - crack in the wall denying § 1031 nonrecognition to
exchanges of vacation homes. Rev. Proc. 2008-16, 2008-10 I.R.B. 547 (2/15/08). This revenue
procedure provides safe-harbor guidance regarding whether a residential property that the
taxpayer held or intends to hold for mixed uses, e.g., personal vacation use and rental /
investment purposes qualifies as property held for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment under § 1031. Under the revenue procedure, the relinquished property qualifies if: (1)
the property was owned by the taxpayer for at least 24 months immediately before the exchange,
and (2) within that period, in each of the two 12-month periods immediately preceding the
exchange, (a) the taxpayer rented the property to another person or persons at a fair rental for 14
days or more, and (b) the taxpayer's personal use of the property did not exceed the greater of 14
days or 10 percent of the number of days during each 12-month period that the dwelling unit was
rented at a fair rental. (For this purpose, the first 12-month period immediately preceding the
exchange ends on the day before the exchange takes place (and begins 12 months prior to that
day) and the second 12-month period ends on the day before the first 12-month period begins
(and begins 12 months prior to that day).) The replacement property qualifies if (1) the property
is owned by the taxpayer for at least 24 months immediately after the exchange, and within that
period, in each of the two 12-month periods immediately after the exchange (a) the taxpayer
rents the property to another person or persons at a fair rental for 14 days or more, and (b) the
taxpayer's personal use of the property does not exceed the greater of 14 days or 10 percent of
the number of days during each 12-month period that the property is rented at a fair rental. (For
this purpose, the first 12-month period immediately after the exchange begins on the day after
the exchange takes place and the second 12-month period begins on the day after the first 12month period ends.) Personal use of a dwelling unit occurs on any day on which a taxpayer is

deemed to have used the dwelling unit for personal purposes under § 280A(d)(2) (taking into
account § 280A(d)(3) but not § 280A(d)(4)).
2Clarifying the treatment of exchange accommodation loans. T.D.
9413, Escrow Accounts, Trusts, and Other Funds Used During Deferred Exchanges of Like-Kind
Property, 73 F.R. 39614 (7/10/08). The Treasury promulgated final regulations under § 468B
providing rules regarding the taxation of income earned on escrow accounts, trusts, and other
funds used during deferred like-kind exchanges of property and under § 7872 regarding belowmarket loans to facilitators of like-kind exchanges. The regulations affect taxpayers that engage
in deferred like-kind exchanges and escrow holders, trustees, qualified intermediaries, and others
that hold funds during deferred like-kind exchanges. Exchange funds generally are treated as
loaned by a taxpayer to the exchange facilitator, and the facilitator takes into account all items of
income, deduction, and credit with respect to the funds. There is an exception if the agreement
provides that earnings from the exchange funds are payable to the taxpayer. Special rules apply
when an intermediary commingles exchange funds with other funds. A loan to an exchange
facilitator is treated as a compensation-related demand loan under § 7872(c)(1)(B). The
regulations generally are effective 10/08/08.
3.
We didn't realize that the mutual ditch, reservoir, or irrigation
company lobby had this kind of clout! Section 1031(i), added by the Heartland, Habitat,

Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008, provides that the general disqualification under
§1031 (a)(2) of exchanges of stock does not apply with respect to certain shares in mutual ditch,
reservoir, or irrigation companies.
4.
Is it a reverse like-like exchange? Is it a deferred like-kind exchange?
It's both! ILM 200836024 (5/12/08). The IRS Chief Counsel's office concluded that a taxpayer
may engage in a "reverse" like-kind exchange under Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2002-2 C.B. 308, and a
deferred forward like-kind exchange described in Reg. § 1.1031(k)-i using the same
relinquished property in both exchanges. This is useful where the surrendered property is more
valuable than either replacement property.
E.
Section 1033
F.
Section 1035
1.
Rev. Proc. 2008-24, 2008-13 I.R.B. 684 (3/18/08) The direct transfer of a
portion of the cash surrender value of an existing annuity contract for a second annuity contract,
regardless of whether the two annuity contracts are issued by the same or different companies, is
a tax-free exchange under § 1035 if either (a) no amounts are withdrawn from, or received in
surrender of, either of the contracts involved in the exchange during the 12 months beginning on
the date on which amounts are treated as received as premiums or other consideration paid for
the contract received in the exchange (the date of the transfer); or (b) the taxpayer demonstrates
that one of the conditions described by § 72(q)(2)(A), (B), (C), (E), (F), (G), (H) or (J), or any
similar life event (such as divorce or loss of employment), occurred between the date of the
transfer, and the date of the withdrawal or surrender; a transfer that is not treated as a tax-free
exchange under § 1035 will be treated as a distribution, taxable under § 72(e), followed by a
payment for the second contract.
G.
Miscellaneous
1.
Tax protection for lenders to over-exuberant short-sellers. Rev. Proc.
2008-63, 2008-42 I.R.B. _ (9/26/08). Section 1058 provides nonrecognition to a person whose
stock or securities is lent to another person to effect a short sale of that stock or securities.
Technically, the transaction is a transfer of stock or securities in exchange for a contractual right

to receive back identical stock or securities, together with any dividends, interest, or other
payments receivable with respect to the stock or securities during the period between the initial
transfer and the transfer back or replacement securities, which otherwise is a realization and
recognition event. This revenue procedure provides that if a securities loan under § 1058 is
terminated because of the bankruptcy of the borrower or an affiliate and the lender applies the
collateral to the purchase of identical securities as soon as is commercially practicable (but in no
event more than 30 days following the default), the IRS will treat the purchase as an exchange to
which § 1058(a) applies.
COMPENSATION ISSUES
A.
Fringe Benefits
The cafeteria line is better for a military reservist who is called to
1.
active duty. Section 125(h), added by the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of
2008, provides an exception to the cafeteria plan requirement of forfeiture of unused benefits at
the year's end for a "qualified reservist distribution." A cafeteria plan or a health flexible
spending arrangement (FSA) is not disqualified if it permits a distribution to a participant of
some or all of his FSA balance if the participant is a military reservist who is called to active
duty for a period of at least 180 days (or for an indefinite period).
2.
Some transit systems need additional time to modify their technology
to "get smart." Notice 2008-74, 2008-38 I.R.B. _ (9/3/08). The IRS has delayed the effective
date of Revenue Ruling 2006-57, 2006-2 C.B. 911, which provides guidance to employers on the
use of smartcards, debit or credit cards, or other electronic media to provide qualified
transportation fringes under §§ 132(a)(5) and 132(f), from 1/1/09 (See Notice 2007-76, 2007-40
I.R.B. 735) until 1/1/10. "Nevertheless, employers and employees may rely on Revenue Ruling
2006-57 with respect to transactions occurring prior to January 1, 2010."
3.
Qualifying for disability insurance is not dispositive in determining
whether an individual is disabled for purposes of the 10-percent additional tax under
§ 72(t). Kowsh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-204 (9/28/08). The taxpayer took early
distributions from a qualified retirement account and did not file a tax return. He did not have an
easy life in the period leading up to the distributions. His wife died from cancer at age 53 in June
2001, leaving him to care for their two teenage children and her aged mother. He worked at
Deutsche Bank near the World Trade Center and lost a number of friends and neighbors in the
9/11 attacks, including several friends who had attended his wife's funeral. By February 2002,
his depression, and sleep apnea that caused him to have narcoleptic episodes, left him unable to
work. Although the taxpayer received both short-term and long-term disability payments from a
disability insurance policy with a private insurer, his doctor was unwilling to provide any
certification that he was disabled, and at trial he provided no evidence that he applied for or
received Social Security disability benefits. In addition, to finding him liable for the deficiency,
interest, and failure to file and failure to pay penalties, he was held to be liable for the § 72(t) 10percent additional tax for a premature distribution.
Qualified transportation includes bicycles. Emergency Economic
4.
Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], Act § 211, adds to the qualified transportation fringe
benefit excluded from income under § 132(f), a qualified bicycle commuting benefit. The
provision excludes from income an employer reimbursement during the 15 month period
beginning on the first day of the taxable year of up to $20 per month of bicycle commuting for
the purchase, improvements, repair and storage of a bicycle. A qualified bicycle commuting
month is any month during which an employee regularly uses the bicycle for a substantial
IV.

portion of travel between the employee's residence and work place and does not receive the
benefit of any other qualified transportation fringe benefit. The bicycle benefit is not subject to
the cash alternative escape from constructive receipt of § 132(0(4).
B.
Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1.
Beginning in 2008, 401(k) plans may contain an automatic
contribution feature. Pension Protection Act § 902 adds new Code § 401(k)(13) to permit
qualified automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, under which an employee is enrolled to make
elective contributions unless he or she affirmatively elects otherwise. This provision is effective
for plan years beginning after 12/31/07.
0
Note that employer match costs should be expected to
increase because participation can be expected to increase.
a.
Polly want a QACA? REG-133300-07, Automatic Contribution
Arrangements, 72 F.R. 63144 (11/8/07). The Treasury has published proposed regulations
relating to automatic contribution arrangements. These proposed regulations would amend Reg.
§ 1.401(k)-3 to provide a new design-based safe harbor for a qualified automatic contribution
arrangements ("QACA") under § 401 (k)(13).
2.
Notice 2007-94, 2007-51 I.R.B. 1179 (11/29/07). This notice publishes the
2007 cumulative list of changes in plan qualification requirements.
C.
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options
1.
Section 409A added a new layer of rules for nonqualified deferred
compensation. Section 885 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 added new § 409A,
which modifies the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation plans for amounts deferred
after 2004. Section 409A has changed the tax law governing nonqualified deferred compensation
by making it more difficult to avoid current inclusion in gross income of unfunded deferred
compensation. Nevertheless, § 409A has not completely supplanted prior law. The fundamental
principles of prior law continue in force but have been modified in certain respects.
a.
Section 409A guidance provides transition rules and excludes
stock appreciation rights from the purview of that section. Notice 2005-1, 2005-1 C.B. 274
(12/20/04), modifiedby Notice 2006-100, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1109 (11/30/06). These notices provide
guidance in Q&A form with respect to the application of § 409A.
b.
Proposed regulations incorporate much of the guidance in
Notice 2005-1. REG-158080-04, Application of Section 409A to Nonqualified Deferred
Compensation Plans, 70 F.R. 57930 (10/4/05). These proposed regulations incorporate much of
the guidance provided in Notice 2005-1, as well as "substantial additional guidance." They
identify the plans and arrangements covered by § 409A and describe the requirements for
deferral elections and the permissible timing for deferred compensation payments. They also
extend the deadline for "documentary compliance" to 12/31/06, but 1/1/05 remains as the
effective date for statutory compliance (although there are transition rules applicable for 2005).
c.
Interim guidance on withholding and reporting requirements
for 2005 and 2006. Notice 2006-100, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1109 (11/30/06). This notice provides
interim guidance to employers on their wage withholding requirements for calendar years 2005
and 2006 with respect to compensation and amounts includible in gross income under § 409A, as
well as guidance to service providers on their income tax reporting and payment requirements
for amounts includible in gross income under § 409A for those years.
d.
Final regulations. T.D. 9321, Application of Section 409A to
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 72 F.R. 19234 (4/17/07). Final regulations have

been adopted that generally follow the format and structure of the proposed regulations with a
number of clarifications and additions in response to comments.
e.
Transition relief extended for NQDC under § 409A. Notice
2006-79, 2006-43 I.R.B. 763 (10/4/06). Although the IRS expects that the proposed regulations
will become final by the end of 2006, the proposed effective date of 1/1/07 for the final § 409A
regulations is extended to 1/1/08. Additional transition relief is provided through 12/31/07.
And is sort-of extended for one more year through the end of
f.
2008. Notice 2007-78, 2007-41 I.R.B. 780 (9/10/07). This notice provides some 2008 transition
relief and additional guidance on the application to § 409A to nonqualified deferred
compensation plans.
Now, transition relief is really extended through the end of
g.
2008. Notice 2007-86, 2007-46 I.R.B. 990 (10/22/07), revoking and superseding Notice 200778. This notice extends to 12/31/08 the transition relief that was scheduled to expire on 12/31/07,
as provided in Notice 2006-79.
h.
More guidance. Notice 2007-89, 2007-46 I.R.B. 998 (10/23/07).
This notice provides interim guidance to employers regarding reporting and wage withholding
requirements for calendar year 2007 with respect to deferrals of compensation and amount
includible in gross income under § 409A. It also provides interim rules on calculating amounts
includible in gross income under § 409A. Notice 2005-1 was modified; Notice 2006-100 was not
affected by this notice.
i.
Did you know that § 409A will apply for the 2008-2009 school
year to teachers who elect to receive their salaries over a 12-month period instead of being
paid only during the nine-month school year? Remember, this results from an anti-Enron
provision in the 2004 Act. IRS [or, should it be Congress], give us a break! IR-2007-142
(8/7/07). School districts that offer annualization elections to teachers may have to make some
changes in their procedures in the future, but the IRS announced that the new deferred
compensation rules will not be applied to annualization elections for school years beginning
before 1/1/08.
(1)
Notice 2008-62, 2008-29 I.R.B. 130 (7/1/08). The IRS has
announced its intent to propose regulations under § 457(f), which would exclude from coverage
under §§ 457(o and 409A of most arrangements involving public school employees who provide
services during a 9- or 10-month school year and elect to be paid ratably over 12 months.
2.
Purchase of fancy life insurance products in the guise of an employee
benefit plan fails to produce claimed deductions. V.R. DeAngelis M.D.P.C. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-360 (12/5/07). The taxpayer doctors each owned a Subchapter S corporation
that was a partner in a partnership through which they practiced medicine. Each individual
doctor was an employee of the doctor's S corporation. The S corporations made contributions to
the partnership which in turn contributed to the Severance Trust Executive Program Multiple
Employer Supplemental Benefit Plan and Trust (STEP), a plan promoted to wealthy
professionals as a qualified welfare benefits fund that was part of a 10 or more employer plan
under § 419A(f)(6). The plan purchased cash-laden whole life insurance policies on behalf of
each doctor. Judge Laro described the case as "arising from a plan designed aggressively to
bolster the sale of insurance products through a claim of permissible tax savings." The court
disallowed deductions as ordinary business expenses for contributions to the "welfare benefit
plan" finding that "the facts of these cases establish that the plan was nothing more than a
subterfuge through which the participating doctors, through VRD/RTD, used surplus cash of the

PCs to purchase cash-laden whole life insurance policies primarily for the benefit of the
participating doctors personally." The court rejected the IRS's additional assertion that
contributions by the S corporations were included in the doctors' gross income, finding instead
that the contributions represented distributions to the doctors as shareholders of their respective
S corporations.
3.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division C], Act
§ 504(c), provides that up to $100,000 of amounts received by a taxpayer engaged in the fishing
business from the settlement of Exxon Valdez litigation can be contributed in the year of receipt
to retirement accounts.
D.
Individual Retirement Accounts
1.
Penalty-free premature IRA distributions for active duty reservists.
The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 made permanent § 72(t)(2)(G),
which, exempts from the 10 percent penalty tax for premature IRA distributions certain
distributions to reservists called to active duty for at least 179 days. This exemption originally
was scheduled to expire after 2007.
2.
Limited unlimited contributions of military death benefits to Roth
IRAs for survivors of reservists. The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of
2008 amended § 408A(e) to permit an individual who receives a military death gratuity payment
(excluded from gross income by § 134) or a Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance payment
(excluded from gross income by § 101) to contribute the payment to a Roth IRA without regard
to the otherwise applicable annual contribution limit and the income phase-out of the
contribution limit.
3.
Congress encourages retirees to drain their ravaged IRAs to benefit
charities. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through 2009 Code
§ 408(d)(8), which permit tax-free distributions up to $100,000 directly to charities that are
publicly supported under § 509(a)(1) and (2) (but not § 509(a)(3)) from IRAs owned by
individuals over 70/2 years of age.
V.
PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.
Rates
B.
Miscellaneous Income
1.
Forgiven accrued but unpaid interest on a consumer loan is COD
income. Hahn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-75 (4/2/07). The Tax Court (Judge Wells)
held that discharge of indebtedness income can be realized under the Kirby Lumber Co. "freeing
of assets" rationale even though the debtor did not receive any cash or other property when he
incurred the liability. When a creditor writes off accrued but unpaid interest owed by a cash
method debtor, discharge of indebtedness income is realized, unless the interest would have been
deductible if it had been paid and thus excludable under § 108(e)(2), because "[t]he right to use
money represents a valuable property interest." Taxpayer's motion for summary judgment was
denied because whether the interest expenses incurred in a horse breeding activity was
deductible as a trade or business expense was a question of fact on which a trial was necessary.
a.
More bad tax news for over-burdened consumer credit card
debtors who beat the bank. They don't beat the IRS! Payne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2008-66 (3/18/08). Compromise of credit card debt, including interest, incurred for personal
living expenses results in realization of COD income for a cash method taxpayer. Section
108(e)(5) is inapplicable where the only relationship between the debtor and creditor is the
debtor-creditor relationship and there was no property sale and purchase giving rise to the debt.

2.
Some tax exemptions are found in federal statutes outside of the
Internal Revenue Code. Wallace v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 132 (4/16/07). Payments of
$16,393 received by a veteran under a compensated work therapy program administered by the
Department of Veterans Affairs were excluded from gross income even though the taxpayer was
required to perform work as part of a veterans construction team as part of the program. 38
U.S.C. § 5301(a) exempts from taxation benefits payments to the beneficiary of veterans
benefits. See also I.R.C. § 140(a)(3). Broadly construing the exemption, the Tax Court rejected
the Commissioner's argument that amounts received under the work therapy program were
includible in gross income because of the work requirement.
a.
And the IRS now agrees. Rev. Rul. 2007-69, 2007-49 I.R.B. 1083
(11/1 6/07). Payments made by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs under the compensated
work therapy program described in 38 U.S.C. § 1718 are exempt from income tax as veterans'
benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), which provides that payments of benefits due or to
become due under any law administered by the VA made to, or on account of, a beneficiary are
tax-exempt.
3.
Congress provides tax relief for sub-prime mortgage borrowers. The
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 added new § 108(a)(1)(E), which excludes
from gross income the discharge of "qualified principal residence indebtedness" (QPRI) that
takes place on or after 1/1/07 and before 1/1/10. The provision is, of course, a legislative
response to the subprime mortgage loan crisis. QPRI is defined as acquisition indebtedness, a
loan on a taxpayer's principal residence, as defined in § 163(h)(3)(B), except that for purposes of
§ 108(a)(1)(E) the ceilings are $2,000,000 (for married couples filing joint returns) and
$1,000,000 (for other taxpayers). QPRI does not include (1) indebtedness on a home that is not
the taxpayer's principal residence, or (2) home equity indebtedness. The exclusion is not
available if the discharge is not on account of either (1) a decline in the value of the home or
(2) the financial condition of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's basis in the principal residence must
be reduced by the amount excluded under § 108(a)(l)(E). If only a portion of the cancelled debt
is QPRI, the exclusion applies only to the extent the amount discharged exceeds the non-QPRI
portion of the loan. If a taxpayer qualifies for both the QPRI exclusion and the insolvency
exclusion of § 108(a)(1)(B), the QPRI exclusion applies unless the taxpayer elects the
application of the insolvency exclusion.
4.
Ouch! Sanford v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-158 (6/23/08).
Damages received as a result of an EEOC proceeding based on claims of work-related sexual
harassment were not excluded under § 104(a)(2). The damage award was not on account of
personal physical injuries or sickness.
5.
Section 134(b)(6), added by the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief
Tax Act of 2008, provides that an excludable qualified military benefit includes "any bonus
payment by a State or political subdivision thereof to any member or former member of the
uniformed services of the United States or any dependent of such member only by reason of such
member's service in [a] combat zone."
6.
Anticipating the tax consequences of the next wave of ARMs and
teaser-rate home mortgages that reset interest rates. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 extended § 108(a)(1)(E), excluding from gross income discharge of
COD that is qualified principal residence indebtedness (QPRI) through December 31, 2012. The
provision, which was added in the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Act of 2007, had been
scheduled to expire after December 31, 2009.

C.

Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
1.
When will trust investment advisory fees get up off the § 67 floor?
Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 304 (6/27/05) (reviewed, 18-0), aff'd,
467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 10/18/06) (2-0), aff'd sub nom. Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782
(1/16/08). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) held that amounts paid for investment management
advice by trusts set up by a family involved in the founding of the Pepperidge Farm food
products company (which was sold to Campbell Soup Company in the 1960s) are not subject to
the § 67(e) exception to the § 67(a) floor of 2 percent of AGI (which limits the deductibility of
employee business expenses and miscellaneous itemized deductions to amounts exceeding that
floor). In reaching this result, the court determined that these expenses did not qualify for the
exception in § 67(e)(1), under which costs paid or incurred in connection with the administration
of a trust that wouldn't have been incurred if the property weren't held in the trust are allowed as
deductions in arriving at adjusted gross income. The Tax Court explained that the statutory text
of § 67(e)(1) creates an exception allowing for deduction of trust expenditures without regard to
the 2 percent floor where two requirements are satisfied: 1) the costs are paid or incurred in
connection with administration of the trust and 2) the costs would not have been incurred if the
property were not held in trust.
0
The Tax Court previously held that a trust's investment
advice costs were subject to the 2 percent floor. ONeill Trust v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 227
(1992). However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that investment counseling fees
paid by the trust to aid the trustees in discharging their fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries were
not subject to the 2 percent floor under the § 67(e)(1) exception. (994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit approach was rejected by the IRS (nonacq, 1994-2 C.B. 1); the
Federal Circuit (Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); and the Fourth
Circuit (Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003)). In reaching their decisions, the Federal
and Fourth Circuits emphasized the importance of not interpreting the statute so as to render
superfluous any portion of it. They said that if courts were to hold that a trust's investment-advice
fees were fully deductible, the second requirement of § 67(e)(1) would have been rendered
meaningless. The Sixth Circuit's rationale was stated as follows:
The Tax Court reasoned that "[i]ndividual investors routinely incur costs for
investment advice as an integral part of their investment activities." Nevertheless,
they are not required to consult advisors and suffer no penalties or potential
liability if they act negligently for themselves. Therefore, fiduciaries uniquely
occupy a position of trust for others and have an obligation to the beneficiaries to
exercise proper skill and care with the assets of the trust. (994 F.2d at 304)
a.
The Second Circuit affirmed Rudkin Trust and gave a third
interpretation of "an unambiguous statute." 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 10/18/06) (2-0). Judge
Sotomayor held that § 67(e) was unambiguous and permitted a full deduction only for those
types of trust expenses that an individual could not possibly incur.
b.
The Treasury tried to preempt the Supreme Court with
proposed regulations. REG-128224-06, Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 F.R.
41243 (7/27/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.67-4 would provide that costs incurred by estates or non-grantor
trusts that are unique to an estate or trust are not subject to the 2 percent floor of § 67. Under
Prop. Reg. § 1.67-4(b), a cost is unique to an estate or trust if an individual could not have
incurred that cost in connection with property not held in an estate or trust. Any miscellaneous
itemized deductions that do not meet this standard are subject to the 2 percent floor. Prop. Reg.

§ 1.67-4(c) prevents circumvention of the limitation by "bundling" investment advisory fees and
trustees' fees into a single fee. If an estate or non-grantor trust pays a single fee that includes
both costs that are unique to estates and trusts and costs that are not, the fee must be allocated
between the two types of costs. The regulations provide a non-exclusive list of services for
which the cost is either exempt from or subject to the 2 percent floor. The regulations will apply
to payments made after the date final regulations are published in Federal Register.
0
Under
the
reasoning
of National Cable
&
a
court's
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005),
interpretation of a statute trumps an agency's subsequent regulation "under the doctrine of stare
decisis only if the prior court holding 'determined a statute's clear meaning.' ... [A] court's prior
interpretation of a statute ... overrides an agency's interpretation only if the relevant court decision
held the statute unambiguous." Otherwise the validity of the regulation is determined under Chevron
US.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
C.
The Supreme Court issued the writ of certiorari to resolve the
conflict between the Second and Sixth Circuits, but decided to follow the Federal and
Fourth Circuits. The Supreme Court affirmed Rudkin Trust sub nom. Knight v.
Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782 (1/16/08) (9-0). The Court affirmed the Second Circuit in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts but rejected the Second Circuit test in favour of the test
of whether individuals commonly employ investment advisors set forth in Mellon Bank and
Scott. This holding leaves the final resoluation to a factual inquiry and the results could differ in
different caases.
d.
Meanwhile, bundled fiduciary fees may be deducted in full.
Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 593 (2/27/08). This Notice provides interim guidance on the
treatment of investment advisory costs subject to the 2 percent floor of § 67 that are bundled as
part of a single fiduciary fee for years beginning before 1/1/08. It provides that the taxpayer may
deduct the full amount of the bundled fiduciary fee without regard to the 2 percent floor.
2.
He lost in the casinos but won his bet that he'd beat the IRS in Tax
Court with the help of an expert witness named Mark Nicely. Gagliardi v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2008-10 (1/24/08). Gagliardi won the California lottery and was receiving annual
payments of approximately $666,500. After winning the lottery, Gagliardi spent most of his
waking hours at casinos, averaging approximately 10 hours per day playing the slot machines.
He was a compulsive gambler, who placed at a minimum four or five bets per minute, averaging
$9 per bet. For the years in question he reported wagering losses of up to $500,000 more than his
wagering winnings and deducted the excess losses against his lottery winnings. The IRS
disallowed a substantial portion of his claimed deductions, but the Tax Court (Judge Vasquez)
held for the taxpayer, finding that the evidence supported the conclusion that Gagliardi's actual
losses exceeded the amount he claimed. Although the Gagliardi did not maintain a
contemporaneous wagering log, he retained all his receipts and records related to his gambling
winnings and losses, including but not limited to: ATM receipts, copies of checks cashed at the
casinos, bank and credit card statements reflecting withdrawals made at the casinos, and Forms
W-2G he received from the casinos, all of which he provided to his tax return preparer. In
addition, taxpayer's expert witness Mark Nicely, a casino gaming industry and math expert with
an expertise in math and slot machines [whose was the head of a department at a slot machine
manufacturer responsible for the development of games and gaming math, testing equipment,
working with regulators, and training employees on how to design games for casinos], credibly
testified that the application of a formula to calculate the likelihood and extent of Gagliardi's

gambling losses at slot machines during the years in issue indicated that Gagliardi's total net
losses from slot machine play for the years at issue was greater than the total net gambling losses
from slot machine play he claimed for the tax years at issue.
3.
Those union dues helped the taxpayer prove his case. Balla v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-18 (2/5/08). The taxpayer was a merchant seaman who
incurred mileage, meals and incidental expenses incurred in connection with attending
firefighting school, the tuition for which was paid by his union. Judge Cohen held that even
though the taxpayer's employer did not require him to attend the school, he had adequately
substantiated the business purpose of his travel expenses because (1) firefighting was related to
his employment as a merchant sailor and engineer, and (2) payment of tuition for the course by
his union supported characterization of the related travel expenses as ordinary business expenses.
The taxpayer was allowed to deduct as unreimbursed employee business expenses the mileage,
meals, and incidental expenses incurred in connection with attending the firefighting school,
even though he never sought reimbursement for the mileage, meals and incidental expenses.
4.
Section 212 deductions for a day trading seminar disallowed even
though there wasn't any fun in the sun. Jones v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 3 (7/26/08). The
taxpayer was a day trader who incurred approximately $6,000 of expenses to attend a 5-day oneon-one course called DayTradingCourse.com that consisted of 37 hours of instruction. He stayed
in a modest hotel and did not participate in any recreational activities. The seminar was held in
Cartersville, Georgia, approximately 750 miles from the taxpayer's home in Florida. The
taxpayer conceded that he was not in the trade or business of day trading, but claimed the
deduction under § 212. Judge Vasquez upheld the IRS's disallowance of the deduction under
§ 274(h)(7), which disallows any deduction under § 212 for "expenses allocable to a convention,
seminar, or similar meeting, including the costs of registration fees, travel, meals, and lodging,
"even if the personal benefits of the trip are secondary to the investment benefits." Judge
Vasquez cited Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1985), which defines a seminar
as a "meeting for giving and discussing information," and concluded that the course was a
seminar, or a similar meeting within the scope of § 274(h)(7).
5.
Hammering employees whose deferred compensation comes from
offshore, i.e., hedge fund managers. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
added new Code § 457A, which provides that any nonqualified deferred compensation (as
defined in § 409A) under a plan of a nonqualified entity must be included in gross income in the
first year in which there is no substantial risk of forfeiture. Nonqualifed entitles include (1) a
foreign corporation unless substantially all of its income is either: (a) effectively connected with
the conduct of a U.S. trade or business, or (b) subject to a comprehensive foreign income tax,
and (2) any partnership unless substantially all of its income is allocated to persons other than:
(a) foreign persons with respect to whom such income is not subject to a comprehensive foreign
income tax, and (b) tax exempt organizations. If the amount of the deferred compensation is not
determinable when the right to it vests, the deferred compensation will be includible will be
included when it becomes determinable, but an interest charge at the deficiency rate plus one
percent will be added with respect to the period between the year when the compensation was
deferred, or vested if later, and the year it becomes includible. To the extent provided in
regulations if compensation is determined solely by reference to the amount of gain recognized
on the disposition of an investment asset, the compensation will be treated as subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture until the disposition.
D.
Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes

Maybe the taxpayer/IRS auditor should have hired Michael Vick as a
1.
business consultant to bolster his case. How relevant should it be that he never named the
dogs? Whitecavage v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-203 (8/27/08). The taxpayer, who was a
full-time IRS auditor, raised and raced greyhounds. He did not spend time with the dogs except
for feeding and cleaned up after them mornings and evenings. He kept the pups at his kennel
until they were a little over a year old and then sent them to racing kennels. When they were
done racing, the dogs were either sent for adoption or euthanized. The taxpayer had no
employees or business advisor and consistently lost money. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton)
held that the taxpayer's losses were limited by § 183.
Certain aspects of petitioner's activity, such as feeding, grooming, and cleaning
up after the greyhounds, generally might not be considered pleasurable, even
though they are not so different from the duties of any pet owner. Ultimately,
however, it seems to us that petitioner's activity of breeding greyhounds for
racing, although conducted by petitioner in a seemingly inhumane manner (for
many years keeping numerous dogs confined in crates in his Yuma, Arizona,
garage, while he worked a full-time job at the IRS, sending the pups off to
"training" that almost a fourth of them would not survive, and ultimately casting
off most of the others for possible adoption or destruction) involved recreational
elements as are common to other forms of recreational gambling, with those
elements being enhanced by such sense of sport or gamesmanship as might derive
from having one's own dogs in the races. This factor weighs against petitioner.
E.
Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
Congress encourages sub-prime mortgage lending. The Tax Relief and
I.
Health Care Act of 2006 added new § 163(h)(3)(E), providing an itemized deduction for the
cost of mortgage insurance on a qualified personal residence. The deduction is phased-out
ratably by 10 percent for each $1,000 by which the taxpayer's AGI exceeds $100,000. Thus, the
deduction is unavailable for a taxpayer with an AGI in excess of $110,000. As originally
enacted, the provision was effective for amounts paid or accrued (and applicable to the period)
after 12/31/06 and before 1/1/08 for mortgage contracts issued after 12/31/06.
a.
And Congress extends the provision encouraging sub-prime
mortgage borrowing. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 extended the
12/31/07 termination date for § 163(h)(3)(E) to 12/3 1/10.
2.
You don't have to be sick to incur deductible medical expenses. Rev.
Rul. 2007-72, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1154 (12/10/07). The IRS has ruled that following expenses are
deductible medical expenses under § 213: (1) Amounts paid for an annual physical examination
for diagnosis, even though the taxpayer is not experiencing any symptoms of illness; (2) amounts
paid for a full-body scan for diagnosis, and which serves no non-medical function, even though
the taxpayer is not experiencing symptoms of illness and has not obtained a physician's
recommendation before undergoing the procedure; and (3) amounts paid for an over-the-counter
pregnancy test kit, even though its purpose is to test the healthy functioning of the body rather
than to detect disease.
3.
The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 made
permanent § 32(c)(2)(B)(vi), which permits a taxpayer to elect to treat combat pay excluded
from gross income under § 112 as earned income for EITC purposes. The provision had been
scheduled to expire after 2007.

4.
The deduction for state and local property taxes is only semi-itemized
for 2008. We bet this one becomes a permanent fixture in the annual extenders bill until it
becomes permanent. Section 63(c)(1)(C), added by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008,
adds the "real property tax deduction" as a component of the standard deduction, effective only
for taxable years beginning in 2008. The amount of the deduction is the lesser of(1) the amount
the taxpayer could claim as a state and local real property tax deduction under § 164(a)(1) if he
itemized his deductions, or (2) $500 ($1,000 in the case of a joint return).
a.
Congress extends another microscopic and complicating tax
deduction. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through 2009 the
Code § 63(c)(1)(C) above-the-line deduction for a limited amount of real property taxes, The
amount of the deduction is the lesser of (1) the amount the taxpayer could claim as a state and
local real property tax deduction under § 164(a)(1) if he itemized deductions, or (2) $500
($1,000 in the case of a joint return). The provision originally was effective only for 2008.
5.
This "relief" provision is an interest free loan from the government
unless your tax bracket increased. Section 3082 of the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008
(an uncodified provision) allows a taxpayer who claimed a casualty loss deduction with respect
to his personal residence resulting from Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, or Hurricane Wilma,
and who in a later year receives a federal grant as reimbursement for the loss, to elect to file an
amended return for the earlier taxable year (eliminating the casualty loss deduction to the extent
of the later reimbursement) in lieu of including the reimbursement in income in the later year.
6.
Helping entry-level homebuyers invest in the bear housing market.
Section 36, added by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, provides a refundable credit for
a "first-time homebuyer" who purchases a principal residence on or after 4/9/08, and before
1/1/09. The amount of the credit is the lesser of 10 percent of the purchase price or $7,500
($3,750 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return). If two or more unmarried
persons purchase a principal residence together, the total amount of the credit will be allocated
among them as prescribed by the IRS. The credit is phased out over the modified adjusted
income range of $75,000 to $95,000 ($150,000 to $170,000 in the case of a joint return). A
person qualifies as a "first-time homebuyer" if neither the person nor the person's spouse (if any)
owned a principal residence at any time during the three-year period ending on the date of
purchase of the credit-generating residence. The credit is not available if the taxpayer purchased
the property from a related person or acquired it by gift, or if the taxpayer's basis in the property
is determined under § 1014. (Persons are related for this purpose if they are related for purposes
of § 267 or § 707, except that the family of an individual under § 267(c)(4) is limited for this
purpose to his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.) The credit is also not available: (1) if a
credit under § 1400C (relating to first-time homebuyers in the District of Columbia) has ever
been allowable to the taxpayer, (2) if the taxpayer's financing is from tax-exempt mortgage
revenue bonds, (3) if the taxpayer is a nonresident alien, or (4) if the taxpayer disposes of the
residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence before the close of the taxable year.
The amount of the credit is recaptured ratably over the 15year period beginning with the second taxable year following the taxable year in which the creditgenerating purchase was made. For example, if a taxpayer properly claimed a credit of $7,500 for a
purchase in 2008, the recapture amount would be $500 in 2010, with another $500 recapture amount
in each of the next 14 years. Thus, the credit actually functions as an interest-free loan from the
government to the taxpayer. If, prior to the end of the 15-year recapture period, a taxpayer disposes
of the credit-generating residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence, the recapture of any

previously unrecaptured credit is accelerated. In the case of a sale of the principal residence to an
unrelated person, the recapture amount is limited to the amount of gain (if any) on the sale. There is
no recapture (either regular or accelerated) after the death of a taxpayer, and there is no accelerated
recapture following an involuntary conversion of a residence if the taxpayer acquires a new principal
residence within the next two years. If a credit-generating residence is transferred between spouses
or incident to a divorce, in a transaction subject to § 1041, any remaining recapture obligation is
imposed solely on the transferee.
0
Although the credit is ordinarily allowed with respect to the
year in which the credit-generating purchase occurred, a taxpayer purchasing a home in 2009 (before
July 1) may elect to treat the purchase as having been made in 2008, for the purpose of claiming the
credit on his 2008 tax return. If the election is made, the first year of the recapture period will be
2010, rather than 2011.
7.
Congress wants to encourage consumers - at least those in Texas and
Florida and a few other states - to shop in these hard times. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through 2009 the § 164(b)(5) itemized deduction for state
sales taxes (optionally in lieu of income taxes in those states that have both sales and income
taxes).
8.
Making children more affordable. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 added Code § 24(d)(4), which provides that for 2008 (and only for
2008) the ceiling on the refundable child credit is 15 percent of the excess of earned income over
$8,500 rather than $10,000 (indexed for post-2000 inflation). Because the 2008 inflation
adjusted $10,000 amount would have been $12,050, this provision increases the by $532.50 the
refundable amount.
F.
Divorce Tax Issues
1.
It ain't a QDRO unless the ex has a right in the pension trust itself,
not merely a right to be paid out of withdrawals from the trust. Amarasinghe v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-333 (11/6/07). Provisions in a divorce instrument requiring the
husband to withdraw funds from his pension trust to pay alimony and child support were not a
QDRO because the instrument did not give the husband's former wife any direct interest in the
pension trust. Rather, the order directed the husband to "cash out" a particular amount and pay it
over his former wife. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1996), was
distinguished. Alternatively, the purported QDRO did not qualify because an order cannot be a
QDRO unless it is delivered to the pension trustee [Karem v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 521
(1993)], which the instrument in this case was not. Accordingly, husband was required to include
the full distribution in gross income and was allowed to deduct the portion paid over to the
former wife as alimony, and the wife was required to include only the portion of the payment
that was alimony.
2.
Final regulations identify which divorced or separated parent can
claim the dependency exemption. T.D. 9408, Dependent Child of Divorced or Separated
Parents or Parents Who Live Apart, 73 F.R. 37797 (7/2/08). The Treasury has finalized proposed
regulations [REG-149856-03, Dependent Child of Divorced or Separated Parents or Parents
Who Live Apart, 72 F.R. 24192 (5/2/07)] interpreting § 152(e), as amended by the 2005 Act
(GOZA), to provide that a child of parents who are divorced, separated, or living apart may be
claimed as a qualifying child of the non-custodial parent if the child receives over one-half of
his/her support from the parents, the child is in the custody of one or both parents during the
calendar year, and the custodial parent signs a written declaration that the custodial parent will

not claim the exemption (which must be attached to the non-custodial parent's return), or a pre1985 instrument allocates the exemption and the non-custodial parent contributes at least $600
for the support of the child during the year.
*
Under Reg. §1.152-4:
(1) The custodial parent is the parent with whom the child spends the greatest
number of nights during the taxable year. A child who is temporarily away is treated as spending
the night with the parent with whom the child would have resided. If another person is entitled to
custody for a night, the child is treated as spending the night with neither parent. If a child is
temporarily absent from a parent's home for a night, the child is treated as residing with the
parent with whom the child would have resided for the night, but if the child resides with neither
parent for a night and it cannot be determined with which parent the child would have resided or
if the child would not have resided with either parent for the night, the child is treated as not
residing with either parent for that night. If because a parent works at night, a child resides for a
greater number of days but not nights with that parent, that parent is treated as the custodial
parent. On a school day, the child is treated as residing at the primary residence registered with
the school.
(2) The required written declaration must contain an unconditional statement that
the custodial parent will not claim the exemption for the specified year or years, and a
declaration is not unconditional if it conditions the custodial parent's release of the right to claim
to the exemption on the noncustodial parent meeting a support obligation. The written
declaration may be made on Form 8332, Release/Revocation of Release of Claim to Exemption
for Child by Custodial Parent, or a successor form designated by the IRS; any declaration not on
the form designated by the IRS must conform to the substance of that form and must be a
document executed for the sole purpose of serving as a written declaration under § 152(e)(2).
The original document need not be attached to the tax return; a copy of the written declaration
must be attached to the tax return for each year the noncustodial parent claims the exemption.
(3) The custodial parent may revoke a revocation by providing written notice to
the non-custodial parent specifying the years of the revocation. A revocation will be effective in
the first calendar year after the year in which the revoking parent provides notice to the other
parent.
(4) Never-married parents who live apart are entitled to agree by written
declaration to transfer the exemption to the non-custodial parent (following King v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. 245 (2003)).
a.
A child who is not a dependent is a dependent for some
purposes. Rev. Proc. 2008-48, 2008-36 I.R.B. 586 (8/18/08). If a child of parents who are
divorced, legally separated, or living apart at all times for the last 6 months of the calendar year:
(1) receives over one-half of the child's support for the parents, (2) is in the custody of one or
both parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, and (3) is qualified as a qualifying child
or qualifying relative of one of the parents, the child will be treated as a dependent of one or both
parents for purposes of (1) the exclusions of § 105 for medical expense insurance
reimbursements, (2) § 106 for employer provided health coverage, (3) the definition of covered
employees under § 132(h)(2)(B) for purposes of certain excluded fringe benefits, (4) qualifying
payments from Archer Medical Savings Accounts (§ 220(d)(2)), and (5) qualifying payments
from Health Savings Accounts (§ 223(d)(2)), whether or not the custodial parent has released the
claim for exemption with respect to the child under § 152(e)(2). (However, absent the filing of a
release, only the custodial parent is entitled to claim a dependency exemption with respect to a

child.).
b.
Refining the definition of qualifying child and tightening (very
modestly) eligibility for the child credit. The Fostering Connections to Success and
Increasing Adoptions Act, § 501, amended the definition of a qualifying child to add
requirements that a qualifying child must not have filed a joint return with a spouse (other than
to claim a refund) [§ 152(c)(3)(A)] and must be younger than the claimant [§ 152(c)(1)(D)]. In
addition, if the parents fail to claim their child as a dependent, another taxpayer must have a
higher gross income than either of the parents in order to claim the child [§ 152(c)(4)(C)].
Finally, § 24(a) was amended to limit the child credit to taxpayers eligible to claim the child as a
dependent under § 151.
3.
The IRS should be sanctioned for pursuing this case. If not, it sends
the message that the IRS's lawyers can ignore easy to find unambiguous state law that
determines the outcome of the case. Le v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-183 (7/30/08). In a
divorce proceeding, a Kansas court entered a temporary spousal maintenance order pursuant to
which the taxpayer was required to pay his soon-to-be ex-wife $12,000. The state court order
specifically stated that "Said spousal maintenance shall be taxable income to [the soon-to-be exwife] and shall be deductible on [taxpayer's] income tax return," but it did not specifically
provide the obligation to pay the lump sum (in satisfaction of past due temporary support) would
be cancelled if the soon-to-be ex-wife died before the payment was made. The IRS claimed that
the payment was not deductible as alimony because the obligation to make the payment did not
terminate upon the death of the obligee. Judge Vasquez held for the taxpayer, finding that
Kansas law provided that the obligation to make the payment would terminate upon the death of
the soon-to-be ex-wife.
In Kansas "temporary maintenance ceases when the divorce action
terminates". In re Marriage of Vientos, 139 P.3d 152 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). A
divorce action is "purely personal and ends on the death of either spouse." Wear
v. Mizell, 946 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Kan. 1997). In cases where the payor spouse is in
arrears on support payments but then later pays the amount in arrears, "the
payment retains the characteristics of the original payments for which it is
substituted". Davis v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 815, 820 (1964); see also Stroud v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-317.
The $12,000 of spousal support was temporary maintenance. Accordingly,
under Kansas law the liability to make such payments would have ceased on
either petitioner's or Ms. Le's death because the divorce proceeding would have
automatically terminated, ending the operation of the temporary orders.
0
We ask: For gosh sakes, couldn't the Chief Counsel's office
have figured this out without a trial?
4.
Only till death do the payments continue. Johanson v. Commissioner,
102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-6099 (9th Cir. 9/3/08). Where state [California] law unambiguously
provides for spousal support payments to terminate upon the death of a payee souse, a payment
may be found not to qualify as alimony if under state law a written agreement can waive that
termination requirement and the agreement in question does so. If the agreement is ambiguous,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the intent of the parties. On the facts, the payee
spouse failed to prove that payments would not terminate upon her death, and the payments were
thus alimony.

G.

Education
1.
A tax subsidy for newly-minted public interest lawyers. Rev. Rul.
2008-34, 2008-28 I.R.B. 76 (6/20/08). Section 108(f) excludes from gross income cancellation of
indebtedness income that would otherwise be realized when a student loan is canceled pursuant
to its terms as a result of the former student working for a specified period of time in certain
professions for one of a broad class of employers. This ruling held that a law school loan, that
refinanced original student loans, made under a "Loan Repayment Assistance Program" (LRAP)
was a "student loan" and satisfied the requirements of § 108(f). The specific facts dealt with an
LRAP under which to qualify the law school graduate was required to work in a law-related
public service position for, or under the direction of, a tax-exempt charitable organization or a
governmental unit, including a position in (1) a public interest or community service
organization, (2) a legal aid office or clinic, (3) a prosecutor's office, (4) a public defender's
office, or (5) a state, local, or federal government office. The amount of the LRAP loan was
based on the graduate's outstanding student loan debt and annual income. After the graduate
worked for the required period in a qualifying position, the law school forgives all or part of the
loan.
Professor Ellen Aprill of Loyola, Los Angeles cautions that
*
"because the tax-free status of loan forgiveness under § 108(f) pursuant to the College Cost
Reduction and Access Act of 2007 may be available for some borrowers, uncertain for others, and
unavailable for yet others, supporters of this recent legislation have identified the need for and are
seeking legislation extending § 108(f)." In other words, to quote, "Close, but no cigar."
2.
Section 530(d)(9), added by the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief
Tax Act of 2008, allows an individual who receives a military death gratuity payment (excluded
from gross income by §134 or a Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance payment (excluded from
gross income by §101), to contribute the payment to a Coverdell Educational Savings Account
without regard to the otherwise applicable annual contribution limit and the income phase-out of
the contribution limit.
3.
Congress extends the [paltry] deduction for college tuition, and adds
ridiculous complexity. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through
2009 Code § 222, which allows an above-the-line deduction for up to $4,000 of qualified tuition
and expenses for higher education for a taxpayer with AGI of $65,000 or less ($130,000 or less
for a joint return), or up to $2,000 for a taxpayer with AGI greater than $65,000 ($130,000) but
not greater than $80,000 ($160,000) through 2008. The provision, which was added in 2004 had
been scheduled to expire after December 31, 2007. In addition, the Act amended § 222 to
disallow the qualified tuition deduction to any taxpayer for 2008 and 2009 if in the absence of
the alternative minimum tax the taxpayer would have a lower tax liability for that year if he
elected the Hope or Lifetime Learning credit with respect to an eligible individual instead of the
qualified tuition deduction.
We have no idea how to explain this new limitation. We
*
would need to plug the numbers into Turbo Tax and just believe the answer it spit out.
H.
Alternative Minimum Tax
1.
Making the world safe from the AMT, one year at a time. The Tax
Increase Prevention Act of 2007 provided another one-year "patch" for the AMT. The 2007
exemption amounts are $44,350 for unmarried taxpayers and $66,250 for married taxpayers
filing joint returns, and $33,125 for married taxpayers filing separately. The Act also extended to

2007 the special rule in §26(a)(2) allowing the otherwise nonrefundable personal credits to offset
the AMT (after taking into account the foreign tax credit).
a.
Congress, save us from the AMT! Amen, again only for a year
at a time. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 provided yet another one-year
patch for the AMT.
9
The exemption amount for 2008 is increased to $46,200 for
unmarried taxpayers and to $69,950 for married taxpayers filing joint returns ($34,975 for married
taxpayers filing separately). (Because of the inflation adjust in § 59(j) the lower ceiling on the AMT
kiddie tax exemption amount for 2008 will be the sum of the child's earned income plus $6,400.)
0
The AMT credit for 2008 and 2009 is increased by 50 percent
of the aggregate amount of the interest and penalties paid by the taxpayer before October 3, 2008 as
a result of failure to report AMT liability resulting from application of the § 56(b)(3) treatment of
ISOs requiring taxation under § 83 for AMT purposes.
*
The rule allowing nonrefundable credits (e.g., the dependent
care credit, the credit for the elderly and disabled, the adoption credit, the child tax credit, the credit
for interest on certain home mortgages, the HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits, the
credit for savers, the credit for certain nonbusiness energy property, the credit for residential energy
efficient property, and the D.C. homebuyer's credit) to offset the AMT also was extended to 2008.
0
The refundable credit rules also were modified. First, the
refundable credit includes the § 53(f)(2) AMT credit for 2008 and 2009 of 50 percent of the
aggregate amount of the interest and penalties paid by the taxpayer before October 3, 2008 as a
result of failure to report AMT liability resulting from application of the § 56(b)(3) treatment of
ISOs requiring taxation under § 83 for AMT purposes. Second, the $5,000 minimum allowable
credit was eliminated. Third, as amended, § 53(e) provides a refundable credit amount for a tax year
is the amount (not in excess of the long-term unused minimum tax credit for the tax year) equal to
the greater of (1) 50% of the long-term unused minimum tax credit for the tax year (instead of 20
percent under prior law), or (2) the AMT refundable credit amount (if any) for the taxpayer's
preceding tax year (determined without regard to the increased AMT refundable credit amount
allowed under § 53(f)(2)). [The change of 20% to 50% means that the long-term unused minimum
tax credit can be claimed over a two-year period rather than a five-year period.] Fourth, the AGI
phase-out was eliminated.
*
New §53(0(1) abates any underpayment of tax outstanding
on October 3, 2008 that is attributable to the application of the § 56(b)(3), requiring taxation of ISOs
under § 83 for AMT purposes, for any taxable year ending before January 1, 2008, as well as any
interest or penalty with respect to such underpayment. Any outstanding AMT liability that has been
abated under § 53(0(1) cannot be taken into account in computing the AMT credit.
2.
More instances of the AMT wandering from its original, i.e., 1969,
roots; more preferences creep into the AMT. The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008
amended § 57(a)(5)(C) to provide that tax-exempt interest on a bond issued after 7/30/08, is not
a tax preference item if the bond is (1) an exempt facility bond issued as part of an issue at least
95 percent of the net proceeds of which are used to provide qualified residential rental projects,
(2) a qualified mortgage bond, or (3) a qualified veterans' mortgage bond. As amended by Act
§ 38(c)(4)(B) allows the low-income housing credit [§ 42] and the rehabilitation credit [§ 47] to
be claimed against the AMT.
VI.
CORPORATIONS

A.

Entity and Formation
Congress gave the IRS the power to overrule the statute and the IRS
1.
accepted the invitation. T.D. 9397, Assumption of Liabilities, 73 F.R. 26321 (5/9/08). Section
358(h) requires that the basis of the stock received in a § 351 transaction be reduced (but not
below the fair market value) by the amount of any § 357(c)(3) liability that was assumed by the
corporation, but § 358(h)(3) provides that, except as provided in regulations, § 358(h) does not
apply if, as part of the exchange (1) "the trade or business with which the liability is associated is
transferred to the person assuming the liability," or (2) "substantially all of the assets with which
the liability is associated are transferred to the person assuming the liability." Reg. § 1.358-5,
replacing Temp. Reg. § 1.358-5T, narrows the statutory exception by providing that the
exception for a transfer of "substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated" to
the corporation assuming the liability is inoperative. Thus, the exception in § 358(h)(3) actually
applies if, and only if, the trade or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to
the corporation assuming the debt, for example, the specific fact pattern in Rev. Rul. 95-74,
1995-2 C.B. 36. The exception in § 358(h)(3) does not apply to selective transfers of assets that
may bear some relationship to the liability, but that do not represent the full scope of the trade or
business with which the liability is associated.
B.
Distributions and Redemptions
1.
We think the taxpayer should seek attorney's fees after winning this
one. The IRS's constructive dividend claim was off the wall. Beckley v. Commissioner, 130
T.C. No. 18 (6/30/08). The taxpayer's wife made a loan to a corporation (CT) in which he was a
50 percent shareholder. CT used the borrowed funds to develop a working model of Web-based
video conferencing software. Subsequently, CT however, had financial problems and was
dissolved, and the working model was transferred to a new corporation (VDN) in which the
taxpayer was a shareholder (the precise ownership percentage not being a matter of record taxpayer claimed he owned only 1 percent of VDN's stock, while the IRS claimed he owned 50
percent). VDN made payments to the taxpayer's wife, a portion of which was reported as taxable
interest income and the balance of which was treated as a repayment of the principal she lent to
CT. The IRS accepted the taxpayer's wife's reporting, but treated 50 percent of the payments she
received as taxable constructive dividends to the taxpayer from VDN. Before the Tax Court, the
IRS argued "that VDN's payments to [the taxpayer's wife] were made to satisfy only [his]
personal moral obligations," because VDN did not execute a written loan agreement and that,
therefore, under the statute of frauds [Oregon] VDN was not liable for the debt. Judge Swift
rejected the IRS's argument, concluding that "the existence of an oral agreement ... may cause
an Oregon court to enforce an oral agreement if unjust enrichment would occur if the oral
agreement were not enforced," and, in any event, "VDN's conduct in actually making payments
to Virginia, which related to Virginia's loan to CT and to CT's transfer of the working model to
VDN, establish the loan repayment character of the payments and the principal and interest
nature thereof."
2.
Section 162(k)'s bite is as loud as its bark. Ralston Purina Co. v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 4 (9/10/08). Ralston Purina claimed a deduction under § 404(k) for
payments made to its ESOP in redemption of Ralston Purina preferred stock owned by the ESOP
to fund distributions to employees terminating participation in the ESOP. The Commissioner
argued the redemption payments were not deductible under either § 404(k)(1) or (5), or
alternatively that deduction was barred by § 162(k). The Tax Court, in a unanimous reviewed
opinion by Judge Nims, held that because Ralston Purina's payments were "in connection with

the redemption of its own stock," § 162(k) applied to disallow the deduction. The Tax Court
refused to follow the contrary opinion on almost identical facts in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United
States, 329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003). In Boise Cascade the Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase
"in connection with" to include only expenses that have their origin in a stock redemption
transaction, excluding expenses that have their origin in a "separate, although related,
transaction". The Tax Court previously had rejected the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of
the phrase "in connection with" in Fort Howard Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner,103 T.C. 345
(1994), and did so again in Ralston Purina.The court rejected Ralston Purina's argument that
because the payments were an applicable dividend under 404(k), the transaction was excepted
from the application of § 162(k) under § 162(k)(2)(A)(ii). The Tax Court reasoned that the entire
transaction potentially deductible as an applicable dividend under § 404(k) - payment from the
corporation to the ESOP and the distribution to the ESOP participants - must also pass muster
under §162(k), and that the "otherwise allowable" deduction was disallowed because the
payment was "in connection with" a repurchase of stock.
*
This is the same result reached in Conopco, Inc. v. United
States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5296 (D. N.J. 7/18/07).
C.
Liquidations
D.
S Corporations
1.
Proposed regulations implementing the ever-easing standards for
qualifying as an S. REG-143326-05, S Corporation Guidance Under AJCA of 2004 and GOZA
of 2005, 72 F.R. 55132 (9/28/07). The Treasury has published proposed amendments to various
regulations under Subchapter S,including, among others, Prop. Regs. §§ 1.1361-1(e) [number of
shareholders]; 1.1361-1(h) [special rules relating to trusts eligible to be shareholders]; 1.13611(m) [ESBTs]; 1.1361-4 [inadvertent terminations and inadvertently invalid elections]; and
1.1366-2 [limitations on deduction of passed-though losses].
*
The entire state of Arkansas counts as one shareholder.
Section 403(b) of GOZA amended § 1361(c)(1)(B)(iii) to apply the test for qualifying members of a
family with a common ancestor not more than six generations removed to the latest of (1) The date
the S election is made, (2) the earliest date an individual who is a "member of the family" holds
stock in the S corporation, or (3) October 22, 2004. Prop. Reg. § 1.1361-1(e)(3) clarifies that the "six
generation" test is applied only at the date specified in § 1361(c)(1)(B)(iii) and thereafter has no
continuing significance in limiting the number of generations of a family that may hold stock and be
treated as a single shareholder.
*
Section 234 of AJCA amended § 1361(e)(2) to provide that
in determining an ESBT's potential current beneficiaries for any period (PCBs), powers of
appointment are disregarded if not exercised by the end of that period. Also, the period during which
an ESBT may safely dispose of S corporation stock after an ineligible shareholder becomes a PCB
was increased from 60 days to one year. Prop. Reg. § 1.1361-1(m)(2)(vi) reflects these changes. All
members of a class of unnamed charities permitted to receive distributions under a discretionary
distribution power held by a fiduciary that is not a power of appointment, will be considered,
collectively, to be a single PCB for purposes of determining the number of permissible shareholders,
unless the power is actually exercised, in which case each charity that actually receives distributions
will also be a PCB. A power to add beneficiaries, whether or not charitable, to a class of current
permissible beneficiaries is generally a power of appointment and thus will be disregarded to the
extent it is not exercised. Fiduciary powers to spray trust distributions to a class of current

beneficiaries or possible current beneficiaries are not "powers of appointment," and thus every
member of the class remains a PCB, whether or not receiving a distribution.
0
Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.1362-4 implement 1996
amendments to § 1362(f), which provide relief for corporations with inadvertently invalid S
corporation elections [in addition to the relief previously available for inadvertent terminations of
valid S corporation elections]. Section 238 of AJCA amended § 1362() to provide that QSubs are
eligible for relief for an inadvertent invalid QSub election or termination under the same standards
applied to an inadvertent invalid S corporation election or termination. The proposed regulations
would make conforming changes to Reg. § 1.1362-4.
*
Section 235 of AJCA amended § 1366(d)(2) to provide that
if the stock of an S corporation is transferred between spouses or incident to divorce under
§ 1041(a), any loss or deduction with respect to the transferred stock that could not be taken into
account by the transferring shareholder in the year of the transfer because of the basis limitation in
§ 1366(d)(1) is treated as incurred by the corporation in the succeeding taxable year with regard to
the transferee. Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(5) would implement this exception to
the general rule of nontransferability of losses and deductions. Losses and deductions carried over to
the year of transfer that are not used by the transferor spouse in that year will be prorated between
the transferor spouse and the transferee spouse based on their stock ownership at the beginning of
the succeeding taxable year.
a.
Finalized before you could say "Jack Robinson." T.D. 9422, S
Corporation Guidance Under AJCA of 2004 and GOZA of 2005, 73 F.R. 47526 (8/13/08). The
proposed regulations were finalized, with only ministerial changes. They are effective 8/14/08,
with various specific applicability dates. Notice 2005-97, 2005-2 C.B. 1164, was obsoleted.
2.
Short-term beneficial treatment for charitable contributions through
an S corporation teaches why you shouldn't make future charitable contributions of
appreciated property through an S corporation unless the law changes. Rev. Rul. 2008-16,
2008-11 I.R.B. 585 (3/17/08). If an S corporation made a charitable contribution of appreciated
property during a taxable year beginning after 12/31/05, and before 1/1/08, the shareholder's
deduction may not exceed the sum of: (1) the shareholder's pro rata share of the fair market
value of the contributed property over the contributed property's adjusted tax basis, and (2) the
amount of the § 1366(d) loss limitation amount that is allocable to the contributed property's
adjusted basis under Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(4). Any disallowed portion of the contribution retains its
character and is carried over.
*
The Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007 added
§ 1366(d)(4), which provides, in effect, that the basis limitation rule of § 1366(d)(1) does not apply
to the amount of deductible appreciation in the contributed property in taxable years beginning after
12/31/05, and before 1/1/08.
*
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended § 1367(a)(2)
to provide that the decrease in shareholder basis under § 1367(a)(2)(B) by reason of a charitable
contribution of property is the amount equal to the shareholder's pro rata share of the adjusted basis
of such property in taxable years beginning after 12/31/05, and before 1/1/08.
0
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extend
through 2009 the application of § 1366(d)(4).
0
Absent further statutory change, charitable contributions
made by S corporations in subsequent taxable years are subject to the law in existence prior to these

amendments [i.e., stock basis will be reduced by the full amount of the deduction]. The IRS and
Treasury Department are considering issuing guidance on the treatment of charitable contributions
made by S corporations in subsequent taxable years.
F reorganizations of S corporations. Rev. Rul. 2008-18, 2008-13 I.R.B.
3.
674 (3/7/08). When an S corporation undergoes § 368(a)(1)(F) reorganization [through a § 351
contribution of the S corporation stock to a holding company or through a downstream merger
into a newly formed second tier subsidiary] in which an operating S corporation becomes a QSub
of a newly formed holding company that qualifies to be an S corporation, the newly formed
parent succeeds to the original S corporation's election and does not have to make a new S
election. See Rev. Rul. 64-250, 1964-2 C.B. 333. Effective 1/1/09, the new parent must obtain its
own EIN rather than succeed to the QSub's EIN. However, for S corporations that have
previously undergone a § 368(a)(1)(F) reorganization in a manner described in the ruling
transaction to create the holding company, where the parent took the QSub's EN, the parent
should continue to use that EIN and the QSub will have to get a new EIN when it is treated as a
separate corporation. Rev. Rul. 64-250, 1964-2 C.B. 333 is amplified.
Revenge for Gitlitz? REG-102822-08, Section 108 Reduction of Tax
4.
73 F.R. 45656 (8/6/08). Section 108(d)(7)(A) provides that if an S
S
Corporations,
for
Attributes
corporation excludes COD income under § 108(a), the excluded amount reduces the S
corporation's tax attributes under § 108(b)(2); § 108(b)(4)(A) provides that the reduction occurs
after the S corporation's items of income, loss, deduction and credit for the taxable year of the
discharge pass through to its shareholders. Pursuant to § 108(d)(7)(B), Prop. Reg. § 1.108-7(d)
would treat any § 1366(d)(3) shareholder carryover losses from prior years and any passed
through losses from the current year in excess of the shareholders' bases as a "deemed NOL" of
the S corporation that would be reduced under § 108(b). Where an S corporation has more than
one shareholder during the taxable year of the discharge, a shareholder's disallowed losses or
deductions equal a pro rata share of the total losses and deductions allocated to the shareholder
under § 1366(a) during the corporation's taxable year (including losses and deductions
disallowed under § 1366(d)(1) for prior years that are treated as current year losses and
deductions with respect to the shareholder under § 1366(d)(2). The proposed regulations will be
effective when finalized.
Section 101(j) meets § 1368(e). Rev. Rul. 2008-42, 2008-30 I.R.B. 175
5.
(7/1/08). Premiums paid by an S corporation on an employer-owned life insurance contract, of
which the S corporation is directly or indirectly a beneficiary, do not reduce the S corporation's
AAA. The benefits received by reason of the death of the insured from an employer-owned life
insurance contract that is not taxed under § 101(j), because it meets one of the exceptions under
§ 101(j)(2), do not increase the S corporation's AAA.
Reorganizations
E.
Making post-reorganization intra-group restructurings even easier.
1.
T.D. 9361, Corporate Reorganizations; Transfers of Assets or Stock Following a Reorganization,
72 F.R. 60552 (10/25/07), making final REG-130863-04, Corporate Reorganizations; Transfers
of Assets or Stock Following a Reorganization, 69 F.R. 51209 (8/18/04). The Treasury has
finalized regulations dealing with (1) the continuity of business enterprise requirement (Reg.
§ 1.368-1(d)) and (2) the definition of a "party to a reorganization" requirement (Reg. § 1.3682(f)) to liberalize the rules regarding permissible post-acquisition restructurings of acquiring
corporations in a controlled group of corporations. In addition to post-acquisition drops of assets
to lower-tier subsidiaries, certain post-acquisition distributions by an acquisition subsidiary that

is member of the acquiring corporation's group to a corporation that controls the acquiring
corporation of either the target corporation's stock (following a § 368(a)(1)(B) or § 368(a)(2)(E)
reorganization) or assets (following a § 368(a)(1)(A), § 368(a)(1)(C), or § 368(a)(2)(E)
reorganization), and certain cross chain transfers, subsequent to the acquisition, do not disqualify
the acquisition from reorganization treatment, even though there is no statutory provision
expressly providing that such distributions do not affect the validity of reorganization treatment,
provided that the distribution would not result in the distributing corporation being treated as
liquidated for income tax purposes. The regulations thus permit the acquiring corporation to
significantly rearrange ownership of the target corporation's assets or stock, as the case may be,
among the members of its qualified group (based on § 368(c) control) without disqualifying the
reorganization. Furthermore, the final regulations (Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(4)(ii)), unlike the proposed
regulations, permit qualified group members to aggregate their direct stock ownership of a
corporation, in a manner similar to aggregation under § 1504(a), in determining whether they
have the requisite § 368(c) control of such corporation (provided that the issuing corporation has
§ 368(c) control in at least one other corporation).
a.

Less than six months later the new regulations require

clarification. T.D. 9396, Corporate Reorganizations; Amendment to Transfers of Assets or
Stock Following a Reorganization, 73 F.R. 26322 (5/9/08). Reg. § 1.368-(k), dealing with drop
downs and push-ups following reorganizations, which was finalized in October, 2007, has been
amended in several respects: (1) The amended regulations clarify that a transfer to the former
shareholders of the target corporation (other than the acquiring corporation) is not a safe harbor
push-up to the extent it constitutes consideration by the shareholders for their proprietary
interests in the target, because it "calls into question" whether the transaction satisfies the
continuity of interest requirement, as well as statutory limitations on permissible consideration
(such as the "solely for voting stock" requirement in § 368(a)(1)(B) or (C)); however, the safe
harbor applies to transfers to the former shareholders that are not consideration for their
proprietary interests in the target, for example a pro-rata dividend distribution following the
acquisition; (2) The safe harbor is available for an upstream reorganization, e.g., a merger of an
eighty percent controlled subsidiary into its parent, followed by a drop-down of the acquired
assets. The preamble refers to Rev. Rul. 69-617, 1969-2 C.B. 57, as an example of this principle
(3) The safe harbor does not apply to a transfer to the issuing corporation or a person related to
the issuing corporation by the former shareholders of the target corporation (other than a former
shareholder that is also the acquiring corporation) of consideration initially received in the
potential reorganization; (4) A transfer to a shareholder is always a push-up described in
paragraph (k)(1)(I) even if it also meets the description of a drop-down described in paragraph
(k)(1)(ii), e.g., a transfer to a subsidiary that also is a shareholder; and (5) The drop-down /
sideways safe harbor does not apply if the target or acquisition subsidiary terminates its
corporate existence for Federal income tax purposes in connection with the transfer.
2.
Proposed amendments to regulations governing the marriage of
accounting methods in tax-free reorganizations. REG-151884-03, Update and Revision of

Sections 1.381(c)(4)-l and 1.381(c)(5)-1, 72 F.R. 64545-02 (11/16/07). The Treasury
Department has published proposed amendments to Reg. §§ 1.381(c)(4)-1 and 1.381(c)(5)-1,
dealing with the carryover of tax attributes, including accounting and inventory methods, in
corporate reorganizations and tax-free § 332 liquidations. Generally, following a § 381(a)
transaction, the accounting method or combination of methods used by the parties to the
transaction would continue to be used. If the businesses of the parties to a § 381(a) transaction

are combined by the surviving party and different methods have been used, then the principal
and special method (including the inventory method) rules would apply. However, when the
prior accounting methods cannot be continued after the transaction, Reg. § 1.381(c)(4)-l would
identify the accounting method to be used after the transaction; Reg. §1.381(c)(5)-1 would
provide similar rules regarding inventory accounting methods. "[T]he current regulations are
inconsistent in the treatment of adjustments for inventory methods and for other accounting
methods, and that there is confusion regarding the appropriate procedure for making accounting
method changes required by section 381." The proposed amendments generally would continue
many of the provisions of the existing regulations regarding the accounting method or
combination of methods to be used by the corporation that acquires the assets of another
corporation in a § 381(a) transaction, but are designed to eliminate confusion and uncertainty
and to provide simplicity and uniformity. Unlike the current regulations, the proposed
regulations have a default rule to determine the principal method if there is no principal method.
3.
The step-transaction doctrine applies to cause a push-up to defeat taxfree reorganization treatment, but it does not apply to treat the push-up as an asset
purchase. Rev. Rul. 2008-25, 2008-21 I.R.B. 986 (5/27/08). A reverse triangular merger that
otherwise would qualify as a tax free reorganization under § 368(a)(2)(E), but which could not
qualify as a tax-free reorganization either under § 368(a)(1)(C) because of the mix of
consideration or under § 368(a)(1)(D) because the shareholders of the target did not own
sufficient stock of the issuer, followed by an liquidation of the newly acquired subsidiary
pursuant to an "integrated plan," will be treated as a qualified stock purchase of the target
corporation's stock, followed by a § 332 liquidation. Because the acquired corporation was
liquidated, Reg. § 1.368-2(k) does not apply and the first step does not qualify as a
§ 368(a)(2)(E) tax-free reorganization, because after the acquisition, the target does not hold
substantially all of its properties.
*
Note that nonrecognition at the corporate level and the basis
of the target's assets are unaffected by this ruling. The only effect is that shareholders of the target
recognize all of their gain or loss.
4.
Did the IRS strike out by swinging for a home run? Fisher v. United
States, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. 50,481 (Fed. Cl. 8/6/08). The taxpayer (a trust) owned a life-insurance
policy issued by a mutual insurance company with respect to which it had paid over $190,000 in
premiums. The insurance company converted to a stock company and the taxpayer received
3,892 shares of stock in exchange for its voting and liquidation rights. Pursuant to the
demutualization plan, it elected to take cash in lieu of the shares and the insurance company sold
those the shares on the open market for $31,759.00, which was paid to the taxpayer. The IRS had
issued a private letter ruling to the insurance company stating that the receipt of the shares would
be tax free under § 354, but that under § 358 the shares would take a zero basis because that was
the basis of the policyholder's voting and liquidation rights. The taxpayer reported $31,759.00,
unreduced by any basis adjustment, on its federal income tax return for 2000, and then sought a
refund, claiming that the entire basis of the insurance policy could be offset against the stock sale
proceeds under the open transaction doctrine. Judge Allegra rejected the IRS's position and
agreed with the taxpayer. He reasoned that under Reg. § 1.61-6(a), the basis of the mutual
insurance policy should have been apportioned between the stock received in the
demutualization and the continuing insurance policy, but that because it was "impractical or
impossible" to allocate the basis of the mutual insurance policy between the insurance benefits
and voting and liquidation rights, because they were not alienable apart form the insurance

policy, the open transaction doctrine applied. He cited Inaja Land Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.
727 (1947), acq., 1948-I C.B. 2, as his rationale of applying open transaction treatment to the
payment.
*
Judge Allegra rejected the IRS's argument that the payment
represented a "windfall," stating, "The 'windfall' tag, therefore, lacks evidentiary adhesive and does
not stick."
*
We wonder if the IRS might have blown this one by going for
a home run and trying to assign a zero basis to the stock on the ground that zero was the basis of the
voting and liquidation rights appurtenant to the mutual insurance policy in exchange for which the
stock was received. It should have argued that the basis of the mutual insurance policy should have
been apportioned between the stock and the continuing insurance policy, although the exact
statutory provision to cite for that proposition is not entirely clear.
Can't the IRS spell FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC when $5
5.
I.R.B. __ (9/8/08). Sections 1117(a) and (b) of
trillion is at stake? Notice 2008-76, 2008the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289 (2008), authorize the
Treasury Department to purchase obligations and other securities issued by FANNIE MAE and
FREDDIE MAC - described in the notice as "certain entities" to protect the names of the guilty
parties - under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. The IRS and Treasury will
issue regulations under § 382(m) that will provide that notwithstanding any other provision of
the Code or the regulations, for purposes of § 382, with respect to a corporation as to which there
such an acquisition, the term "testing date" (as defined in Reg. § 1.382-2(a)(4)) will not include
any date on or after the date on which the United States (or any agency or instrumentality
thereof) acquires stock or an option to acquire stock in the corporation. The regulations will
apply on or after September 7, 2008. Thus, the bailout of FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC
will not trigger an ownership change invoking the § 382 limitations on NOLs.
0
Various media outlets attribute the substance of the provisions of the notice
to Henry Paulson, who is reported to have ordered the IRS to issue the notice. See
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfin/12079734/c_12079931 ?f=hometodayinfinance
F.
Corporate Divisions
G.
Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
Taking from the big and contributing to the small does not produce
1.
excluded contributions to capital. United States v. Coastal Utilities, Inc. 483 F. Supp. 2d 1232
(S.D. Ga. 3/28/07). Summary judgment was granted to the Government denying a utility's
refund claim based on its assertion that payments received from the Universal Service
Administration Company and the State of Georgia Access Funds were contributions to capital
excluded from gross income under § 118. The payments were part of state and federally
mandated programs funded by fees collected from telecommunications carriers based on
revenues. Payments are made to carriers with high cost obligations to provide universal access to
telephone services. Based on undisputed facts, and following an in-depth analysis of the relevant
authorities distinguishing non-shareholder contributions to capital from gross income, the
District Court concluded that the purpose of the payments was to supplement income. The court
focused on the mechanisms used to calculate the amount of universal support, which, although
largely related to investment expenditures, took into account operation, maintenance,
administrative, and other expenses that were unrelated to capital investment.

a.
The IRS concludes the same by ruling. Rev. Rul. 2007-31, 200721 I.R.B. 1275 (4/27/07). The IRS ruled that universal service support payments received are not
a non-shareholder contribution to capital under § 118(a).
And the Eleventh Circuit agrees too. Coastal Utilities is
b.
affirmed. United States v. Coastal Utilities, 514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1/23/08). The Eleventh
Circuit adopted in full the district court's order.
State law is relevant in determining who is performing professional
2.
services, but lack of a state law license doesn't mean you're not performing professional
services. Grutman-Mazler Engineerina Inc v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-140 (5/21/08).
In determining whether a corporation a "qualified personal service corporation" as defined under
§ 448(d)(2), state law is relevant to determine whether an activity is within a qualifying field.
Under the relevant state law [California] civil engineering includes submitting designs, plans,
tentative tract maps, grading plans, and engineering reports to local governments and
coordinating other professionals. A 40 percent shareholder who performed such services in a
"planning division," who had an engineering degree but was not a licensed civil engineer, thus
was performing "engineering service." Therefore, because the other conditions of § 448 were
met - a 60 percent shareholder was a licensed engineer who performed engineering services for
the corporation and oversaw its activities - the corporation's income was taxed at the flat 35
percent rate under § 11 (b)(2), not at the graduated rates claimed by taxpayer.
Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns
H.
1.
Twenty-two years after the authorizing statute was enacted, the
Treasury and IRS propose regulations to prevent triple taxation resulting from sales,
exchanges and distributions of corporate stock resulting from General Utilities repeal.
REG-143544-04, Regulations Enabling Elections for Certain Transactions Under Section 336(e),
73 F.R. 49965 (8/25/08). The IRS has published proposed regulations under § 336(e). Section
336(e), enacted as part of the TRA 1986 repealing the General Utilities doctrine, authorizes
regulations allowing a corporation that sells, exchanges, or distributes stock in another
corporation (target) meeting the requirements of § 1504(a)(2) to elect to treat the disposition as a
sale of all of target's underlying assets in lieu of treating it as sale, exchange, or distribution of
stock, as under § 338(h)(10). The purpose of a § 336(e) election is to prevent creation of a triple
layer of taxation - one at the controlled corporation level, one at the distributing corporation
level and, ultimately, one at the shareholder level. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-0 through, when
finalized, will provide the requirements and mechanics for, and consequences of, treating a stock
sale, exchange, or distribution that would not otherwise be eligible for a § 338 election. Under
the proposed regulations, the results of a § 336(e) election generally are the same (with certain
exceptions) as those of a § 338(h)(10) election. The structure of the proposed regulations
resembles the § 338(h)(10) regulations regarding the allocation of consideration, application of
the asset and stock consistency rules, treatment of minority shareholders, and the availability of
the § 453 installment method, although certain definitions and concepts differ to reflect
differences between § 336 and § 338(h)(10). Unlike under § 338(h)(10), however, a § 336(e)
election is a unilateral election by the seller. A transaction that meets the definition of both a
qualified stock disposition and a qualified stock purchase under § 338(d)(3) generally will be
treated only as a qualified stock purchase and does not qualify for a § 336(e) election. Prop. Reg.
§ 1.336-1(b)(5)(ii).
0
General Rules. A qualified stock disposition for which a §
336(e) election may be made is any transaction or series of transactions in which stock meeting the

requirements of § 1504(a)(2) of a domestic corporation is either sold, exchanged, or distributed, or
any combination thereof, by another domestic corporation in a disposition (as defined in Prop. Reg.
§ 1.336-1(b)(4)), during the 12-month disposition period (as defined in Prop. Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(5)).
(All members of a consolidated group are treated as a single transferor. Prop. Reg. § 1.336-2(g)(2)).
Stock transferred to a related party (determined after the transfer) is not considered in determining
whether there has been a qualified stock disposition. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-1(b)(4)(i)(C) and 1.336l(b)(5)(i). A section 336(e) election is available for qualifying dispositions of target stock to noncorporate transferees, as well as to corporate transferees. Prop. Reg.§ 1.336-1(b)(2) However, the
election is not available with respect to the stock of an S corporation. See Prop. Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(5).
a
Because the proposed regulations require only that stock
meeting the requirements of § 1504(a)(2) be transferred, the transferor (or a member of its
consolidated group) may retain a portion of the target stock. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-2(b)(1)(v) and
1.336-2(b)(2)(iv). Furthermore, the proposed regulations allow amounts of target stock transferred to
different transferees, in different types of transactions to be aggregated fin determining whether there
has been a qualified stock disposition. For example, the sale of 50 percent of target's stock to an
unrelated person and a distribution of another 30 percent to its unrelated shareholders (who might or
might not be the purchasers of the 50 percent that was sold) within a 12-month period would
constitute a qualified stock disposition. Prop. Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(5).
*
Sales or Exchanges of Target Stock. In general, if a seller
sells or exchanges target stock in a qualified stock disposition, the treatment of old target, seller, and
purchaser are similar to the treatment of old target (old T), S, and P under § 338(h)(10). If a § 336
election is made, the sale or exchange of target stock is disregarded. Instead, target (old target) is
treated as selling all of its assets to an unrelated corporation in a single transaction at the close of the
disposition date (the deemed asset disposition). Old target recognizes the deemed disposition tax
consequences from the deemed asset disposition on the disposition date while it is a subsidiary of
seller. Old target is then treated as liquidating into seller which in most cases will be treated as a
§ 332 liquidation to which § 337 (or § 336) applies. Additionally, the deemed purchase of the assets
of old target by new target constitutes a deemed purchase of any subsidiary stock owned by target,
and a § 336(e) election may be made for the deemed purchase of the stock of a target subsidiary if it
constitutes a qualified stock disposition. A § 336(e) election generally does not affect the tax
consequences, e.g., stock basis, to a purchaser of target stock.
&
Distributionsof Target Stock Not Subject to § 355. A § 336(e)
election can be made for a taxable distribution of target stock (e.g., dividend, redemption,
liquidation), but the election does not affect the tax treatment of the shareholders. Special rules
assure that the tax consequences to a distributee are the same as if no § 336(e) election was made. If
a distribution is a qualified stock disposition, the distributing corporation is treated as purchasing
from new target (immediately after the deemed liquidation of old target) the amount stock
distributed and to have distributed the new target stock to its shareholders. The distributing
corporation recognizes no gain or loss on the distribution (old target having recognized gain on the
deemed asset sale). Prop. Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(1)(iv). If the distribution is a § 301 distribution, the
portion that is a dividend may affect by the difference between the § 311 gain, and thus E&P, that
would have been recognized on a stock distribution and the gain, and thus E&P) that results from the
deemed asset disposition and liquidation of target. See Prop. Reg. § 1.336-2(c). Because a
distributing corporation cannot recognize loss of the distribution of stock in a § 301 or 302
distribution, losses cannot be recognized on the§ 336(e) deemed asset disposition to the extent the
qualified stock disposition was the result of a stock distribution; only a portion of the losses may be

recognized. Only the portion of the loss on stock that was sold or exchanged, rather than distributed,
maybe recognized. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-2(b)(1)(i)(B)(2) and (3).
9
Section 355 Distributions. The proposed regulations would
allow a corporation that would otherwise recognize gain with respect to a qualified stock disposition
resulting, in whole or in part, from a disposition described in § 355(d)(2) or (e)(2) to make a § 336(e)
election. However, to preserve the E& P allocation consequences of a § 355 distribution under Reg.
§ 1.312-10, the proposed regulations provide special rules. Old target is not deemed to liquidate into
the distributing corporation, but is treated as acquiring all of its assets from an unrelated person and
the distributing corporation is treated as distributing the stock of the controlled corporation (old
target) to its shareholders. Prop. Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(2)(ii) and (iii). Because the controlled corporation
(old target) is not treated as liquidated, it will retain its tax attributes despite the § 336(e) election.
Furthermore, the controlled corporation will take into account the effects of the deemed asset
disposition to adjust its E&P immediately before allocating E&P pursuant to Reg. § 1.312-10. Prop.
Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(2)(vi). Losses from the deemed asset sale will be recognized only in relation to the
amount of stock sold or exchanged in the qualified stock disposition on or before the disposition
date. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336- 2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2) and (3). However, if the controlled corporation (old
target) has any subsidiaries for which a § 336(e) election is made, the general deemed asset
disposition methodology shall apply. This prevents taxpayers from effectively electing whether the
attributes of the lower tier subsidiary become those of target, by doing an actual sale of target
subsidiary's assets followed by a liquidation of target subsidiary, or remain with target subsidiary, by
making a § 336(e) election for target subsidiary.
*
Intragroup Transfers Priorto External Dispositions. If target
stock is transferred within an affiliated group and is then transferred outside the affiliated group, a §
336(e) election is not available for the intragroup transfer (because a qualified stock disposition may
not be made between related sellers and purchasers). Even if a § 336(e) election is made for the
transfer outside of the group, the affiliated group would recognize gain both on target's assets and
the target stock. The proposed regulations do not solve this problem, but the preamble requests
comments on how to address this issue, and related issues under § 355(f), which provides that § 355
does not apply to an intragroup distribution prior to a distribution subject to § 355(e)(2).
0
Aggregate Deemed Asset Disposition Price (ADADP) and
Adjusted Grossed Up Basis (AGUB). To calculate old target's gain under a § 336(e) election, the
proposed regulations determine a new term, "aggregate deemed asset disposition price" (ADADP);
new target's asset basis is determined with reference to adjusted grossed up basis (AGUB), as used
in § 338 and Reg. § 1.338-5. Under Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-3 and 1.336-4, ADADP and AGUB are
determined similarly to the way ADSP and AGUB are determined under the § 338 regulations. The
proposed regulations account for the lack of an actual amount realized on a stock distribution by
treating the grossed-up amount realized as including in the amount realized the fair market value of
distributed target stock Prop. Reg. § 1.336-3(c)(1)(i)(B). In addition, because in the case of a §
336(e) election (unlike in the case of a § 338 election, where there is only one purchasing
corporation and it is relatively easy to determine the purchaser's basis in nonrecently purchased
stock in order to determine AGUB), there can be multiple purchasers or distributees who acquired
target stock prior to the 12-month disposition period, the proposed regulations provide that
"nonrecently disposed stock," which has a similar meaning to the term "nonrecently purchased
stock" in § 338(b)(6)(B), includes only stock in a target corporation held by a purchaser (or a related
person) who owns (with § 318(a) attribution, except §318(a)(4)), at least 10 percent of the total

voting power or value of the stock of target that is not recently disposed stock. Prop. Reg. § 1.3361(b)(17).
New target is treated as acquiring all of its assets from an
unrelated person in a single transaction at the close of the disposition date, but before the deemed
liquidation (or, in the case of a § 355 distribution, before the distribution) in exchange for an amount
equal to the AGUB. With certain modifications, Prop. Reg. § 1.336-4 generally resembles Reg. §
1.338-5 to determine target's AGJB for target. New target allocates AGUB among its assets in the
same manner as in Regs. §§ 1.338-6 and 1.338-7. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-2(b)(1)(ii) and 1.3362(b)(2)(ii).
*
Any stock retained by a transferor (or a member of its
consolidated group) is treated as acquired by the seller on the day after the disposition date at its fair
market value, which is a proportionate amount of the grossed-up amount realized on the transfer
under the § 336(e) election. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-2(b)(1)(v) and 1.336-2(b)(2)(iv). A continuing
minority shareholder is generally unaffected by the § 336(e) election. Prop. Reg. § 1.336-2(d).
*
A holder of nonrecently disposed stock may irrevocably elect
(similarly to under § 338) to treat the nonrecently disposed stock as being sold on the disposition
date. Prop. Reg. § 1.336-4(c). The gain recognition election is mandatory if a purchaser owns (after
applying § 318(a) , other than section 318(a)(4)) 80 percent or more of the voting power or value of
target stock. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.336-1(b)(15) and 1.336-4(c).
*
A taxpayer will be allowed to make a protective § 336(e)
election if it is unsure whether a transaction constitutes a qualified stock disposition. A protective
election will have no effect if the transaction does not constitute a qualified stock disposition, but it
will otherwise be binding and irrevocable. Prop. Reg. § 1.336-2(j).
*
Correction to Reg. § 1.338-5. Reg. § 1.338- 5(d)(3)(ii) is
proposed to be corrected to use the grossed-up basis of recently purchased stock in determining the
basis amount, rather than the non-grossed-up basis.
t
Effective date. The regulations will apply to any qualified
stock disposition for which the disposition date is on or after the date of publication of final
regulations.
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A.
Formation and Taxable Years
1.
The 2007 Small Business Tax Act, § 8215(a), added Code § 761(f),
which provides that a husband and wife who operate a qualified joint venture may elect not to
treat the joint venture as a partnership. A qualified joint venture is one conducted by a husband
and wife both of whom are material participants and who file a joint return. Each spouse is
required to report the spouse's share of income and expense items on a separate schedule C.
Each spouse is individually assessed self-employment tax. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(17), as amended by
the 2007 Small Business Tax Act. Note that Rev. Proc 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 831, permitted a
husband and wife to treat a wholly owned LLC held as community property as a disregarded
entity.
a.
Chief Counsel clarifies employment tax rules. Chief Counsel
Advice 200816030 (4/18/08). Income of husband and wife from real estate rental and dividends,
that is excluded from wages for self-employment tax purposes (§ 1402(a)), does not become
subject to employment taxes by virtue of the making of an election under § 761(f) for treatment
as a qualified joint venture.

2.
LMSB asserts that the § 118 exclusion does not apply to partnerships.
LMSB-04-1007-069, 2007 TNT 202-16 (10/18/07), reaffirming LMSB-04-1106-016 (10/28/06).
The § 118 exclusion from income for nonshareholder contributions to the capital of a corporation
does not apply to partnerships. The directive contains the following admonition, "This Directive
is not an official pronouncement of law, and cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such."
3.
I.R. 2008-110 (9/25/08). The IRS is considering the issue of guidance
regarding technical termination of publicly traded partnerships under § 708(b) resulting in
multiple taxable years of an affected partnership due to transfers of more than 50 percent of a
partnership's capital and profits interests in a 12-month period.
B.
Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis
IRS publishes a safe-harbor for allocation of alternative energy tax
1.
credits. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967 (10/19/07). Section 45 provides a 1.5 cent
credit for each kilowatt of energy from qualified energy sources. Partnership allocations of tax
credits that do not affect partners' capital accounts can not have substantial economic effect.
Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. (11) and 1.704-1(b)(4)(ii) provide that credits are allocated in
proportion to the allocation of expenditures or receipts related to the credit. The revenue
procedure indicates that the IRS will respect allocations of § 45 wind energy production credits
under the principles of Reg. § 1.704-4(b)(4)(ii) if certain conditions are satisfied: (1) the
developer must have a minimum one percent interest in the partnership and the investors must
each have a minimum five percent interest in each partnership material item, (2) the investor
must maintain a minimum investment throughout the project equal to 20 percent of fixed capital
contributions that is not protected from loss, (3) 75 percent of the investor's capital contribution
must be fixed and determinable, (4) the developer or related parties may not have a right to
purchase project property for less than fair market value, and (5) the company cannot have a
fixed right to cause any party to purchase project property (except electricity).
a.
Announcement 2007-112, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1175 (11/21/07). Rev.
Proc. 2007-65 was revised to clarify that the requirements that must be met to qualify for the safe
harbor are neither intended to provide substantive rules nor to be used as audit guidelines.
2.
Final regulations test substantiality of partnership allocations by
looking to the tax impact to the owners of look-through entities. T.D. 9398, Partner's
Distributive Share, 73 F.R. 28699 (5/19/08). Under § 704(b) partnership allocations provided in
a partnership agreement are followed if the allocation has substantial economic effect. An
allocation is substantial only if there is a reasonable possibility that the allocation will affect the
dollar amounts to be received by the partners independent of the tax consequences of the
allocation. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a). The regulations provide that an allocation is not
substantial if the after-tax economic consequences to one partner are enhanced in present value
terms while the after-tax economic consequences to other partners are not diminished. An
allocation is not substantial if the economic consequence of the allocation is a shifting allocation
(an allocation that merely shifts tax consequences without altering economic consequence) or a
transitory allocation (an allocation that will be offset by another allocation so that net increases
and decreases in partners' capital accounts will not differ substantially from what they would
have been absent the allocation).
*
The regulations clarify that the appropriate comparison is the
after-tax consequences that result from an allocation with the after-tax consequences that would
have resulted if the allocations were determined from the partners' interests in the partnership. Reg.
§ 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iii)(a).

*
The new regulations provide that in determining the
economic detriment of an allocation to a look-through entity that is a partner, the effect of the
allocation on the tax attributes of the owner of the look-through entity must be taken into account.
Look-through entities include a partnership, S corporation, estate, trust, disregarded entity, and
controlled foreign corporation that owns at least 10 percent of the capital or profits of the
partnership. In addition, in the case of an allocation to a corporate partner that is a member of a
consolidated group, the effect of the allocation on the tax attributes of members of the group is taken
into account. Reg. § 1.704-1 (d).
0
The regulations contain a de minimis rule that the tax
attributes of less than 10 percent partners, or partners to whom less than 10 percent of any item is
allocated, need not be taken into account in determining substantiality. Reg. § 1.704-1(e).
*
The new regulations also remove the presumption that if a
partnership allocation does not have substantial economic effect, then with respect to the item the
partners' interest in the partnership is per capita. The Treasury concluded that "because the per
capita presumption failed to consider factors relevant to a determination of the manner in which the
partners agreed to share the economic benefits or burdens corresponding to the allocation of
partnership items, the correct result was reached in very few cases."
*
The final regulations are effective as of May 19, 2008.
3.
Proposed regulations would expand anti-abuse rules to look at the tax
attributes of indirect owners to test allocations of built-in gain or loss. REG-100798-06,
Contributed Property, 73 F.R. 28765 (5/16/08). Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) provides that an allocation
with respect to contributed built-in gain or loss property under § 704(c) (or a reverse allocation
in the case of a book-up) is not reasonable if the contribution of property and the allocation is
made with a view of shifting built-in gain or loss among partners in a manner that substantially
reduces the present value of the partners' aggregate tax liability. Proposed regulations would
provide that in testing for a reduction in aggregate tax liability, the tax consequence to both
direct and indirect partners would have to be considered. Indirect partners include the owners of
an entity that is a partner and is a partnership, S corporation, estate, trust, or controlled foreign
corporation that is a ten percent partner. Indirect partners include the members of a consolidated
group in which the partner is a member.
*
The proposed regulations would also provide in Prop. Reg.
§ 1.704-3(a)(1) that the use of allocation methods with respect to built-in gain or loss property only
apply to contributions to a partnership that "are otherwise respected." The regulation would add that
even though an allocation may comply with the literal language of Reg. § 1.704-3(b), (c), or (d)
(traditional method, curative allocations, or remedial allocations), "the Commissioner can recast the
contribution as appropriate to avoid tax results inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K." The
proposed regulations would identify remedial allocations among related partners as one factor that
may be considered.
a
The proposed regulations would be effective on publication
of final regulations in the Federal Register.
4.
Sorting out § 162 from § 212 expenses in upper-tier and lower tier
partnerships. Rev. Rul. 2008-39, 2008-31 I.R.B. 252 (7/4/08). This revenue ruling addressed
the treatment of management fees paid by an upper-tier investment partnership (UTP) and by
lower-tier trader partnerships (LTP) to their respective managers under §§ 162 and 212 where
the upper tier partnership's activities consist solely of acquiring, holding, and disposing of

interests in the lower tier trader partnerships and UTP's management fee is not paid or incurred
by UTP on behalf of any LTP in connection with the trades or businesses of the LTPs. The ruling
holds that UTP's management fee is not a § 162 deduction and cannot be taken into account in
computing UTP's taxable income or loss described in § 702(a)(8). Rather, UTP's management
fee is a § 212 expense and must be separately stated by UTP and separately taken into as a § 212
deduction by an individual limited partner. In contrast, the management fee paid by an LTP is a
§ 162 expense taken into account in computing the LTP's § 702(a)(8) bottom-line taxable
income or loss. UTP's distributive share of LTP's bottom-line income or loss is taken into
account in computing UTP's bottom-line income or loss, the distributive share of which an
individual limited partner in UTP takes into account.
C.
Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners
D.
Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
E.
Inside Basis Adjustments
F.
Partnership Audit Rules
1.
Epsolon Limited v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 738 (10/10/07). The FPAA
issued in a Son son-of-BOSS case was timely because the issuance of a summons to Sidley
Austin Brown & Wood seeking the identities of individual investors suspended the running of
the statute of limitations.
2.
Son of a Boss! Make sure your accountant has your home address.
Stone Canyon Partners v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-377 (12/26/07). The Tax Court
petition filed by a partner, John Bedrosian, more than two years after issuance of an FPAA was
dismissed as untimely. The IRS mailed fourteen FPAAs to addresses shown on the partnership
return, and to addresses supplied by the taxpayer partners' accountant, but not to the taxpayers'
home addresses as shown on their Form 1040. The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) held that the
notice requirements of § 6223(a), which requires adequate or minimal notice of the final
adjustments, was met.
a.
And you can't raise the issue to contest an individual
deficiency. Bedrosian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-375 (12/26/07). The Tax Court
(Judge Vasquez) also granted the IRS's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the taxpayer's
petition regarding the notice of deficiency regarding affected partnership items on the taxpayer's
individual return, because of the pending partnership proceeding. The Tax Court did find that it
had jurisdiction to consider deductions claimed on the taxpayers' individual returns for legal,
accounting, and consulting fees regarding the disputed transactions.
3.
Individual partners' reasonable reliance defenses to penalties is not
part of TEFRA partnership proceeding. Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States 101
A.F.T.R.2d 2008-558 (Fed. Cl. 3/10/08). The court (Judge Miller) rejected the motion of nonmanaging members of a family LLC to assert jurisdiction to hear individual defenses to accuracy
related penalties based on asserted reasonable reliance on the advice of the managing investment
advisor member of the LLC. The court held that TEFRA establishes a two-tier process under
which the court in the partnership proceeding has jurisdiction to consider whether the partnership
itself has a reasonable cause defense to asserted penalties, but not whether individual partners
can assert a reasonable cause defense. Citing §§ 6230(c)(1) and 6231(a)(2)(B), the court
indicated that individual partners may challenge an erroneous computational adjustment and may
raise individual defenses to penalties in a refund action.
4.
The statute of limitations tolls for these bean farmers. Cristopher v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-80 (4/2/08). Taxpayers reported partnership losses from an

investment in Contra Costa Jojoba Research Partners in their 1983 and 1985 tax years. The IRS
sent notices of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPPA) on May 30, 1989, and a
petition was filed by the tax matters partner on July 13, 1989. The issue of an FPPA suspends the
three-year statute of limitations during the period a petition for judicial review may be brought,
and until one-year following final decision. I.R.C. § 6229(d)(1) & (2). The Tax Court entered a
decision against the partnership in April 2005, which was not appealed and became final in July
2005. Thus, the statute of limitations expired in July 2006, one-year and 90 days after the
partnership level decision. An individual partner cannot challenge the timeliness of the FPPA
issued to the partnership. Notices of deficiency issued to the taxpayers on April 17, 2006, were
within the statute of limitations. The taxpayers were also held responsible for negligence
penalties. Reliance on assurances of the tax shelter promoter, without further investigation, was
rejected as reasonable reliance on the advice of professionals. The taxpayers were also subject to
substantial understatement penalties related to the partnership deductions.
5.
The partner was a party to a proceeding he didn't know about.
Kimball v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-78 (4/1/08). Taxpayer disputed liabilities for
additional interest in tax motivated transactions in a Collection Due Process hearing. The Tax
Court (Judge Haines) held that since the taxpayers had not received a notice of deficiency or
other opportunity to dispute the tax for the interest increase the Tax Court would review the case
de novo. However, the court held that the taxpayers were liable for the increased interest. Even if
the tax matters partner failed to notify the taxpayer partner of the partnership proceedings
(although the court was satisfied that the taxpayer was notified), the partner is a party to those
proceedings, which remain applicable to the partner. Enhanced interest under § 6621(c) is a
partnership level item so the Tax Court has limited jurisdiction to reconsider the item outside of
the partnership level proceeding. See River City Ranches #1 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 401 F.3d
1136 (9th Cir. 2005). The determination in the partnership proceeding that the transaction lacked
economic substance is sufficient to establish that the transaction was tax motivated and thus the
enhanced interest is appropriate. The taxpayer was also assessed a failure to pay penalty for
delayed payment of the deficiency.
Another reason to not just sit back and let the TMP handle the
6.
v.
TEFRA audit. Prati United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 422 (4/16/08). Section 7422(h) bars partners
who did not participate in a TEFRA partnership audit proceeding, but signed Forms 870-AD in
connection with that proceeding, from pursuing refund claims challenging timeliness of
assessments arising from the TEFRA partnership audit proceeding that were made more than
three years after the partnership filed its tax return. (Note that § 6229(d) suspends that statute of
limitations upon issuance of a FPAA.) Pursuant to § 6229(a), the statute of limitations on
adjustments to partnership items is itself a partnership item (the statute of limitations on an
affected item is partner specific). A determination of the timeliness of the assessment would
affect the assessment for all partners and thus is a partnership-level determination, not an
affected item determination.
7.
Proof of mailing suffices. Proof of actual receipt is not necessary.
McClaskey v. Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 2008-147 (6/9/08). Proof of mailing of notice of
beginning of partnership administrative proceeding (NBAP) and final partnership administrative
adjustment (FPPA) is sufficient to prevent a partner from treating an item as requiring partner
level determination under § 6223(e)(2). Proof of the actual receipt of the mailing is not required.
Uncontested FPAA does not act as res judicata to consideration of a
8.
partnership tax deficiency in a bankruptcy proceeding. Central Valley AG Enterprises v.

United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-2682 (9th Cir. 6/25/08). The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 505(a), allows a bankruptcy court to determine the amount or legality of a tax unless the tax
had been contested and adjudicated before a "judicial or administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction" before commencement of the bankruptcy case. The taxpayer, Central Valley,
wholly owned a subsidiary that invested in the tax shelter partnership. Central Valley thus was
an "indirect partner" under the TEFRA audit rules. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(2), (9), (10). An FPAA
issued to a tax shelter limited partnership was not contested by the tax matters partner or other
partners. After the FPAA had become final, Central Valley filed a bankruptcy proceeding. The
court concluded that since the FPAA was never challenged in a court of competent jurisdiction,
11 U.S.C. § 505(a) permits the bankruptcy court to adjudicate Central Valley's tax liability
attributable to the partnership item. The court held that the appeals conference more closely
resembles a settlement conference than a hearing before an administrative tribunal that would
preclude bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
9.
$2.9 million short on the deposit, that's a reasonable mistake. Kislev
Partners v. United States, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. 50,490 (Fed. Cl. 8/13/08). The taxpayer, a non-tax
matters partner, filed an action seeking review of a final partnership administrative adjustment
for Kislev Partners, which claimed $140 million of losses in an abusive tax shelter known as a
distressed asset/debt transaction (DAD). In order to invoke jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims, a filing partner is required under § 6226(e)(1) to make a deposit of the amount by which
the taxpayer's tax liability would be increased if the partner's return were filed consistent with
the treatment of partnership items in the FPAA. In this case the taxpayer made a deposit of
$9,500 reflecting the taxpayer's potential tax liability for the year in which the claimed losses
were passed through from the partnership. The taxpayer did not calculate the deposit based on
the taxpayer's liability for years to which he carried over the losses. The correct amount of the
deposit, including claimed tax reductions in the carryover years was $2,905,046, exclusive of
penalties and interest. The court held that the deposit amount is to be calculated over multiple
taxable years. However, the court was satisfied that the taxpayer made a good faith effort to
determine the deposit under the statute and denied the government's motion to dismiss, as long
as the taxpayer makes the additional deposit within 60 days of the date of the opinion.
10.
Former Chief Counsel Will Nelson wins one for a non-tax matters
partner against the tax matters partner. Imprimis Investors, LLC v. United States, 2008-2
U.S.T.C. 50,489 (Fed. Cl. 8/7/08). The tax matters partner filed an action challenging an FPAA.
The tax matters partner asserted that the tax allocations made on the partnership return should be
upheld over the reported inconsistent position taken on its return by the other partner. The Court
of Federal Claims (Judge Horn) granted summary judgment to the intervening partner
interpreting the allocation provisions of the LLC agreement to include allocations of long-term
capital gain income to the intervening partner, and increasing allocations of ordinary income to
the tax matters partner.
G.
Miscellaneous
1.
Partnership interest incurred in the business of trading securities is
treated as investment interest to a noncorporate limited partner.Rev. Rul. 2008-12, 2008-10
I.R.B. 520 (2/19/08). The IRS ruled that a limited partner in a partnership engaged in the trade or
business of trading securities is subject to the investment interest limitation of § 163(d) on the
partner's distributive share of the partnership's interest deduction. Section 163(d)(5)(A)(ii)
provides that the term "property held for investment" includes any interest held by a taxpayer in
an activity involving the conduct of a trade or business that is not a passive activity and with

respect to which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Reg. § 1.469-IT(e)(6) provides that
trading personal property for the account of owners of an interest in the activity (without regard
to whether or not the activity is a trade or business) is not a passive activity. Thus, partnership
interest of a partner who is not a material participant is investment interest described in
§ 163(d)(3). As such it is subject to the § 163(d) limitation on the deduction of investment
interest.
a.
But the interest is deductible above the line. Rev. Rul. 2008-38,
2008-31 I.R.B. 249 (7/3/08). This revenue ruling addressed two issues. First, with respect to an
individual limited partner who does not materially participate, interest paid or accrued on
indebtedness allocable to investment-type property [see § 163(d)(5)(A)(ii)] by a partnership
engaged solely in the trade or business of trading securities for its own account and not for
customers is, after the application of the § 163(d)(1) limitation, a deduction described in
§ 62(a)(1) that is taken into account in determining AGI. Second, if an individual has both
(1) investment interest expense described above, and (2) investment interest expense attributable
to indebtedness allocable to investment property held in an activity that is excluded from the
definition of a passive activity by § 469(e)(1) [see § 163(d)(5)(A)(I)], e.g. investment assets
owned by the same partnership, and (3) the individual partner's aggregate investment interest
expense is greater than his net investment income, the taxpayer must allocate net investment
income between the two categories of investment interest expense. A reasonable method of
allocation is an allocation proportionate to the relative amounts of interest expense within each
category.
b.
The interest expense is reported on Schedule E. Announcement
2008-65, 2008-31 I.R.B. 279 (7/4/08). The limited partner described in Rev. Rul. 2008-12 should
include the allowable amount of his distributive share of the trading partnership's interest
expense described in § 163(d)(5)(A)(ii) on Schedule E (identified in Part II, Line 28, column (a),
as "investment interest," followed by the name of the trading partnership that paid or incurred
the interest expense, and the amount of such interest expense should be entered in column (h)) in
computing ordinary business income or loss.
2.
Not "Epluribus unum" but "Many out of one." Private Letter Ruling
200803004 (01/18/08). This PLR ruled that each series of a series LLC (organized under
Delaware law) is treated as a separate tax entity and its own tax status will be determined
independently of the other series, based upon its own characteristics and elections. Some of the
series were disregarded entities, some were partnerships, and others were corporations (RICs on
the facts).
VIII. TAX SHELTERS
A.
Tax Shelter Cases
1.
District Court upholds BLIPS tax shelter on taxpayer's partial
summary judgment motion. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 7/20/06). The court (Judge Ward) held that the premium portion of the
loans received from the bank in connection with the funding of the instruments contributed to a
partnership was a contingent obligation, and not a fixed and determined liability for purposes of
§ 752. The transaction was entered into prior to the release of Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255,
which related to Son of BOSS transactions. Judge Ward held that a regulation to the contrary,
Reg. § 1.752-6 (see T.D. 9062), was not effective retroactively, and was therefore invalid as
applied to these transactions. Judge Ward held that there was clear authority existing at the time

of the transaction that the premium portion of the loan did not reduce taxpayer's basis in the
partnership.
Fighting duplication and acceleration of losses through
a.
partnerships before June 24, 2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R.
37414 (6/24/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T provides rules, similar to the rules applicable to
corporations in § 358(h), to prevent the duplication and acceleration of loss through the
assumption by a partnership of a liability of a partner in a nonrecognition transaction. Under the
temporary regulations, if a partnership assumes a liability, as defined in § 358(h)(3), of a partner
(other than a liability to which § 752(a) and (b) apply) in a § 721 transaction, after application of
§§ 752(a) and (b), the partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but not below the adjusted
value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the term "liability"
includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the
obligation is otherwise taken into account for Federal tax purposes. Reduction of a partner's
basis generally is not required if: (1) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is
transferred to the partnership, or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is
associated are contributed to the partnership. However, the exception for contributions of
substantially all of the assets does not apply to a transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2
C.B. 255 (or a substantially similar transaction).
0
The temporary regulations purport to be effective for
and
before 6/24/03.
transactions occurring after 10/18/99
b.
Klamath on the merits: It does not work because it lacks
economic substance, but no penalties. The authorities discussed in the Holland & Hart and
Olson Lemons opinions provide "substantial authority." Klamath Strategic Investment Fund,
LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 1/31/07), on appeal to the Fifth Circuit
(9/19/07). The transactions lacked economic substance because the loans would not be used to
provide leverage for foreign currency transactions, but no penalties were applicable because
taxpayers passed on a 1999 investment and they thought they were investing in foreign
currencies and the tax opinions they received that relied on relevant authorities set forth in the
court's earlier opinion provided "substantial authority" for the taxpayers' treatment of their basis
in their partnerships.
C.
On government motions, Judge Ward refuses to vacate partial
summary judgment decision on the retroactivity of the regulations under § 752, and he
permits the deduction of operational expenses, despite his earlier finding that the
transactions lacked economic substance, because the taxpayers had profit motives. Klamath
Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2001 (E.D. Tex. 4/3/07).
First, Judge Ward held that even though the loans lacked economic substance, they still existed,
and thus the partial summary judgment on the non-retroactivity of the regulations under § 752
was not premised on invalid factual assumptions. Second, he held that the existence of profit
motive for deduction of operational expenses was based on the purposes of Nix and Patterson and not on the motives of Presidio, the managing partner of the partnership.
2.
There is a partnership liability in a short sale: Another shelter falls on
summary judgment for the IRS with penalties, and a FPAA to one is as good as an FPAA
to the other. This case differs from Klamath because the transaction was entered into
following the 8/11/00 release of Notice 2000-44 (which made it a listed transaction). Cemco
Investors, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1882 (N.D. Ill. 3/27/07), aff'd, 515 F.3d
749 (7th Cir. 2/7/08). In this tax shelter scheme, Cemco Investment Trust (CIT), a grantor trust,

entered into two foreign exchange digital option transactions on December 2, 2000, with
Deutsche Bank. CIT simultaneously purchased a $3.6 million digital foreign currency option (the
long position) and sold a digital foreign currency option for $3.564 million (the short position).
On the following day CIT assigned the options to Cemco Investment Partners (CIP), a general
partnership. A few days later, CIP purchased E55,947 for $50,000. CIP then entered into a
termination agreement with respect to both of the option contracts. On December 21, CIP was
liquidated with a transfer of the C55,947 and $45,847 to CIT. The transfer occurred by moving
assets from CIP's account at Deutsche Bank to CIT's account. On December 26, CIT transferred
the euros to Cemco LLC. On December 29, Cemco sold the majority of the euros for $51,324 (a
non-functional currency treated as property). Cemco and CIP consisted of two partners, Steven
Kaplan and Forest Charter Holdings, Ltd. Forest was a shell company to orchestrate the
transactions. Forest's sole shareholder and president, Paul Daugerdas, was the trustee of CIT.
Kaplin and Forest were the CIT beneficiaries.
*
Cemco claimed a $3.53 million loss on the sale of the euros.
CIP claimed a $3.6 million basis in the long currency position, and that the contingent obligation of
the short position is not treated as a liability for § 752 purposes, which would otherwise have
reduced basis on termination of the contracts. (See Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975160.) Cemco asserted that while CIP had a total tax basis of $3.6 million, its only assets were the
euros and cash in its possession. Thus, the basis of the euros distributed in liquidation would be $3.6
million less the $47,847 cash, producing a loss on the sale of euros. The District Court held that
Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, which was issued on 9/5/00 [predating the transaction], and Reg.
§ 1.752-1 (a)(4)(ii), issued in June 2003, established that the contingent obligation represented by the
short sale would be treated as a liability to prevent the creation of artificial basis in transactions
designed to create artificial tax losses by overstating basis. Thus, Cemco's losses were disallowed.
*
Cemco's major claim was that that the FPPA should have
been issued to CIP, which was the partnership that executed the transactions and thereby generated
the basis figure with respect to property distributed to Cemco. Agreeing with the Government, the
District Court held that, although the basis of the Euros was a partnership item of CIP, Cemco was
also required to correctly determine the basis of the euros contributed to it and could not merely
carry over the basis as determined by either CIT or CIP. Thus, the FPAA issued to Cemco was not
premised on CIP's errors.
0
The summary judgment also affirmed imposition of the
§ 6662(a) accuracy related penalty, increased to 40% under § 6662(e) for a gross valuation
misstatement.
Affirmed, with very strong support for the authority of the IRS
a.
to issue retroactive regulations. 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2/7/08). Judge Easterbook upheld the
retroactive application of Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T to reduce the basis of the partnership interest
by the contingent obligation. He reasoned that § 309(d)(2) of the 2000 Act specifically provided
that the basis reduction regulations for partnerships authorized by that act could be retroactive to
October 18, 1999, and "[t]hat's the power the Commissioner used when promulgating Treas.
Reg. §1.752-6." Judge Easterbrook rejected what he read as the holding of the district court in
Klamath [440 F. Supp. 2d 608] - that although a retroactive application of the regulation could
have been grounded on the 2000 Act, the IRS had not properly availed itself of that power.
Judge Easterbrook reasoned:
0
But if the IRS was not using that authority, why in the world does the regulation
reach back to October 18, 1999? Retroactivity requires justification; to make a

rule retroactive is to invoke one of the available justifications; and the choice of
date tells us that the justification is the one supplied by the 2000 Act (in
conjunction with §7805(b)(6)). A regulation's legal effect does not depend on
reiterating the obvious. So Treas. Reg. §1.752-6 applies to this deal and prevents
Cemco's investors from claiming a loss.
Judge Easterbook added that Cemco was "scarcely in a position to complain - not only because
this tax shelter was constructed after the warning in Notice 2000-44, but also because all the
regulation does is instantiate the pre-existing norm that transactions with no economic substance
don't reduce people's taxes." Finally, Judge Easterbook rejected Cemco's procedural argument
that an FPPA should have been issued to CIP. Such an action was not required because Cemco
never had been partner of CIP, and thus its basis in the euros was not a partnership item of CIP,
even if the basis of the euros in the hands of CIT, which contributed them to Cemco was the
same as in the hands of CIP.
0
Note that unlike Judge Easterbrook, we read the holding of
Klamath to be that the retroactive application of Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T was invalid under the Fifth
Circuit precedent in Snap-Drape Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 1996), because
the retroactivity to a transaction before the date of Notice 2000-44 was an abuse of discretion.
b.
The Court of Federal Claims disagrees on the retroactive
application of the regulations, but slammed the door on the digital options strategy on
economic substance grounds and upholds penalties. Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United
States 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (Fed. Cl. 7/31/08). The Welles family recognized substantial capital gain
on disposition of 50 percent of the family residential entry door business for $455 million. Prior
to sale the family transferred their stock holdings in the family corporation, Therma-Tru, to a
family investment partnership, Stobie Creek. The partnership, through single member LLC's,
participated in the Jenkens & Gilchrist digital options strategy, to no avail according to the Court
of Federal Claims. In an extraordinarily detailed and lengthy opinion, the court held:
*
Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160, establishes
that the contingent nature of the short sold position in foreign currency prevents a reduction in basis
for a reduction in partnership liabilities on distribution of property from the partnership. Thus the
potential liability on the open currency option did not reduce the taxpayers' basis in distributed
Therma-Tru stock, whose basis was increased by the purchase price of the short options.
0
Retroactive application of Reg. § 1.752-6 is not justified by
§ 309 of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309, 114 Stat.
2763A-587, -638. That provision was aimed at corporate transactions and is focused on the use of
contingent liabilities to accelerate or duplicate losses. The court opined that, "The transfers of the
contingent liabilities in the cases at bar resulted in increasing each partner's outside basis, but did not
cause any acceleration or duplication of losses."
*
Judge Miller held that the long and short digital options were
two options, not one as contended by the government.
0
Judge Miller dismissed Notice 2000-44, which was issued in
August 2000, after the transactions occurred but before they were reported by taxpayers in 2001, as
follows:
[The government's] argument misunderstands the import of IRS notices. As a
general proposition, IRS notices are press releases stating the IRS's position on a
particular issue and informing the public of its intentions; such notices do not

constitute legal authority .... Whether [taxpayers] had "notice" that their
transactions would be subject to scrutiny has no bearing on whether a Treasury
regulation, seeking retroactively to effect a change in the law, can serve to
disallow [taxpayers'] reporting position.
0
Nonetheless, under Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States,
454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the partnership transaction in options lacked economic substance.
The court indicated that in Coltec, "The Federal Circuit thus adopted a disjunctive test for
determining whether a transaction should be disregarded as an economic sham: the doctrine should
apply and a transaction should be disregarded either if the transaction lacks objective economic
substance or if it is subjectively shaped solely by tax avoidance motivations." After an exhaustive
analysis of conflicting expert opinions, the court found that, "the weight of the evidence overwhelms
plaintiffs' claim that the transactions were investments motivated by a business purpose to return a
profit." The court also interpreted Coltec as holding that, "if a transaction was shaped solely by a
tax-avoidance purpose, the fact that the transaction may have some objective economic reality
cannot save it from being disregarded as an economic sham." As to the taxpayers' subjective
purpose, the court found that, "Plaintiffs' limited evidence of non-tax avoidance subjective
motivation does not imbue the transactions with economic substance."
*
The court also applied the step transaction doctrine to deny
the claimed tax benefits. The court stated, "Trial established that, under either the interdependence
test or the end result test, the step transaction doctrine applies to plaintiffs' transactions. Accordingly,
the tax consequences must turn on the substance of the transaction and not on the form by which
plaintiffs engaged in it. In disregarding the predetermined steps of the J&G strategy, Stobie Creek is
unable to claim a basis increase in the Therma-Tru stock, and the capital gains must be taxed
according to the reality of the transaction."
*
The court upheld accuracy and negligence penalties and
rejected the taxpayers' claim that they reasonably relied on the advice of counsel. The court
concluded that because of the built-in conflict of interest of the lawyers promoting the transaction
that was known to the taxpayers, reliance on the legal opinions was not reasonable.
3.
Hi-Lili, Hi-Lili, LILO! District court grants summary judgment to the
government in a LILO transaction. BB&T Corp. v. United States, 2007-1 U.S.T.C. 50,130,
99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-376 (M.D. N.C. 1/4/07). Taxpayer, a financial services corporation, leased
equipment from a wood pulp manufacturer [a head lease] and re-leased it back to the wood pulp
manufacturer in a "lease-in-lease-out" ("LILO") transaction and claimed substantial rent and
other deductions. The court held that the form of the transaction should not be respected for tax
purposes because taxpayer did not acquire a current leasehold interest in the equipment and
incurred no risk of loss. The reciprocal offsetting obligations were disregarded because, in
substance, the taxpayer acquired only a future interest in the right to use and possess the
equipment - and acquired that interest only if the owner-sublessee did not exercise its option to
buy-out taxpayer's interest in the head lease. The transaction did not substantially affect the
wood pulp manufacturer's rights to use and possess the property.
a.
Affirmed, 523 F.3d 461, 2008-1 U.S.T.C. 50,306 (4th Cir.
4/29/08). In this "typical" LILO transaction entered into in 1997 - the tax benefits of which were
largely eliminated by regulations that became effective in 1999 [Reg. § 1.467-1 to -5] - the court
(Judge Williams) found that the transaction was a financing arrangement, not a genuine lease and
sublease, distinguishing FrankLyon Co. v. UnitedStates, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).

Same result in a SILO. AWG Leasing Trust v. United States,
2008-1 U.S.T.C. 50,370 (N.D. Ohio 5/28/08). A LILO transaction evolved into a Sale In Lease
Out (SILO), which is essentially the same transaction but the head lease is longer term so that the
initial acquisition is claimed to be treated as a sale. Not so says Judge Gwin of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In this case the taxpayer acquired a German municipal
incineration and power generation facility with a nonrecourse loan from German banks and
leased the facility back to the seller with an option for the seller to purchase the plan. The court
concluded that the "small, but guaranteed, pre-tax profit [was] sufficient to show that the
transaction had some 'practicable economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses"'
and refused to disregard the transaction under the economic substance doctrine. However,
finding that substance controls over form, the taxpayer was denied depreciation and amortization
deductions on the grounds that the transaction was a financing arrangement rather than a
purchase of property because the transaction was structured to avoid transfer of the substantive
rights and liabilities associated with ownership. The court also denied interest deductions on the
nonrecourse loan. The circular flow of funds involved with the loan proceeds in an escrow
arrangement to fund the lease payments that were equal to obligations on the note meant that the
loan was a sham. The court described the loan as a .'loop debt' in which the loan proceeds are
used solely for the purpose of paying the purported debt."
Interest is suspended under § 6404(g) because of the absence of fraud.
4.
Sala v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2551 (D. Colo. 5/1/07). If an individual files a timely
return (including extensions) and the IRS has not sent the taxpayer a notice of additional liability
(e.g., a math error notice of deficiency), including an explanation of the basis for the liability,
within one year following the later of(1) the due date of the return (without regard to extension),
or (2) the date on which the taxpayer filed the return, § 6404(g)(1) suspends the accrual of
interest for the period beginning one year after the due date (or filing, if applicable) of the return.
Interest resumes running twenty-one days after the IRS sends a notice to the taxpayer. Section
6404(g) does not apply at all if an underpayment is due to fraud. In this case, the district court
held that the fraud exception to § 6404(g) does not apply to a deficiency from a tax shelter
transaction ["Baby BOSS"] that lacked economic substance, unless the government shows that
the taxpayer engaged in some act of concealment or misrepresentation. Even though the taxpayer
entered into the transaction knowing that it was a listed transaction [Notice 2000-44], and
knowing that it would not be registered with the IRS in order to conceal his participation,
because taxpayer relied on a "more likely than not opinion" by R.J. Ruble that the tax results of
the transaction would be upheld, the taxpayer acted in good faith and the government could not
prove that the taxpayer had fraudulent intent. Summary judgment was entered for the taxpayer.
Was it a "qualified amended return"? Sala v. United States, 99
a.
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1709 (D. Colo. 5/30/07). On plaintiff s motion for partial summary judgment,
Judge Babcock held that the amended 2000 return filed by Sala on 11/18/03 was possibly not a
"qualified amended return" because the date that the IRS notified KPMG that it was under a
§ 6700 examination was 10/17/03. The resolution of this issue depends upon the scope of the
§ 6700 examination at the time the amended return was filed, and an issue of fact exists that
would preclude summary judgment. The court refused to stay the case pending the availability of
testimony from Sala's KPMG accountant, Tracie Henderson, and from R.J. Ruble, both of whom
indicated they would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, because the delay would be
substantial and would prejudice Sala.
b.

b.
Sala v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5097 (D. Colo.
7/3/07). Judge Babcock reiterated his holding that there is an issue of fact as to whether the
11/18/03 amended return was a qualified amended return.
c.
District Court holds for the taxpayer on the merits in an
options transaction for which R.J. Ruble provided the tax opinion. Sala v. United States, 552
F. Supp. 2d 1167, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1843, 2008-1 U.S.T.C. 50,308 (D. Colo. 4/22/08). The
District Court (Judge Babcock) held that taxpayer was entitled to a $60 million ordinary loss on
24 long and short currency options entered into in November 2000 as part of a Deerhurst
Program, in which the options were contributed to a partnership. The basis of that partnership
interest was increased by the cost of the long options but was not reduced by the contingent
liability on the short options under Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160 (1975). This
was based upon Judge Babcock's finding of fact that the long and short options were separate
instruments for tax purposes. The court found that the regulations issued in 2003, Reg. § 1.752-6,
retroactive to October 1999, which contained an "exception to the exception" for transactions
described in Notice 2000-44, exceeded Treasury's authority. Judge Babcock held that the
regulations were not legislative because the "exception to the exception" was not comparable to
the rules for corporations described in § 358(h) because the corporate rules were to be only "to
prevent acceleration or duplication of losses," which were not involved in the transactions
described in Notice 2000-44. He refused to follow Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515
F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).
*
He analyzed the complex transaction under the step
transaction doctrine and found the doctrine inapplicable.
*
He found the losses deductible under § 165(c)(2) because
they were incurred in a transaction entered into for profit, which was to be determined at the time
taxpayer entered into the transaction, and not in hindsight. In this, Judge Babcock credited Sala's
testimony that "he expected his investment in Deerhurst to be profitable above and beyond the
expected tax loss...."
*
He found the taxpayer was "an extremely cautious investor
who invested a great deal of time and energy carefully researching and choosing his investments"
and that he had a business purpose other than tax avoidance for structuring his investment as he did.
a
Judge Babcock further held that Sala's amended return filed
on 11/18/03 was a "qualified amended return" because KPMG had not been contacted regarding
Deerhurst prior to that date, although it had been previously contacted regarding transactions similar
to Deerhurst.
d.
Government motion on 6/10/08 for new trial based upon
affidavit given in connection with decision not to prosecute investment manager. Andrew J.
Krieger, a key witness for the taxpayer, stated in an affidavit dated 5/22/08 that a portion of the
testimony he gave at deposition was false, in that there was no "test period" for an "investment
program" but merely an effort to obtain tax savings. 2008 TNT 114-15. The motion was opposed
by the taxpayer because Krieger gave his affidavit only after the government granted him
immunity from prosecution by executing a non-prosecution cooperation agreement in connection
with a criminal investigation unrelated to this case, i.e., the Coplan criminal case pending in the
Southern District of New York. 2008 TNT 130-62, 7/1/08.
e.
Government motion for new trial denied. 2008 WL 2799715
(7/18/08). 2008 TNT 140-70. Judge Babcock denied the motion, holding that the evidence
submitted by the government was not new. He stated, "Rather than implying diligence, the

timing of this "new" evidence instead implies a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government
to further delay and derail this case for tactical gain."
5.
This decision might have a "colming" effect on the IRS. COLM
Producer, Inc. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 10/16/06). The court (Judge
Godbey) upheld the disallowance of a loss of about $102.7 million on the sale of a limited
partnership interest in December 1999. The partnership interest was funded by the Ettman
Family Trust with $2 million plus the contribution of the $102.5 million proceeds of the short
sale of $100 million (face value) of U.S. Treasury Notes subject to the obligation to replace the
borrowed T-notes. The partnership interest was then sold to an unrelated third party for $1.8
million. Judge Godbey held that the obligation to replace the borrowed T-notes [on the closing of
the short sale] should have been treated as a liability under § 752. Although contingent liabilities
were not included as liabilities under § 752, the obligation to close the short sale was a "liability"
based upon his reading of the Black's Law Dictionary definition ["the quality or state of being
legally obligated or accountable" or, "a financial or pecuniary obligation"]; he reinforced his
conclusion by citing Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, and Salina Partnership LP v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-352.
a.
Short sale

obligations

in

Son

of Boss transaction

are

indebtedness under § 752(b). Kornman & Associates Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 20081 U.S.T.C. 50,333 (5th Cir. 5/12/08). This variant of the Son of Boss shelter involved the
taxpayer entering into a short-sale of Treasury notes, followed by contribution of the $102.5
million of cash proceeds and the obligation to replace the borrowed Treasury notes to a
partnership. The taxpayer then sold the partnership interest for a $1.8 million promissory note
from the buyer claiming a basis of $102.5 million and a capital loss. The taxpayer claimed that
relief from the obligation to replace the Treasury bills was a contingent liability based on closing
the short sale and therefore not release of indebtedness includible in amount realized on sale of
the partnership interest under § 752(b). The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
government holding that the obligation to close a short sale is a liability for purposes of § 752.
(See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4)(i), effective May 26, 2005).
a
The court followed Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 C.B. 128; Rev.
Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131; and Rev. Rul. 95-45, 1995-1 C.B. 53, in holding that short sale
obligations are taken into account in computing basis. The court held that the revenue rulings are not
entitled to deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844

(1984), but, although not controlling, the rulings are entitled so some deference depending on the
power to persuade. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
a
The court also held that the open transaction treatment
applied to short sales under § 1233 applies to recognition of capital gains and losses and has no role
in determining basis under § 752.
6.
Short sale obligations are treated as liabilities under § 752. Marriott
International Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-6039 (Fed. Cl. 8/28/08). The
taxpayer, Marriott Resorts was a limited partnership consisting of Marriott International JBS
Corporation (JBS), the general partner, and Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. (MORI), the
limited partner. JBS was the general partner of MORI. The limited partner in MORI was
Marriott International Capital Corporation. MORI sold timeshare units in resort properties and
subsequently transferred the buyer's promissory notes to TIAA. MORI entered into a short sale
of five-year Treasury notes and invested the proceeds of the short sale in repurchase obligations
(Repos) yielding a fixed return. MORI contributed the repurchase obligations and some

mortgage notes to the taxpayer partnership for a 99 percent limited partnership interest. The
partnership assumed MORI's obligation on the short sale. (This is similar to a Son of BOSS
transaction but predates the retroactive effective date of Reg. § 1.752-6.) The partnership closed
the short sales by using funds from the repurchase obligations to acquire Treasury securities.
MORI then transferred its partnership interest to Marriott International Capital Corporation,
which caused a termination and re-formation of the partnership under § 708(b). All of the parties
claimed a basis in partnership interests and partnership assets from the cost of the repurchase
obligations unreduced by the obligation under the short sale, and used this basis to claim losses
on the ultimate disposition of partnership assets (done through a grantor trust). The partnership
claimed a loss on the sale of the contributed mortgage notes. The Claims Court (Judge Lettow)
held on summary judgment that the obligation under the short sale was a liability for purposes of
§ 752(b) that reduced the partnership's basis in its assets, and thereby eliminated the claimed
losses. The court followed the result in Salina Partnershipv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000352, and rejected arguments based on holdings in La Rue v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 465 (1988);
Long v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1 (1978); and Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1975-160.
Citing Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 C.B. 128, the court noted that the taxpayer was on notice that the
IRS would assert that symmetry is required under § 752 on the transfer of property that creates
basis and offsetting contingent obligations that should reduce basis.
7.
Son of Boss deal fails because a few thousand C$ were left behind in a
bank account. 7050 Ltd. v. Commissioner T.C. Memo 2008-112 (4/23/08). The Son of Boss
transaction relies on a partnership liquidation distribution of property that takes an inflated
exchanged basis under § 732(b). One of the issues in the government's partial summary
judgment motion in the this Son-of-Boss tax shelter case was whether a distribution of property
(foreign currency) from the partnership was a liquidating distribution, resulting in an exchanged
basis for the property determined with reference to the partnership interest pursuant to § 732(b)
(which the taxpayer partner claimed was determined with respect to a high basis option
contributed to the partnership), or a current distribution, resulting in a transferred basis from the
partnership pursuant to § 732(a). The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) granted summary judgment for
the Commissioner, holding that liquidation of a partner's interest on dissolution of a partnership
requires a complete termination of all partnership activities, including the distribution to the
partners of all the partnership's assets. The presence of a few thousand Canadian dollars in an
account belonging to the partnership, distributed in the next taxable year, caused a distribution of
property to a partner in the prior year to be treated as a current distribution to the partner in
which the distributee partner's basis in the distributed property was the transferred partnership's
basis under § 732(a), rather than the higher exchanged basis from the partner's outside
partnership basis. Property distributed in complete liquidation of a partner's interest takes the
partner's outside basis in the partnership interest under § 732(b). In addition, the court refused to
grant summary judgment to the Commissioner on the issue of whether options originally
contributed to the partnership had expired by the date of the contribution indicating that the issue
depended on questions of fact that could not be settled on summary judgment. The Tax Court
also reserved judgment on penalty issues pending resolution of whether Temp. Reg. § 301.6221 IT(c), treating reasonable reliance as a partner-level defense, is valid.
0
This is a more appropriate way of attacking tax shelters than
by the government relying on amorphous judicial doctrines and on whether a black muumuu wearer
is "shocked, shocked" by the result of Congressional language plainly interpreted.

The Court of Federal Claims follows Coltec on the economic
substance issue. Jade Trading LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (12/21/07). The Court of
Federal Claims (Judge Williams) held that, although they literally complied with the Code,
digital options spread transactions lacked economic substance. She relied upon Coltec Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), to reach that conclusion. Judge Williams
stated,
In sum, this transaction's fictional loss, inability to realize a profit, lack of
investment character, meaningless inclusion in a partnership, and disproportionate
tax advantage as compared to the amount invested and potential return, compel a
conclusion that the spread transaction objectively lacked economic substance.
0
The 20 percent and 40 percent penalties were applied
although the § 6664 reasonable cause exception issue was postponed to possible partner-level
proceedings.
a.
Reconsideration denied. 81 Fed.Cl. 173, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 20081411 (3/20/08). The taxpayer argued that the negligence penalty should not have been applied at
to the partnership, because the inaccurate reporting occurred on the individual partner's tax
returns, not on Jade's. Judge Williams responded as follows:
The Code dictates that the Court assess the applicability of the negligence penalty
with respect to the partnership in the context of this partnership proceeding. First,
section 6621, "Tax Treatment Determined at Partnership Level," directs that the
tax treatment of any "partnership item" and the applicability of any penalty which
"relates to" an adjustment to a "partnership item" shall be determined at the
partnership level. ... The negligence penalty clearly related to the inflated basis
the spread transaction in the partnership generated on the [partner's] individual
returns ....
Although typically accuracy-related penalties are applied at the partnership level
based upon the partnership return's inaccurate reporting, it would be
inappropriate to eliminate the penalty here solely because there are no numerical
inaccuracies on Jade's partnership tax return. Applying the negligence penalty to
the partnership here is particularly appropriate because it was only the construct
of forming the partnership and contributing the spread to the partnership that
permitted the tax losses to be realized. Had the Ervin LLCs simply done the
spread transactions on their own without contributing them to Jade there would
have been no substantial losses. As the Court recognized: "packaging the
investment in the partnership vehicle was an absolute necessity for securing the
tax benefits." Jade, 80 Fed. Cl. at 14.
... [S]ections 6621, 6226(f) and 6662(b) and (c), read together permit the Court to
determine whether an underpayment on an individual partner's tax return is
"attributable to" negligence that "relates to" partnership items. In doing so, the
Court is free to analyze the conduct at the partnership level which generated the
losses. (emphasis in original)
9.
A major partnership razzle dazzle that defers real estate gains with
liquidation distributions survived economic substance scrutiny by the Tax Court, but there
is much more to come. Countryside Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-3
(1/2/08). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) granted summary judgment to limited partners holding
8.

that distributions of non-marketable securities held by a disregarded LLC in liquidation of
limited partners' interests were respected as distributions of non-marketable securities that did
not trigger recognition of gain under § 731. The partnership borrowed $17 million (guaranteed
by one of the distributee partners) which it used to acquire a 99 percent interest in two LLCs.
The LLCs borrowed an additional $3.4 million and purchased non-traded notes from AIG. The
interest payable on the notes was less than the interest paid on the debt. The LLC interests were
distributed to two limited partners in liquidation of their interests in 2000. The reduction in the
liquidated partners' share of partnership liability did not exceed the basis generated by the
liabilities. The partnership sold its highly appreciated real estate in 2001. The proceeds of sale
were used to repay the partnership's liabilities. The AIG notes were redeemed in 2003. The Tax
Court rejected the IRS' claim that the economic substance of the transaction was a distribution of
cash. The court was satisfied that, although the transaction was structured to avoid tax, in
economic substance the transaction represented a conversion of the taxpayers' investment in the
partnership to an investment in 10-year promissory notes, "two economically distinct forms of
investment." The issue of the partnership's step-up in basis under § 734(b) as a result of the
liquidation distributions remained at issue in a separate case addressing the partnership's 2001
taxable year.
10.
As the old saying goes, "There's no tax free basis step-up without a
funeral." This "midco" tax shelter was rejected by the court. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc. v.
United States, 553 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 3/31/08). In a transaction substantially similar to
the transaction described in Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730, the taxpayer (Midcoast) acquired
the assets of a selling corporation (Bishop) through an intermediary (K-Pipe). Midcoast desired
to acquire the Bishop assets with a cost basis, but Bishop's shareholder (Langley) was unwilling
to engage in an asset sale, insisting on a stock sale and purchase. Midcoast's tax advisor, PWC,
arranged for the formation of an intermediary, K-Pipe Merger, and the financing necessary for
K-Pipe Merger to purchase the Bishop stock, with the loan to K-Pipe Merger being secured by
Midcoast assets. After a downstream merger of K-Pipe Merger into Bishop, Bishop, which
changed its name to K-Pipe Group, sold the Bishop assets to Midcoast. (K-Pipe purportedly
offset the gain with built-in loss on assets contributed to it by its shareholder in a pre-§ 362(e)
year.) Thereafter, K-Pipe engaged in no business activity and was merely a shell. On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court (Judge Harmon) upheld the IRS's treatment of
the transaction from Midcoast's perspective as a stock sale followed by a § 332 liquidation,
which resulted in denying the step-up in basis on which Midcoast's claimed depreciation
deductions were based. After disregarding K-Pipe because it had no substance other than as a
vehicle to allow Midcoast to claim a cost basis in the Bishop assets in a stock sale transaction
without a § 338 election, the court addressed what was the real substance of the transaction: a
sale of stock or a sale of assets. Because Langley would not agree to a direct sale of Bishop's
assets, "the only way in which Midcoast could have obtained the Bishop Assets was to purchase
the Bishop Stock and liquidate." Assessment of the § 6662(d) substantial understatement penalty
was upheld, and because the transaction was a "tax shelter," neither the substantial authority nor
adequate disclosure exceptions applied. Alternatively, there was not substantial authority
because the weight of authority in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases was held to have
required disregarding K-Pipe.
11.
Judge Werlein holds that the transfers by Shell Western E&P Inc. to
Shell Frontier Oil & Gas Inc. of assets that had declined in value, followed by sales of the
subsidiary's stock to unrelated parties at a loss, were not part of a tax-motivated "shell

game." Shell Petroleum Inc. v. United States, _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. 50,422, 102
A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5085 (S.D. Tex. 7/3/08). In 1992 Shell Western transferred high-basis assets
that had declined in value to a newly-created subsidiary, Shell Frontier. Following that, Shell
Western sold so-called "Dutch auction rate preferred stock" for $110 million to unrelated parties,
which constituted more than 20 percent of the value of Shell Frontier stock. This sale created a
loss of more than $353 million. The high-basis property transferred to Shell Frontier was
described by Judge Werlein as follows:
The term "frontier property" is commonly used by Shell to describe an asset that
is not currently commercially competitive, but which has the potential to become
commercially competitive if technological, political, economic, or other factors
change.
The idea of the transaction originated in Shell's Tax
*
Department. Judge Werlein described it as follows:
The Government makes much of the fact that the creation of Shell Frontier was
proposed by Steve Stryker, Shell's Vice President of Tax. The evidence is that
Shell's CEO Frank Richardson had set overarching goals for the company to
improve its return on investment, to reduce costs, and to raise cash without
incurring new debt. A variety of recommendations were made by executives and
managers, from which at least seven major initiatives were adopted and executed
by the company. Only one of these seven approved recommendations came from
the tax department. When Stryker presented the proposal, however, he
intentionally refrained from discussing the specific tax implications of the § 351
exchange with Shell's top management or Richardson, who ultimately approved
the Shell Frontier plan, in order to assure that the ultimate decision to form Shell
Frontier would be made on non-tax business grounds. The testimony of Shell's
decision-makers is that Shell Frontier was formed to raise cash, preserve longterm properties, and increase management efficiency. These proffered business
purposes are consistent with Shell's contemporaneous overall strategy of
improving its return on investment and increasing cash flow by investing
strategically to increase production and by restructuring some of its assets.
Indeed, a taxpayer's restructuring of a going-concern is a recognized, valid
business purpose. See United Parcel Serv. of Am.. 254 F.3d at 1020 (holding a
transaction that "simply altered the form of an existing, bona fide business"
possessed an adequate business purpose). That the Shell Frontier idea originated
with Shell's tax department, which anticipated the beneficial tax consequences
that might also be realized, does not undercut the testimony of Shell's executives
that their authorization of Shell Frontier's formation, including the transfer of
some of Shell Western's non-producing assets, was based on their legitimate cash
raising, asset preservation, and management objectives.
*
In his opinion, Judge Werlein held that the transaction should
be respected. He rejected arguments that the transaction lacked economic substance and refused to
apply Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), to the § 351
transaction taken out of its context.
*
The government argued that assets with no discounted net
cash flow value did not constitute property and Judge Werlein responded as follows:

Under the Government's construction of the term, "property" does not include
assets such as the Shell Western non-producing properties because, while not
producing, they had no discounted net cash flow value. But the statute itself
contains no such limitation. At least one court has implicitly construed § 351(a)
not even to require that the transferred property have a fair market value in excess
of zero. See Abbrecht v. Comm'r T.C. Memo 1987-199, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 611
(1987) (holding § 351 applied to debt exchanged for stock, although the value of
the debt was not shown to have a fair market value greater than zero). ***
In sum, even if the Court were to accept the Government's unsupported view that
real property is not "property" within the meaning of § 351 if it is lacking in
value, the evidence establishes that the non-producing properties transferred by
Shell Western to Shell Frontier did in fact have some value and unquestionably
qualify as "property" entitled to non-recognition under § 351.
0
Note that in 2004, § 362(e) was added to the Code, and, as
stated in footnote 1 of the opinion,
Congress has since changed the law so that in Section 351exchanges occurring
after October 22, 2004, transfers of property with built-in losses require that either
the transferee's basis in the transferred property, or, if the transferor so elects, the
transferor's basis in the stock received, is reduced to fair market value. See Pub.
L. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1596 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 362(e)(2)
(2004)). Hence, as Shell points out, Shell Western's transfer to Shell Frontier of
its producing and non-producing properties had occurred under the 2004
amendment, Shell Western still would have had the right to take the stock it
received with a cost basis equal to that of the properties it transferred to Shell
Frontier, just as Shell claims here. By making that election, however, under the
2004 amendment Shell Frontier's basis in the properties would be reduced to fair
market value as of the date of exchange. Regardless, Shell Frontier's tax liability
is not at issue in this case, and, of course, this case is governed by the pre-2004
statute.
a.
Note also proposed regulations with respect to transfers of
property with no net value. The transfer of something worth nothing (or less than nothing)
on a net basis is not a transfer of property for purposes of subchapter C. REG-163314-03,
Transactions Involving the Transfer of No Net Value, 70 F.R. 11903 (3/10/05). These proposed
regulations deal with the net value requirement for tax-free transactions under subchapter C, and
provide that exchanges under §§ 351, 332 and 368 do not qualify for tax-free treatment where
there is no net value in the property transferred or received, with exceptions for E, F and some D
reorganizations.
*
The proposed regulations also provide guidance on the
treatment of creditors of an insolvent corporation will be treated as proprietors to determine whether
continuity of interest is preserved.
12.
Government misconduct amounting to fraud does not require a
showing of prejudice to justify relief. Tax shelter investors entitled to the same deal
received by the taxpayers who cooperated with the government. Dixon v. Commissioner,
316 F.3d 1044, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,194 (9th Cir. 1/17/03), remanding T.C. Memo. 2000-116
and T.C. Memo. 1999-101. The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court finding that misconduct by

IRS attorneys during the trial of test cases [secretly allowing the deduction of attorney's fees in
exchange for taxpayer cooperation] constituted harmless error. The tax shelter was one designed
and administered by Honolulu businessman Henry Kersting, in which participants purchased
stock with loans from entities financed by two layers of promissory notes, resulting in their being
enable to claim interest deductions on their individual returns. Judge Hawkins held that the
taxpayers demonstrated fraud and that a demonstration of prejudice was unnecessary. The Tax
Court was directed to enter judgment in favor of taxpayers on terms equivalent to the secret
settlement agreements entered into with the test case taxpayers who cooperated with the
government.
*
Three lawyers from the Houston area represented various
taxpayers. They were Henry Binder of Porter & Hedges, Michael Louis Minns, and Joe Alfred Izen,
Jr.
a.
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-008 (2/3/03). This notice reminds
Chief Counsel attorneys of their obligation to adhere to the highest ethical standards in all
aspects of their responsibilities, including representation of the Commissioner before the Tax
Court. ABA Model Rules 3.3 [candor to tribunals], 3.4 [fairness to opposing party and counsel],
4.1 [truthfulness in statements to third persons], and 8.4 [misconduct] were discussed in the
notice.
b.
On remand to the Tax Court, it really hits the fan for the
Commissioner - and deservedly so. The misconduct of the government lawyers involved
and the Commissioner's failure to fully disclose the misconduct to all taxpayers who had
been bound by the outcome of the Kersting project test cases infested the stipulated
decisions in all of the hundreds of cases settled in accordance with the outcome of the test
cases. Hartman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-124 (5/1/08). In a 137-page opinion, the
Tax Court (Judge Beghe) held that all of the hundreds of Kersting tax shelter cases in which
stipulated decisions had been entered and which had became final many years ago had to be reopened and the taxpayers' accounts had to be adjusted administratively in accordance with the
settlements received by the taxpayers in the test cases.
B.
Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
1.
A new listed transaction: This time the IRS isn't just TOI-ing. Notice
2008-34, 2008-12 I.R.B. 642 (2/27/08) This notice describes as a listed transaction certain
transactions entered into in an attempt to avoid the effect of the amendments to §§ 704, 734 and
743 in The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 designed to prevent taxpayers from shifting a
built-in loss from a tax indifferent party to a U.S. taxpayer through the use of a partnership. [The
2004 amendments to §§ 704, 734 and 743 generally (1) require that a built-in loss may be taken
into account only by the contributing partner and not other partners, and (2) make the basis
adjustment rules mandatory in cases with a substantial basis reduction or substantial built-in
loss.] In the transaction, a tax indifferent party directly or indirectly contributes one or more
distressed assets (for example, a creditor's interest in debt) with a high basis and low fair market
value to a trust or series of trusts and sub-trusts, and a U.S. taxpayer acquires an interest in the
trust (and/or series of trusts and/or sub-trusts) for the purpose of shifting a built-in loss from the
tax indifferent party to the U.S. taxpayer that has not incurred the economic loss. This
transaction (referred to as a distressed asset trust or DAT transaction) and substantially similar
transactions are listed transactions for purposes of Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) and §§ 6111 and 6112.
C.
Disclosure and Settlement
D.
Tax Shelter Penalties, Etc.

1.

These "value ideas" did produce extraordinary results for E&Y tax

partners, but not the results they expected. United States v. Coplan. Two current and two
former partners of Ernst & Young - all members of its VIPER [Value Ideas Produce
Extraordinary Results] group - were indicted on 5/30/07 in the Southern District of New York
for crimes relating to tax shelters promoted by E&Y. The shelters included CDS ("Contingent
Deferred Swap"); COBRA ("Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives"); CDS Add-On; and
PICO ("Personal Investment Corporation"). 2007 TNT 105-1.
a.
More defendants. 2008 TNT 35-23 (2/21/08). The indictment was
expanded to add David L. Smith, Private Capital Management, and Charles Bolton to the list of
alleged co-conspirators. Smith is alleged to have introduced the CDS strategy to E&Y and is
further alleged to have licensed the CDS transactions to Bolton and a group of Bolton companies
who implemented the transactions.
2.
Liechtenstein! IR-2008-26 (2/26/08). The IRS announced that it is
initiating enforcement action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers in connection with
accounts in Liechtenstein. According to a story in the 2/19/08 Wall Street Journal, (a) Heinrich
Kieber, a former employee of Liechtenstein's largest bank, LGT Group, has offered confidential
client data to tax authorities on several continents over the past 18 months, and (b) the German
government paid roughly E4.2 million ($6.4 million) to an unnamed individual for the same type
of information.
3.
The Court of Federal Claims isn't particularly fussy about who the
taxpayer relies on for bad tax advice. Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 568 (2/27/08). This
case decided by the Court of Federal Claims (Judge Wolski) related solely to negligence
penalties imposed by the IRS under former § 6653(a). When the issue is whether a taxpayer was
negligent in claiming deductions from a tax shelter that are ultimately disallowed for lack of
economic substance, reliance on the advice of a professional investment adviser, who is neither a
lawyer nor accountant that an investment can be expected to be profitable, is reasonable, even if
the adviser lacks knowledge and experience in the relevant industry, if the adviser investigated
the investment in question.
0
In December 1982 the taxpayers invested in a limited
partnership to place plastics recycling machines with businesses generating polystyrene scrap in
order to recycle the scrap into a reusable form of resin pellets, for which they claimed the energy and
investment tax credits. The case involved investors in the Masters Plastic Recycling Tax Shelters,
which were found not to have economic substance in the test case, Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo.1992-177.
4.
The KPMG deal: the price of settling goes up dramatically. IR-200583 (8/29/05). The IRS and the Justice Department announced that KPMG LLP has admitted to
criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution, and penalties as part of
an agreement to defer prosecution of the firm. Nineteen individuals, chiefly former KPMG
partners including the former deputy chairman of the firm [Jeffrey Stein], as well as a New York
lawyer [R.J. Ruble] were indicted in the Southern District of New York in relation to the "multibillion dollar criminal tax fraud conspiracy"; several of those indicted were partners in KPMG's
Washington National Tax group and several of those indicted were practice partners at KPMG.
a.
Judge Kaplan refuses to find prosecutorial misconduct in the
deferred prosecution agreement. United States v. Stein, 428 F. Supp. 2d 138 (S.D.N.Y.
4/4/06). Judge Kaplan denied a motion to dismiss based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct
by reason of the alleged manipulation of KPMG in the deferred prosecution agreement. This

DPA required the firm "upon pain of corporate death, [to] espouse a government-approved
version of [the] facts." Judge Kaplan based his decision on the ethical provision applicable to all
attorneys that prohibits them from coercing witnesses to give false testimony. He further held
that nothing in the DPA pressures individual KPMG employees to testify in any particular way,
but that the DPA merely requires the firm to disavow any assertion by an affiliated individual
that is inconsistent with the DPA's Statement of Facts.
b.
In its post-Enron war against white collar crime, the Justice
Department's notion that what is fair against organized crime is also fair against white
collar crime receives a [temporary?] setback. Judge Kaplan finds prosecutorial misconduct
in the use of the Thompson Memorandum to prevent KPMG from continuing its
customary practice of paying attorney's fees for individuals caught up in controversy by
reason of their affiliation with the firm. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y.
6/26/06), as amended, 7/14/06. The court held that the Justice Department's Thompson
Memorandum policy [continued from the Holder Memorandum] of basing a determination of
whether a firm is "cooperating" with the government on its refusal (unless compelled by law) to
advance legal fees for affiliated individuals unless they in turn fully cooperated with the
government, as it was applied by the prosecutors in this case, was an unconstitutional
interference with defendants' ability to use resources that -absent the government's misconduct
- would be otherwise available to them for payment of attorneys' fees. The resources in question
were funds that would have customarily been received by these defendants from KPMG to pay
their attorneys.
Judge Kaplan suggested that the constitutional violation could
be rendered harmless if the defendants could successfully force KPMG to pay their legal expenses,
and sua sponte instructed the clerk of the district court to open a civil docket number for an expected
contract claim by the defendants against KPMG for payment of their defense costs. Judge Kaplan
stated that the court would "entertain the claims pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction over this case."
The defendants subsequently filed the anticipated complaints against KPMG.
0
Judge Kaplan subsequently refused to eliminate from his
opinion a statement that prosecutors in the case were "economical with the truth." He also refused to
eliminate from his opinion the names of the prosecutors involved. 2006 TNT 130-10.
c.
Judge Kaplan indefinitely postpones the federal criminal trial
against 16 former KPMG employees, an outside investment adviser, and a lawyer. United
States v. Stein, 461 F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 11/13/06). Judge Kaplan reaffirmed his earlier
holding that ancillary jurisdiction existed over the contractual fee dispute between the defendants
and KPMG. He rejected KPMG's argument that the defendant's claims were foreclosed by
written agreements, and found that enforcement of any applicable arbitration clause would be
contrary to public policy, because it might interfere with the ability to ensure a speedy trial,
could lead to a dismissal of meritorious criminal charges, would endanger the defendants' rights
to a fair trial, and might impose unnecessary costs on taxpayers if the defendants became
indigent. Judge Kaplan cited fears that defendants may be unable to pay their lawyers in further
postponing the trial.
d.
Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 5/23/07). The Second
Circuit vacated the district court orders in United States v. Stein to the extent that they found
jurisdiction over the complaint against KPMG and dismissed the defendants' complaint against
KPMG.

The prejudice to KPMG in having these claims resolved in a proceeding ancillary
to a criminal prosecution in the Southern District of New York is clear. At stake
are garden variety state law claims, albeit for large sums. KPMG believed that
contractual disputes between it and the appellees would be resolved by
arbitration. Instead, KPMG is faced with a federal trial of more than a dozen
individuals' multi-million dollar "implied-in-fact" contract claims. Moreover,
because such a proceeding is governed by no express statutory authority, the
district court has indicated its intention to apply to this expedited undertaking an
ad hoc mix of the criminal and civil rules of procedure determined on the fly, as it
were ...
First, "the interrelationship of the factual issues underlying the finding of
constitutional violations and the asserted contract claims is marginal ...
Second, while the ancillary proceeding is a major undertaking, its contribution to
the efficient conclusion of the criminal proceeding is entirely speculative ...
Third, even if there were constitutional violations and even if KMPG is
contractually obligated to advance [defendants'] attorneys' fees and costs, creating
an ancillary proceeding to enforce that obligation was not the proper remedy....
Finally, on the present record, a proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution
was not necessary either to avoid perceived deficiencies in ordinary civil contract
actions to enforce the alleged advancement contracts or to remove some barrier to
the [defendants'] bringing of such actions.
e.
Indictment against 13 KPMG defendants dismissed because
the government interfered with their Sixth Amendment right to secure counsel which
would have been available to them absent government interference. United States v. Stein,
495 F_ Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 7/16/07). Judge Kaplan dismissed the indictment as to 13 of the
16 defendants who had been affiliated with KPMG at the time of their alleged conduct because
the U.S. Attorney's Office interfered with their ability to receive payment of their attorneys' fees
from KPMG. The government announced its intention to appeal the dismissal of the 13
defendants, and Judge Kaplan indicated his intention to proceed with the trial of the remaining
five defendants in October 2007. This trial was postponed until 2008.
Judge Kaplan's dismissal of the indictment against 13 former
f.
,
F.3d
KPMG partners was affirmed by the Second Circuit. United States v. Stein,
2008-2 U.S.T.C. 50,518 (2d Cir. 8/28/08). In a resounding opinion, Chief Judge Jacobs agreed
with Judge Kaplan's analysis that the actions taken by KPMG to "condition[ ], cap[ ] and
ultimately cease[ ]" to advance legal fees to defendants constituted "state action" which deprived
defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel because they were the result of the
prosecutors' (mis?)use of the Thompson Memorandum to overwhelmingly influence KPMG to
not follow its past practice "to advance legal fees for employees facing regulatory, civil and
criminal investigations without condition or cap" upon pain of a possible indictment of the firm.
The McNulty Memorandum is not much better than the
g.
Thompson Memorandum. The Thompson Memorandum was replaced on 12/12/06 by the
McNulty Memorandum which requires threats to prosecute entities "unless" they do something
[e.g., waive attorney client privilege] or "if' they do something [e.g., advance legal fees] to
emanate from a higher level of the Justice Department.

The Filip Memordandum is close, but still no cigar. The
McNulty Memorandum was, in turn, replaced on 8/28/08 with the Filip Memorandum, which
purportedly removes the requirements that a firm must waive attorney-client privilege and work
product protection in order to receive "cooperation credit." Instead, that determination should be
based on "whether the corporation has provided the facts about the events [which putatively
constituted misconduct]." Also, "mere" participation in a joint defense agreement is to be permitted
but such participation should not disable the firm from providing [all] relevant facts to the
government. Payment of legal fees for employees is permissible unless such payment is "used in a
manner that would otherwise constitute criminal obstruction ofjustice."
0

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
Exempt Organizations
A.
1.
This is a real sleeper! All tax-exempt organizations will be required to
file annual electronic notices. Pension Protection Act § 1223 adds new Code § 6033(i) to
require electronic filing of an annual informational notice by all exempt organizations not
currently required to file [specifically, organizations with gross receipts under $25,000] on pain
of losing tax-exempt status. This provision is effective for years beginning in 2007.
Calendar year organizations must do this by May 15, 2008. IRa.
2008-25 (2/25/08). Tax exempt organizations not required to file Forms 990 or 990-EZ are
required to file Form 990-N, "Electronic Notice (e-Postcard) for Tax-Exempt Organizations not
Required to File Form 990- or 990-EZ" for tax years beginning in 2007. Section 6033(i)
provides that organizations that do not file Form 990-N for three consecutive years will lose their
tax-exempt status.
Charitable Giving
B.
One of Timothy McVeigh's lawyers loses again, but the consequences
1.
are not as severe this time. Jones v. Commissioner 129 T.C. No. 16 (11/1/07). Stephen Jones,
one of Timothy McVeigh's lawyers in the criminal proceeding stemming from the Oklahoma
City Federal Building bombing, donated to the University of Texas copies of documents
received by him from the government in the course of his representation of Timothy McVeigh
and claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the appraised value. Judge Cohen upheld the
IRS's disallowance of any deduction on the ground that under the relevant state law (Oklahoma),
the materials were not attorney work product and not being attorney work product, the client, not
the lawyer, was the owner of the materials in the case file. Because the taxpayer "was not the
legal owner of the materials, he was not legally capable of divesting himself of the burdens and
benefits of ownership or effecting a valid gift of the materials." Alternatively, even if the
material in the file was attorney work product, by virtue of § 1221(a)(3) it was an ordinary
income asset, and thus under § 170(e)(1)(A) the deduction was limited to basis, which was zero.
2.
The potential tax benefits of a charitable contribution "described as
offering a 'huge [tax] windfall' of '150K," morphed into a 40% gross valuation
misstatement penalty. Bergquist v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 2 (7/22/08). Prior to 2001, the
taxpayers provided medical services to the Oregon Health & Science University Hospital
(OHSU) through their medical professional corporation (UA). Following the announcement by
OHSU that it would terminate its contracts with various medical professional corporations
through which physicians provided services and form its own organization, the Oregon Health &
Science University Hospital Medical Group (OHSUMG), which thereafter would employ the
physicians, the taxpayers contributed most of the stock of UA to OHSUMG. The corporation
[UA] had no assets other than accounts receivable and had never paid any dividends. After the
IX.

consolidation was completed, UA would have no doctors and no patients, and UA would not
operate other than to collect accounts receivable outstanding as of the date of the consolidation.
According to the court's fact findings, "OHSUMG's executive management accepted the
donation of UA stock as a professional courtesy to the UA stockholders. At the time of donation,
OHSUMG's management did not expect to derive any economic benefit from the donated UA
stock. OHSUMG management did not expect to receive and in fact did not receive from UA any
dividends or distributions." OHSUMG advised the taxpayers that it was valuing the contribution
at zero. Twenty six of twenty eight shareholders claimed charitable contributions deduction of
$401.79 per share, based on an appraisal. Judge Swift found that UA was not a going concern at
the time of the contribution and allowed a deduction of $37 per share for voting stock and $35
per share for nonvoting stock, which had been conceded by the Commissioner based on its
expert's appraisal. The substantial valuation misstatement penalty of § 6662(e) and gross
valuation misstatement penalty of § 6662(h) applied, depending, taxpayer-by-taxpayer, on
whether the deficiency exceed $5,000. The taxpayers did not act in good faith:
From the beginning, the plan to donate UA stock on the brink of the January 1,
2002, consolidation was presented to UA stockholders as a way to reap a potential
"150K" windfall. Petitioners are well educated and surely were cognizant of the
imprudence of valuing the UA stock at such a high value given the likelihood that
by 2002 UA would no longer be an operating entity. ... Petitioners were aware of
the January 8, 2002, letter from OHSUMG's president stating that OHSUMG had
decided to book the donated stock at zero ... . [A] taxpayer will not be considered
to have reasonably relied in good faith on advice from an adviser if the advice is
based on an 'unreasonable' assumption the "taxpayer knows, or has reason to
know, is unlikely to be true". This would appear to be particularly applicable
where no adviser is sought out who is truly independent of the planned
transaction.
3.
Proposed regulations on contributions of used underwear, oh yeah
and also substantiation requirements. REG-140029-07, Substantiation and Reporting
Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable Contribution Deductions, 73 F.R. 45908
(8/7/08). The Treasury Department has published proposed regulations [Prop. Regs. §§ 1.170A15 through 1.170A- 18] regarding substantiation and reporting requirements for cash and noncash
charitable contributions to reflect the enactment of provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004 [§ 170(f)(1 1) and (12)] and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 [§ 170(f)(16) and (17)].
0
Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-15(a) would provide that the
substantiation requirements of § 170(f)(17) regarding cash contributions could be met by a monthly
bank statement and a photocopy or image obtained from the bank of the front of the check indicating
the name of the donee and that a written communication from the charity sufficient to meet the
requirement must show the name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the
contribution. The written communication may be electronic. A contribution made by payroll
deduction can be substantiated by (1) a pay stub, Form W-2, or other document furnished by the
employer that sets forth the amount withheld during the taxable year for payment to a donee,
together with (2) a pledge card or other document prepared by or at the direction of the donee
organization that shows the name of the donee organization. A receipt is not required for
contribution to a charitable remainder trust of less than $250 or for unreimbursed expenses of less
than $250 incurred incident to the rendition of services to a charitable organization, but taxpayers
should maintain records of the gifts or expenses. Prop. Reg. § 1.1 70A- 16(c) would provide that for

claimed noncash contributions of more than $500 but not more than $5,000, the. donor must obtain a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment required by § 170(f)(8) and Reg. § 1.170A-1 3(f) and
must file a completed Form 8283 (Section A) with the return on which the deduction is claimed. For
claimed contributions of more than $5,000 but not more than $500,000, the donor must obtain (a) a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment required by § 170(f)(8) and Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-13(f),
and (b) a qualified appraisal as defined in Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(1) (prepared by a qualified
appraiser, as defined in Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-17)(b)(1)), and must file a completed Form 8283
(Section B), which requires very detailed information about the contribution and the property
contributed, with the return on which the deduction is claimed.
0
Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-17(a) elaborates on the § 170(f)(1 1)(E)
definition of a qualified appraisal. A qualified appraisal is an appraisal document that is prepared by
a qualified appraiser in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards. Under the proposed
regulations, generally accepted appraisal standards are the substance and principles of the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, as developed by the Appraisal Standards Board of the
Appraisal Foundation, see Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, Public Law 101- 73, 103 Stat. 183 (12 U.S.C. §§3331-3351). The fee for a qualified
appraisal cannot be based to any extent on the appraised value of the property. A qualified appraisal
must contain the following declaration by the appraiser: "I understand that my appraisal will be used
in connection with a return or claim for refund. I also understand that, if a substantial or gross
valuation misstatement of the value of the property claimed on the return or claim for refund results
from my appraisal, I may be subject to a penalty under section 6695A of the Internal Revenue Code,
as well as other applicable penalties. I affirm that I have not been barred from presenting evidence or
testimony before the Department of the Treasury or the Internal In addition to the statutory
exceptions providing that a qualified appraisal is not required for (1) publicly traded securities, and
(2) qualified vehicles, if certain conditions have been met, I.R.C. § 170(f)(1 1)(A)(ii), Prop. Reg. §
1.170A-16(d)(2) provides exceptions for certain intellectual property (described in
§170(e)(l)(B)(iii)), (4) inventory and property held by the donor primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the donor's trade or business.
*
Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-17(b) would provide a detailed
definition of "qualified appraiser" including minimum educational requirements. Prop. Reg.
§ 1.170A-16(f)(6) would provide that to satisfy the "reasonable cause" exception to the noncash
substantiation requirements, a donor must (1) submit with the return a detailed explanation of why
the failure to comply was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect and (2) obtain (i) a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment and (ii) a qualified appraisal, if applicable.
a
Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-18 would provide more detailed rules
regarding limitations under § 170(f)(16) for contributions of used underwear, as well as other
clothing and household items. Food, paintings, antiques, and other objects of art, jewelry, gems, and
collections are not household items.
4.
The tax Code continues to try to green-up America. The Heartland,
Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2008, extended § 170(b)(1)(E) though 2009.
Section 170(b)(1)(E) allows an individual (other than a qualified farmer or rancher) to claim a
charitable-contribution deduction for a qualified conservation contribution to the extent of the
excess of 50 percent of the taxpayer's contribution base over the amount of all other allowable
charitable contributions. For an individual who is a qualified farmer or rancher, qualified
conservation contributions are allowed up to 100 percent of the excess of the contribution base
over the sum of all other allowable charitable contributions. The ceiling for a privately held

corporation that is a qualified farmer or rancher is 100 percent of the excess of the corporation's
taxable income over the sum of all other allowable contributions. In all cases, any disallowed
qualified conservation contributions may be carried forward for up to 15 years.
5.
More computers and books for school children. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extend through 2009 the application of Code § 170(e)(6),
which permits a corporation to deduct an amount equal to the lesser of (1) basis plus one-half of
the item's appreciation (i.e., basis plus one half of fair market value in excess of basis) or (2) two
times basis, for a contribution of computer software, equipment, and peripherals to educational
institutions for use in kindergarten through twelfth grade education. The equipment be
previously unused and not more than two years-old. The Act also extends § 170(e)(3)(D) which
provides a similar enhanced charitable contribution deduction for contributions of book
inventory by C corporations.
X.

TAX PROCEDURE
A.
Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions
1.
The standard for preparer penalties is broadened to include
preparers of all tax returns, and is heightened from "realistic possibility of success" to
"more likely than not." The 2007 Small Business Tax Act, § 8246, amends Code §§ 6694 and
7701 to expand the applicability of the § 6694 return preparer penalties from "income tax return
preparers" to all tax return preparers. It also heightens the standards of conduct to avoid the
imposition of the return preparer penalty for undisclosed positions with a requirement that there
be a reasonable belief that the tax treatment of the position was "more likely than not" the proper
treatment. For disclosed positions, the standard is increased from "non-frivolous" to "reasonable
basis." Penalty amounts are increased from $250 to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the
income to be derived by the preparer under § 6694(a) [negligent], and from $1,000 to the greater
of $5,000 or 50 percent of the income to be derived by the preparer under § 6694(b) [willful or
reckless]. These changes are effective for tax returns prepared after 5/25/07.
But practitioners were given a pass under the new rules for
a.
2007. Notice 2007-54, 2007-27 I.R.B. 12 (6/11/07). This notice provided transitional relief for
all returns, amended returns and refund claims due on or before 12/31/07, to estimated tax
returns due on or before 1/15/08, and to employment and excise tax returns due on or before
1/31/08. The transitional relief was that the standards set forth under previous law and current
regulations would be applied in determining whether the IRS would impose penalties under
§ 6694(a), but the transitional relief was not available for penalties under § 6694(b), which
applies to return preparers who exhibit "willful or reckless conduct."
b.
Placeholder proposed Circular 230 regulations. REG-13863707, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 72 F.R. 54621
(9/26/07). These proposed regulations would amend the Circular 230 standards of practice,
§ 10.34 to conform with the § 6694 provisions in the 2007 Small Business Tax Act. Deborah
Butler, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration), has stated that the
proposed regulation contains merely "placeholder language," and that the government will first
get out § 6694 guidance before considering whether the historical linkage between § 6694 and
Circular 230 remains appropriate.
c.
Three subsequent notices clarified Notice 2007-54.
(1)
2007 tax advice given by nonsigning preparers. Notice
2008-11, 2008-3 I.R.B. 279 (12/31/07). This notice provides that advice given before 1/1/08 by
nonsigning preparers will be governed by standards under former § 6694.

Which returns require a preparer signature? Notice
2008-12, 2008-3 I.R.B. 280 (12/31/07). This notice specifies which returns require a preparer
signature and which returns do not.
A notice temporarily relaxes the requirements on
(3)
practitioners, but it is puzzling in places and is not a free pass. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B.
282 (12/31/07). This notice provides interim guidance on the application of the tax return
preparer penalties as amended by the 2007 Small Business Tax Act. These amendments did not
modify the exception to liability under § 6694 that is applicable when it is shown, considering all
the facts and circumstances, that the tax return preparer has acted in good faith and there is
reasonable cause for the understatement.
The notice provides that a tax return preparer is considered
*
reasonably to believe that the tax treatment of an item is more likely than not the proper tax
treatment (without taking into account the possibility that the tax return will not be audited, that an
issue will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be settled) if the tax return preparer analyzes
the pertinent facts and authorities in the manner described in Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) and, in
reliance upon that analysis, reasonably concludes in good faith that there is a greater than 50 percent
likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS.
0
It further provides that a tax return preparer may rely in good
faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer, as provided in Reg. § 1.6694l(e). In addition, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith and without verification upon
information furnished by another advisor, tax return preparer, or other third party. A tax return
preparer will be found to have acted in good faith when the tax return preparer relied on the advice
of a third party who is not in the same firm as the tax return preparer and who the tax return preparer
had reason to believe was competent to render the advice.
A signing tax return preparer shall be deemed to meet the
0
requirements of § 6694 with respect to a position for which there is a reasonable basis but for which
the tax return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not
be sustained on the merits, if the tax return preparer meets any of the following requirements:
(1) The position is disclosed in accordance with § 1.6662-4(f) (which permits
disclosure on a properly completed and filed Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R,
Regulation Disclosure Statement, as appropriate, or on the tax return in accordance with the
annual revenue procedure described in § 1.6662-4(0(2));
(2) If the position would not meet the standard for the taxpayer to avoid a penalty
under § 6662(d)(2)(B) without disclosure, the tax return preparer provides the taxpayer with the
prepared tax return that includes the disclosure in accordance with § 1.6662-4(0;
(3) If the position would otherwise meet the requirement for nondisclosure under
§ 6662(d)(2)(B)(i), the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the difference between the
penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under § 6662 and the penalty standards applicable to
the tax return preparer under § 6694, and contemporaneously documents in the tax return
preparer's files that this advice was provided; or
(4) If § 6662(d)(2)(B) does not apply because the position may be described in
§ 6662(d)(2)(C), the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable
to the taxpayer under § 6662(d)(2)(C) and the difference, if any, between these standards and the
standards under § 6694, and contemporaneously documents in the tax return preparer's files that
this advice was provided.
(2)

*
A nonsigningtax returnpreparershall be deemed to meet the
requirements of § 6694 with respect to a position for which there is a reasonable basis but for which
the nonsigning tax return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would more
likely than not be sustained on the merits, if the advice to the taxpayer includes a statement
informing the taxpayer of any opportunity to avoid penalties under § 6662 that could apply to the
position as a result of disclosure, if relevant, and of the requirements for disclosure
0
One of the examples has raised a good bit of interest.
Example 10. A corporate taxpayer hires Accountant J to prepare its tax return.
Accountant J encounters an issue regarding various small asset expenditures.
Accountant J researches the issue and concludes that there is a reasonable basis
for a particular treatment of the issue. Accountant J cannot, however, reach a
reasonable belief whether the position would more likely than not be sustained on
the merits because it was impossible to make a precise quantification regarding
whether the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits. The
position is not disclosed on the tax return. Accountant J signs the tax return as the
tax return preparer. The IRS later disagrees with this position taken on the tax
return. Accountant J is not subject to a penalty under section 6694.
*
Anita Soucy, spokesperson for the Treasury Office of Tax
Policy explained at a New York State Bar Association meeting that Example 10 should not be relied
on because it is a sympathetic case with mitigating circumstances. Deborah Butler echoed that
statement at the same meeting, saying: "The rules aren't in the examples," and "Don't overdiagnose
the examples. They're not going to be there in a year." 2008 TNT 24-8.
*
It is important to note that the regulations expected to be
finalized in 2008 may be substantially different from the rules described in this Notice, and in some
cases more stringent.
d.
Proposed tax return preparer regulations anticipated to be
effective after 2008. REG-129243-07, Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694 and
6695, 73 F.R. 34560 (6/17/08). Proposed regulations under §§ 6694 and 6695 (as well as under
§§ 6060, 6107, 6109, 6696 and 7701(a)(36)) would implement the amendments made by § 8246
of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007. The proposed regulations
provide that the "reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on
its merits" standard is satisfied if the tax return preparer analyzes the pertinent facts and
authorities and, in reliance upon that analysis, reasonably concludes in good faith that the
position has a greater than 50 percent likelihood of being sustained on its merits. Prop. Reg.
§ 1.6694-2(b)(1). The test is applied on the date the return is prepared. Prop. Reg. § 1.66942(b)(6). Whether a tax return preparer met this standard is determined based upon all the facts
and circumstances, including the tax return preparer's due diligence. The conclusion cannot be
based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events)
and must not unreasonably rely on the representations, statements, findings, or agreements of the
taxpayer or any other person. Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-2. The possibility that the position will not be
challenged by the IRS, because the taxpayer's return may not be audited or because the issue
may not be raised on audit, cannot be considered.
*
Substantial authority plus a chat is all that will be
required. The more-likely-than-not rule is administratively relaxed, as it was in Notice 2008-13, and
is replaced by a standard of a position that will not result in taxpayer penalties plus a discussion with

the client about taking a position that would not result in a preparer penalty provided that the
discussion is memorialized in a non-boilerplate manner.
0
If a signing tax return preparer does not believe that a position
is more likely than not, the requirements of § 6694 could be satisfied by disclosure in one of five
ways. Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(i).
(1)
The position may be disclosed on a properly completed and filed Form
8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, as appropriate,
or on the tax return in accordance with the annual revenue procedure. [See, e.g., Rev. Proc.
2008-14, 2008-7 I.R.B. 435].
(2)
If there is a "reasonable basis" (as defined in Reg. § 1.1662-3(b)(3)) but
there is not "substantial authority" (as defined in Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)) for the position, disclosure
is adequate if the tax return preparer provides the taxpayer with a prepared tax return that
includes the appropriate disclosure.
(3)
If there is "substantial authority" for the position, disclosure is adequate if
the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of all of the penalty standards applicable to the
taxpayer under § 6662.
(4)
If the position involves a tax shelter, as defined § 6662(d)(2)(C), or a
reportable transaction to which § 6662A applies, disclosure is adequate if the tax return preparer
advises the taxpayer that (i) there must be "substantial authority" for the position, (ii) the
taxpayer must possess a "reasonable belief that the tax treatment [on the return] was more likely
than not" the proper treatment, and (iii) disclosure will not protect the taxpayer from assessment
of an accuracy-related penalty.
(5)
For tax returns or claims for refund that are subject to penalties other than
the accuracy-related penalty for substantial understatements under sections § 6662(b)(2) and (d),
the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer
under § 6662. The fifth rule addresses situations in which the penalty standard applicable to the
taxpayer is based on compliance with requirements other than disclosure on the return.
*
If the position was not actually disclosed on the return, to
establish that the tax return preparer's disclosure obligation was satisfied under alternatives (2)
through (5), the tax return preparer must contemporaneously document in his files that the required
information or advice was provided to the taxpayer.
*
In the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer (as defined in
Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2), a position that is not more likely than not correct, but for which
there is a reasonable basis, may be disclosed in one of three ways. Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii).
(1)
The position may be disclosed on a properly completed and filed Form
8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, as appropriate,
or on the tax return in accordance with the annual revenue procedure.
(2)
The nonsigning tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of all
opportunities to avoid penalties under § 6662 that could apply to the position and advises the
taxpayer of the standards for disclosure to the extent applicable, and contemporaneously
documents in his files that this advice was provided.
(3)
The nonsigning tax return preparer advises another tax return preparer
that disclosure under § 6694(a) may be required, and contemporaneously documents in his files
that this advice was provided.
*
For both signing and nonsigning return preparers, if a position
for which there is a "reasonable basis" but for which the tax return preparer does not have a

"reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits" is not
disclosed on or with the return, each return position must be addressed by the tax return preparer.
Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(iii). The advice to the taxpayer with respect to each position must be
particular to the taxpayer and tailored to the taxpayer's facts and circumstances.
0
A signing tax return preparer is any tax return preparer who
signs or who is required to sign a return or claim for refund as a tax return preparer. Prop. Reg.
§ 301.7701-15(b)(1). A "nonsigning return preparer is a person who renders tax advice on a position
that is directly relevant to the determination of the existence, characterization, or amount of an entry
on a return or claim for refund will be regarded as having prepared that entry, even if the person does
not sign the return. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2) and (3). Whether a schedule, entry, or other
portion of a return or claim for refund is a substantial portion is determined based upon whether the
person rendering the tax advice knows or reasonably should know that the tax attributable to the
schedule, entry, or other portion of a return or claim for refund is a substantial portion of the tax
required to be shown on the return or claim for refund. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(3). A de
minimis exception applies for nonsigning preparers if the item giving rise to the understatement is
less than (1) $10,000, or (2) less than $400,000 if the item is also less than 20 percent of the
taxpayer's gross income (or, for an individual, the individual's adjusted gross income). Reg. §
301.7701-15(b)(3)(ii).
•
Write up your hours heavily during the planning process,
but bill by the minute after the events have occurred. Time spent on advice that is given after
events have occurred that represents less than 5 percent of the aggregate time incurred by such
individual with respect to the position(s) giving rise to the understatement is not taken into account
in determining whether the individual is a return preparer. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2)
Like the current regulations, the proposed regulations provide that the § 6694 penalty can be avoided
if, considering all the facts and circumstances, the preparer demonstrates that the understatement was
due to reasonable cause and that the tax return preparer acted in good faith. Prop. Reg. § 1.66942(d). The proposed regulations provide that one of the factors that can avoid the penalty is that the
preparer "reasonably relied in good faith on generally accepted administrative or industry practice in
taking the position that resulted in the understatement." Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)(6). This factor
does not appear in the current regulations. "[F]or purposes of determining whether the tax return
preparer has a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the
merits, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished
by the taxpayer, advisor, other tax return preparer, or other party (including another advisor or tax
return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm)." A preparer may rely in good faith without
verification upon a tax return that has been previously prepared by a taxpayer or another tax return
preparer and filed with the IRS, but may not ignore implications of information actually known by
the preparer; preparer may not rely on information provided by a taxpayer with respect to legal
conclusions on Federal tax issues. Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1); Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e). "[A]
position must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as
to future events) and must not unreasonably rely on the representations, statements, findings, or
agreements of the taxpayer or any other person. For example, a position must not be based on a
representation or assumption that the tax return preparer knows, or has reason to know, is
inaccurate." Prop. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(2).
a
The proposed regulations provide that a tax return preparer
has not recklessly or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation if the position contrary to the rule
or regulation has a "reasonable basis" and is adequately disclosed as provided in the proposed §

6694 regulations. Reg.§ 1.6694-3(c)(2). A position contrary to a regulation must represent a good
faith challenge to the validity of the regulation and the return preparer must identify the regulation
being challenged. In the case of a position contrary to a revenue ruling or notice, a tax return
preparer also is not considered to have recklessly or intentionally disregarded the ruling or notice if
the preparer reasonably believes that the position would more likely than not be sustained on its
merits. Reg. § 1.6694-3(c)(3).
Simplicity is replaced by complexity in determining who
within a firm is the preparer. The one-preparer-per-firm rule will be abolished in favor of a onepreparer-per-position scheme. A signing tax return preparer will be considered to be the person who
is primarily responsible for all the positions on the return unless another person within that same
firm was primarily responsible for the positions. Similarly, for a nonsigning tax return preparer, the
person with overall supervisory responsibility for the position(s) giving rise to the understatement is
the tax return preparer. This substitutes a "facts and circumstances" inquiry for a clear rule.
e.
God's in His Heaven, all's right with the world. The Tax
Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, § 506, brings the standard for
the § 6694 tax return preparer penalty for undisclosed positions into line with the taxpayer
standard, i.e., substantial authority. It penalizes the taking of an "unreasonable position," which
is defined as a position "unless there is or was substantial authority for the position" or is a
disclosed position "unless there is a reasonable basis for the position." For tax shelters and
reportable transactions, the position is an "unreasonable position ...unless it is reasonable to
believe that the position would be more likely than not be sustained on its merits." The provision
contains a reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception. It is retroactive to 5/22/07, except that the
tax shelter provision applies to returns prepared for taxable years ending after 10/3/08.
2.
Increased penalty for failure to file on time. For returns required to be
filed after December 31, 2008, the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008
increases the minimum penalty failure to file a return on time to the lesser of $135 or 100 percent
of the tax required to be shown on the return.
3.
You do the crime, you do time! One year in a half-way house, five
years probation, and a $10,000 fine is too lenient. United States v. Taylor, 499 F.3d 94 (1st
Cir. 8/17/07). In an opinion by Judge Torruella, the First Circuit vacated a tax return preparer's
sentence of one year in a half-way house, five years probation and a $10,000 fine as
unreasonably lenient, and remanded the case for resentencing. The tax return preparer, who was
a full time school teacher and part time return preparer, was convicted on sixteen counts of
aiding and abetting the filing of false returns, resulting from false claims of charitable
contributions in amounts ranging from $9,000 to $16,000, about which he advised his clients to
lie to IRS agents. The court noted, that the "offense ...
is a serious crime ...
at it's heart, it is theft,
specifically theft of money to which the public is entitled," and that "the tax fraud committed
here was not part of an indigent's effort to avoid personal tax liability, but rather, the
supplemental business of a moderately successful man who misled his clients."
a.
Then again, maybe you don't have to do time for a tax crime.
Taylor v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 878 (1/7/08). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the First Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Gall
v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), which held that there is no rule that requires
"extraordinary" circumstances to justify sentence outside Guidelines range.
4.
Deja vu. United States v. Carlson, 498 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 8/20/07). A nonprison sentence for a conviction [pursuant to a guilty plea] under § 7202 for willful failure to pay

over trust fund taxes was vacated as too unreasonably lenient under the sentencing guidelines.
The case was remanded for resentencing.
5.
And baby makes three. United States v. Tomko, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir.
8/20/07). A sentence of one year of home confinement, "the very mansion built through the
fraudulent tax evasion scheme at issue," a $250,000 fine, three years probation, and 250 hours of
community service for evading taxes of $228,557, was vacated as unreasonably lenient. The case
was remanded for resentencing.
a.
But the court has second thoughts about jailing tax cheats.
Rehearing granted and opinion vacated, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 1/17/08).
6.
But will he be a "survivor" in the U.S. Court for the District of Rhode
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/September/05_tax 463.htm
published
a Justice
Island?
Department news release, dated 9/8/05, announcing that Richard Hatch was indicted on charges
of tax evasion for failing to report about $1,037,000 dollars of income from the television reality
series and about $391,000 of income from other sources. He was convicted on 1/25/06, 2006
TNT 17-6.
a.
The First Circuit says "Down the hatch," or is it "Up the
chute"? United States v. Hatch, 514 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2/1/08). The First Circuit (Judge
Campbell) affirmed Survivor Richard Hatch's convictions on three counts of filing false tax
returns omitting his winnings from Survivor in violation of §§ 7201 and 7206(1), as well as his
sentence of 51 months. Hatch never supplied any predicate evidence or testified at trial about
why he believed he had a deal with the show's producers that they, rather than he, would pay the
taxes on his winnings. His sentence was also affirmed. The court of appeals rejected his
argument that the trial court otherwise erred by imposing a perjury enhancement; the record
showed multiple instances of perjury.
It is not criminal tax fraud if you intended to cheat but after the fact
7.
discover a rationale that might disprove the existence of any deficiency. Justice Souter
emphasizes that transactions should be treated in accordance with their substance,
regardless of the intent of their participants. Boulware v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 1168,
2008-1 U.S.T.C. 50,206 (3/3/08) (9-0). Michael Boulware was convicted on nine counts of tax
evasion and filing a false income tax return, stemming from his diversion of funds from
Hawaiian Isles Enterprises (HIE), a closely held corporation of which he was the president,
founder, and controlling (though not sole) shareholder. The Supreme Court emphasized the
necessity of a tax deficiency as an essential element of tax evasion under § 7201 in reversing the
taxpayer's conviction. Boulware involved a shareholder of a closely held corporation who failed
to report millions of dollars from the corporation. "[H]e siphoned off this money primarily by
writing checks to employees and friends and having them return the cash to him, by diverting
payments by HIE customers, by submitting fraudulent invoices to HIE, and by laundering HIE
money through companies in the Kingdom of Tonga and Hong Kong." The funds were used to
support his "lavish lifestyle," and were treated as distributions of property to him from the
corporation. Boulware sought to introduce evidence that HIE had no earnings and profits in the
relevant taxable years and because the amount diverted did not exceed his basis for his stock,
there was no dividend under §§ 301(c)(1) and 316, and the entire amount was a return-of-capital
treatment under § 301(b)(2). Boulware's argument was that because the return of capital was
nontaxable, the Government could not establish the tax deficiency required as an element of
criminal tax fraud. The trial court refused to admit the proffered evidence, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that the return of capital theory could be advanced only if at the time the

occurred the corporation intended it to be a return of capital, following its prior decision in
United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court (Justice Souter)
vacated the conviction. The Court concluded:
There is no criminal tax evasion without a tax deficiency, ... and there is no
deficiency owing to a distribution (received with respect to a corporation's stock)
if a corporation has no earnings and profits and the value distributed does not
exceed the taxpayer-shareholder's basis for his stock.
*
With respect to the intent question the Court reasoned as
follows:
Miller's view that a criminal defendant may not treat a distribution as a return of
capital without evidence of a corresponding contemporaneous intent sits
uncomfortably not only with the tax law's economic realism, but with the
particular wording of §§ 301 and 316(a), as well. As those sections are written,
the tax consequences of a "distribution by a corporation with respect to its stock"
depend, not on anyone's purpose to return capital or to get it back, but on facts
wholly independent of intent: whether the corporation had earnings and profits,
and the amount of the taxpayer's basis for his stock.
0
The Court stated the test to be "that economic substance
remains the right touchstone for characterizing funds received when a shareholder diverts them
before they can be recorded on the corporation's books," and that they "may be seen as dividends or
capital distributions for purposes of §§ 301 and 316(a)." He analyzed the treatment of distributions
received with respect to a corporation's stock under § 301(a) and concluded that an exception for
criminal cases was improper, and concluded
The implausibility of a statutory reading that either creates a tax limbo or forces
resort to an atextual stopgap is all the clearer from the Ninth Circuit's discussion
in this case of its own understanding of the consequences of Miller's rule: the
court openly acknowledged that "imposing an intent requirement creates a
disconnect between civil and criminal liability," 470 F.3d at 934. In construing
distribution rules that draw no distinction in terms of criminal or civil
consequences, the disparity of treatment assumed by the Court of Appeals counts
heavily against its contemporaneous intent construction (quite apart from the
Circuit's understanding that its interpretation entails criminal liability for evasion
without any showing of a tax deficiency).
*
In footnote 7 to the opinion the Court cited Isenbergh,
"Review: Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation," 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859 (1982), for the
proposition that the tax consequences of a transaction should depend on what was actually done, and
not on whether alternative routes would have offered better or worse tax consequences.
*
The court declined to address the government's alternative
argument that diversion was an unlawful act akin to embezzlement, rather than a distribution with
respect to the corporation's stock, which would result in §§ 301 and 316 being irrelevant and give
rise to deficiency for failure to report the proceeds of a theft, because that question had not been
considered by the court of appeals.
8.
Lying in the OIC got the taxpayer 46 months in the Big House. United
States v. Miller, 520 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 3/18/08). The Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) upheld
the taxpayer's [nontaxpayer's?] conviction under § 7201 for attempting to evade payment of his

tax liabilities. The taxpayer owed over $2 million of taxes, interest and penalties. After
surreptitiously transferring over $1 million of assets to offshore accounts, he filed an offer in
compromise based on doubt as to collectability, in which he claimed that because he had
insufficient assets and income he could only afford to pay $7,500. Even though after the fact the
taxpayer discovered that the $1 million had "disappeared" - maybe you can't trust people who
promise to hide your money for you while you're committing tax fraud - at the time he filed the
offer in compromise, "he believed he had $1 million squirreled away overseas."
0
Query whether making a statement that is literally true, i.e.,
that the transferred money was not available to pay his tax obligations, can be criminal?
9.
It's no defense to a criminal failure to pay charge that you
squandered the money and couldn't have paid it you wanted to. United States v. Easterday,
539 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 8/22/08). The defendant was convicted under § 7202 for willful failure
to pay over withheld employee payroll and income taxes. He had requested "an "ability to pay
instruction" in order to contend to the jury that his failure to pay over the taxes he owed was not
'willful,' because he had spent the money on other business expenses and therefore could not
pay it to the government when it was due," but the district court refused to give the instruction.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, overruling its prior decision to the contrary in United States v. Poll,
521 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975), on the ground that the subsequent Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), by implication repudiated any requirement of
proving ability to pay as an element of the crime of willful failure to pay. Possession of sufficient
funds to pay the tax is not an element of the crime of under § 7202 (or § 7203). A conviction will
be sustained without any showing of the taxpayer's ability to pay and a taxpayer is not entitled to
ajury instruction that to support a conviction the government must prove that the taxpayer could
have paid the tax.
B.
Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1.
An attorney can be compelled to testify if the client uses him to submit
fraudulent documents to the IRS. United States v. Cleckler, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-891 (11th
Cir. 2/19/08). In a criminal fraud prosecution, the defendant's attorney was properly compelled
to testify about a conversation he had with the defendant in the course of a civil audit of the
taxpayer's businesses' incomes that led to taxpayer submitting fabricated documents to the IRS
through his attorney. The attorney had told the defendant that it would be helpful to document
any sales by one of the businesses. The attorney received documentation (including invoices and
deposit slips) from the defendant and produced them to the IRS. When the IRS agent requested
additional documentation to support the submitted invoices, the attorney asked the defendant if
he had any additional documentation, and the defendant provided the fabricated documentation.
The attorney was properly required to testify about the content of the conversation that resulted
in the production of the fabricated documentation.
2.
The work product privilege claim didn't work, but the § 7525
privilege claim did. Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6473 (N.D. Ill.
8/23/07). Valero sought to quash summonses issued by the IRS to Valero's tax advisor, Arthur
Andersen, relating to certain branch transactions, foreign currency transactions, dual
consolidated losses, overall foreign losses, and hedge positions in connection with fluctuation
risks. The court (Judge Kennelly) rejected Valero's claim that the documents were protected by
the work product doctrine. He found that the documents were "best categorized as having been
prepared during the ordinary course of business, with the possibility of future litigation being
secondary at most." He concluded that "Valero confuse[d] the possibility of litigation with the

requirement that to be protected, a document must have been prepared because of anticipated
litigation. The fact that Valero hired Arthur Andersen with an eye toward the complex nature of
the transaction, and the possibility that the IRS might investigate, does not support a contention
that Arthur Andersen prepared its materials because Valero or Andersen anticipated actual
litigation." [Under Seventh Circuit precedent, the work product doctrine applies only when "the
document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation." Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
in original).] However, the documents were protected under the § 7525 tax practitioner's
privilege as "confidential tax advice." Even though it had the effect of avoiding federal income
taxes, the tax shelter exception in § 7525(b) did not apply for two reasons. First, "the
transactions in question did not involve the promotion of tax shelters"; nothing in the record
indicated that Arthur Andersen had anything to do with "promotion" of participation in a tax
shelter. Second, the tax shelter exception only applies to a transaction in which tax avoidance is
a "significant purpose," and not where tax avoidance is merely "one of the purposes" of the
transaction. Nothing in the record indicated the purpose of the transactions. [Under Seventh
Circuit precedent, United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 6/2/07), "'the
burden rests on the opponent of the privilege to prove preliminary facts that would support a
finding that the claimed privilege falls within an exception."]
a.
See Valero Energy II and modification
3.
A district court agrees that tax accrual work workpapers are
protected by the work product doctrine. Regions Financial Corp. v. United States. 101

A.F.T.R.2d 2008-2179 (N.D. Ala. 5/8/08). Judge Proctor held that the taxpayer's tax accrual
work workpapers were protected by the work product privilege and did not have to be turned

over pursuant to an IRS summons. He rejected the government's argument that the Eleventh
Circuit had adopted the Fifth Circuit's "primary motivating purpose" test, but nevertheless found
that high standard to have been satisfied. He applied the reasoning of the court in United States
v. Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.I. 2007). "Were it not for anticipated litigation, Regions
would not have to worry about contingent liabilities and would have no need to elicit opinions
regarding the likely results of litigation. ... It is clear in this case that Regions was primarily

motivated by litigation when it solicited opinions about the potential outcomes of litigation from
Alston & Bird and E&Y. The fact that Regions undertook the time and expense of consulting

outside firms to assess its potential liabilities shows that it believed litigation to be likely, and
this court cannot say that Regions' subjective belief was objectively unreasonable." He rejected
the government's argument that the workpapers were not protected, i.e., "'Regions has not
offered any proof that the [documents] were not created, used by or available for use by the
independent auditors of Regions'[s] public financial statements,"' on the ground that there is "no
support for the conclusion that a party must show that it was motivated by preparation for
litigation and nothing else in order to claim that a document is protected work product."
(emphasis in original).
4.
T.D. 9395, Suspension of Statutes of Limitations in Third-Party and John
Doe Summons Disputes and Expansion of Taxpayers' Rights To Receive Notice and Seek
Judicial Review of Third-Party Summonses, 73 F.R. 23342 (4/30/08). The Treasury has
promulgated final regulations, Regs. §§ 301.9703-1, 301.7603-2, and 301.7609-1 through
301.7609-5, regarding the service of third-party record-keepers summonses, the expanded class
of third-party summonses subject to notice requirements and other procedures, and the
suspension of periods of limitations if a court proceeding is brought involving a challenge to a

third-party summons, or if a third party's response to a summons is not finally resolved within
six months after service.
5.
The IRS now permanently can rat out terrorists. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 made permanent the § 6103(i)(3) exception for terrorists to
the return confidentiality rules.
C.
Litigation Costs
D.
Statutory Notice of Deficiency
E.
Statute of Limitations
1.
Existence of a durable power of attorney forecloses tolling of the
statute of limitations under § 6511(h). Bova v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 449 (2/13/08).
Section 6511(h) tolls the statute of limitations on filing refund claims for any period that the
taxpayer is unable to manage his financial affairs by reason of a medically determined physical
or mental impairment that will result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last at least
twelve months, unless another person has been authorized to manage the taxpayer's financial
affairs. The court (Judge Firestone) held that this exception applied where the taxpayer had
executed a durable power of attorney granting another person the power to manage her financial
affairs.
2.
Rock, scissors, paper - Code covers Constitution. United States. v.
Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511 (4/15/08). The taxpayer sought a refund of taxes
paid on coal exports under § 4121(a), which had been held unconstitutional as applied to coal
exports in Ranger Fuel Corp. v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 2d 466 (1998), a decision that the
Government did not appeal, and in which the IRS acquiesced. See Notice 2000-28, 2000-1 C. B.
1116. The taxpayers filed timely administrative claims for coal taxes paid in 1997 through 1999,
which the IRS refunded. The taxpayer filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking a refund
of taxes paid between 1994 and 1996, but did not file any claim for those taxes with the IRS,
because any such claim would have been denied as untimely under § 6511. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the Code's provisions override the more
lenient six year statute of limitations for claims against the government under the Tucker Act, 28
U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1), even where the claim is based on the unconstitutionality of the tax in
question.
3.
The AMT statute of limitations is the same as regular tax statue of
limitations. Nemitz v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 9 (5/15/08). The Tax Court (Judge Cohen)
held that the statute of limitations rule of § 6501(h) - providing "[i]n the case of a deficiency
attributable to the application to the taxpayer of a net operating loss carryback * * * such
deficiency may be assessed at any time before the expiration of the period within which a
deficiency for the taxable year of the net operating loss * * * which results in such carryback
may be assessed" - applies for AMT purposes where the taxpayer erroneously treated an AMT
capital loss (incurred with respect to stock acquired pursuant to a qualified stock option) as an
AMT net operating loss carryback. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that § 6501 (h) did
not apply because "the only situations where the statute of limitations is kept open by reference
to a loss year for noncorporate taxpayers is in the case of deficiencies attributable to a net
operating loss carryback since such taxpayers cannot have a capital loss carryback," and that the
taxpayer's loss was a capital loss, not a net operating loss. The court reasoned that § 6501(h) was
not applicable to the factual situation in this case because the taxpayers had claimed the
carryback as a net operating loss. Finally, the court held that the absence of a reference in

§ 6501(h) to an AMT net operating loss carryback specifically did not prevent its application for
AMT purposes, because the AMT net operating loss carryback is itself based on § 172.
Figure out whether your NOL is a specific liability loss or not and the
4.
year to which it should be carried back before the statute of limitations expires. Barrick
Resources (USA), Inc. v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-2656 (10th Cir. 6/20/08). In 2001,
the taxpayer filed a timely refund claim seeking to carryback to 1994 and 1995 net operating
losses incurred in 1997. In 2002 and 2003 the taxpayer filed additional refund claims treating the
1997 NOLs as specified liability losses (with a ten-year carryback under § 172()), that carried
the losses back to 1991 and 1992, amending that year's return; and in 2003 the taxpayer filed
additional refund claims carrying specified liability losses from 1997 and1998 back to 1991. The
court (Judge Tymkovich) held that the amended returns for 1991 and 1992, based on treating the
1997 and 1998 NOLs as specified liability losses, were not amendments of the timely-filed
refund claims based on carryback to 1994 and 1995 the 1997 NOL but rather were new refund
claims filed outside the period of limitations.
5.
Section 651 l(d)(8), added by the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief
Tax Act of 2008, extends the statute of limitations for the filing of refund claims by retired
military personnel who receive disability determinations from the Department of Veterans
Affairs (thereby resulting in the retroactive conversion of military retirement benefits from
taxable benefits based on length of service to disability benefits excluded under § 104(a)(4)). This
provision generally extends the period for filing a refund claim until one year after the date of
the disability determination.
Liens and Collections
F.
1.
The Tax Court's jurisdiction under § 6330(d) to review CDP
determinations is more limited than its jurisdiction under § 6213(a) to review deficiency
determinations. Giamelli v. Commissioner 129 T.C. 107 (10/30/07) (reviewed opinion, 9-2-8).
The majority of the Tax Court, in an opinion by Judge Goeke, held that the Tax Court's
jurisdiction under § 6330(d) to review CDP determinations is more limited than its jurisdiction
under § 6213(a) to review deficiency determinations. In contrast to deficiency cases, where
"taxpayers may raise any issue regarding their tax liability for the period in question regardless
of their prior communication of such issues to the Commissioner" because the Tax Court's "role
in such cases is for a redetermination of [a] deficiency" and "to determine the amount of [an]
overpayment" ....
[§§ 6213(a), 6512(b)], review in appeals from CDP determinations is limited to
issues that "have been raised properly when the Appeals officer made her determination."
Applying this rule, the majority applied an earlier version of Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3
to preclude taxpayer from challenging on appeal to the Tax Court a previously self-assessed
liability that was not properly contested in the administrative hearing before the Appeals
Division.
Judge Swift's dissenting opinion (joined by four other judges)
raised three arguments against the majority opinion. First, he argued that § 6330(d)(1)(A) confers on
the Tax Court '"de novo' review over the 'matter' ... (namely, the underlying tax liability)," and not
merely the IRS's determination. "Although titled 'Judicial review of determination' the statutory
language in subparagraph (A) that grants our jurisdiction uses the word 'matter,' not
'determination."' Second, he reasoned that by its reading of Reg. § 301.6320-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3, the
majority opinion effectively adopted a jurisdictional restriction that did not harmonize with "the
plain language of the statute, its origins, and its purpose." Third, he argued that Magana v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488 (2002), "prudently left open the possibility that we might consider

issues not raised at Appeals because unusual situations may arise where it would make little sense
not to consider such issues."
*
Judge Vasquez separately dissented on the grounds that "[tihe
in
section
6330 cases Congress intended there to be a trial de novo
history
establishes
that
legislative
in the Tax Court, that we can receive evidence beyond the administrative record, and we may
consider issues not raised at the section 6330 hearing."
*
Judge Marvel, in a dissent joined by four judges (some of
whom also joined in Judge Swift's dissent), argued that because the taxpayer before the court was
the estate of the taxpayer, and the estate did not come into existence until after the decedent
taxpayer's death following the CDP hearing, that the estate should not be foreclosed from raising
issues on appeal not raised by the decedent in the administrative CDP hearing.
2.
"Abrupt" issuance of CDP determination letter is evidence of abuse of
discretion. Blosser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-323 (10/29/07). The Tax Court (Judge
Goeke) held that the IRS abused its discretion by failing to consider issues regarding changed
financial circumstances that might support consideration of collection alternatives raised by the
taxpayer during a CDP hearing. In light of lack of transcript, the "abbreviated" nature of the
entry in the Appeals officer's log regarding the telephonic hearing, and the "abrupt decision" by
inferences" that "the settlement
the settlement officer, the Tax Court was "forced to make ...
officer indicates she did not consider the issues petitioner raised during the hearing as required
by section 6330(c)(3)(B) before deciding to issue the notice of determination."
3.
Nuanced differences in the statutory subsections result in different
periods for suspending the statute of limitations on collections. Severo v. Commissioner, 129
T.C. No. 17 (11/15/07). Section 6503(h) suspends the running of the period of limitations on
collection from the date of the taxpayer's bankruptcy petition was filed to the date six months
after the bankruptcy court issues a discharge order. The more limited suspension of the period of
limitations in § 6503(b), which applies to judicial proceedings generally when the taxpayer's
assets are under control of a court, does not apply in bankruptcy situations.
The Tax Court tries to minimize game playing by the Baltics in
4.
Nevada's answer to Monte Carlo on the Mediterranean. Baltic v. Commissioner, 129 T.C.
No. 19 (12/27/07). The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) held on summary judgment that taxpayers
who received a notice of deficiency but did not file a Tax Court petition could not challenge their
underlying tax liability by making an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to liability ("OICDATL") and asking for audit reconsideration because that is a challenge to the "underlying tax
liability" that is precluded by § 6330(c)(2)(B) ["The person may also raise at the hearing
challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the
person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not
otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability"]. Judge Holmes held that the
settlement officer who conducted the CDP hearing did not abuse her discretion when she
referred the OIC-DATL and audit reconsideration request to the proper offices in the IRS,
postponed collection by levy until the IRS had considered the OIC-DATL, but sustained the lien
in order to give the IRS priority over other creditors.
*
The taxpayers were residents of Ohio when they filed their
petition, their lawyer is from Bellaire [Texas], and they chose Las Vegas [Nevada] as their place of
trial.
5.
Ever expanding Tax Court jurisdiction. Rock, scissors, paper:
Statutory amendment beats old case law. Callahan v. Commissioner 130 T.C. No. 3 (2/5/08).

The Tax Court (Judge Haines) held that under § 6330(d), as amended in 2006 to confer on the
Tax Court jurisdiction to hear all appeals of CDP determinations, the Tax Court has jurisdiction
to review the IRS's determination to review assessment of § 6702 frivolous return penalties. Van
Es v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 324 (2000), which reached contrary result before the 2006
statutory amendment, is no longer controlling. Judge Haines denied the IRS's motion for
summary judgment. Because the validity of the underlying tax liability, i.e., the penalties, was
properly at issue, the court reviewed the matter de novo, see Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
604, 610 (2000). Judge Haines denied the IRS's motion for summary judgment. "Although
petitioners' Form 1040 is confusing and unorthodox, their arguments are not substantially
similar to positions previously held to be frivolous or those that display a desire to delay or
impede the administration of Federal income tax laws. ... Until the record is better developed, we
cannot say as a matter of law that petitioners have taken a frivolous position or that they desired
to delay or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws."
6.
"No prior involvement" really means "no prior involvement." Cox v.
Commissioner, 514 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 1/13/08), rev'g 126 T.C. 237 (5/3/06). The Tax Court
(Judge Wherry) held that an Appeals Officer is not disqualified from conducting a collection due
process hearing for a later year by virtue of conduct of a prior collection due process hearing for
the same taxpayer with respect to an earlier year. Judge Wherry held that the conduct of the CDP
hearing for the prior year was not "prior involvement" within the meaning of § 6330(b)(3) where
the record did not otherwise call into question the Appeals Officer impartiality. The Tenth
Circuit (Judge Kelly) reversed, holding that "no prior involvement" within the meaning of
§ 6330(b)(3) must be interpreted broadly. In denying the taxpayers' challenge to a proposed levy
for the earlier year, which involved a determination of their ability to pay the prior year's tax
liability, the Appeals Officer had considered taxpayers' tax liability for the subsequent years in
question in this case. Even though the prior consideration of the tax liability for the subsequent
year in question in this case was "not technically ...
determination," because "the statute does not
say "'no prior participation in a hearing or matter with respect to the unpaid tax,' [and] it simply
says 'no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax,"' it was prior involvement. That
involvement disqualified the Appeals Officer from hearing taxpayers' challenge to proposed levy
to collect taxes for the subsequent years. "[C]onsideration of those liabilities during the CDP
hearing for [prior years] was a material factor in his decision and constitutes prior involvement."
7.
The last CDP determination is the only CDP determination. Kelby v.
Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 6 (4/28/08). In a CDP hearing, Appeals makes a single
determination, which may or may not be supplemented. When supplemental determinations are
issued, the Tax Court reviews the IRS's decision in the last supplemental determination and does
not consider the position stated in prior notices of determination.
8.
JJ. You say, lien, I say levy, lets call the whole thing off. WilFirst
American Title Insurance Co. v. United States, 520 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 3/27/08) The title
insurance company paid tax liens to satisfy claim filed by third party purchasers who had
acquired the property directly or indirectly from an estate that had not paid all of the estate tax
due that was attributable to an assessment after audit. The title insurance company challenged
the assessment arguing that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 and United
States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that it lacked jurisdiction. The title insurer company argued that Williams, rather than EC Term
of Years Trust v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 1763 (2007), which held that § 7426(a)(1) provides
the exclusive remedy if the IRS levies on property to collect taxes owed by another person; the

levy may not be challenged through a refund suit under § 1346(a)(l), because like Williams, this
case involved a lien. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because § 7426(c) specifically
precludes any challenge to the assessment in an action by a third party to recover taxes. "[A]
§ 7426 is
challenge to an assessment ... , not a levy, ... is a distinction without a difference ...
the sole remedy here, for the same reason that it was in EC Term of Years".
a.
. ; Let's hear that tune again, but is a different Circuit this
time. , ; Munaco v. United States, 522 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 4/15/08). The Sixth Circuit (Judge
Boggs) applied the reasoning of EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1763
(2007), to hold that a third party who satisfied a tax lien on property acquired from the
delinquent taxpayer and who failed to pursue the administrative remedies available under
§ 6325(b)(4) and judicial remedies under § 7426(a)(4), which were enacted in 1998, could not
maintain a refund suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). The precisely drawn and detailed remedies
available in those provisions trump and displace the more generally stated remedies.
9.
The IRS wants the § 6323 regulations to reflect current law and
practice. REG-141998-06, Withdrawal of Regulations Under Old Section 6323(b)(10), 73 F.R.
20877 (4/17/08). The IRS has published proposed regulations to update the regulations under
§ 6323 regarding the validity and priority of the federal tax lien against persons other than the
taxpayer. The proposed regulations also: (1) would provide that a notice of Federal tax lien
(NFTL) relating to real property does not meet the filing requirements until it is both filed and
indexed in the office designated by the state if the real property is located in a state where a deed
is not valid against a purchaser unless it is recorded in a public index; (2) would provide that the
lien will be extinguished if an NFTL contains a certificate of release and the NFTL is not timely
refiled; and (3) would clarify the IRS's authority to file NFTLs electronically if the state permits
electronic filing.
10.
Bankruptcy doesn't discharge taxes where bankrupt taxpayer was
convicted of criminal tax fraud, and perfected tax lien for penalties, trumps Bankruptcy
Act provision discharging penalties. Bussell v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 13 (5/29/08). The
Tax Court's jurisdiction to review a collection action under §§ 6320 and/or 6330 includes the
authority to determine whether a taxpayer's unpaid tax liabilities were discharged in a
bankruptcy proceeding. The taxpayer was collaterally estopped from denying that her tax
liabilities for the years in issue were excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C),
because she had been convicted of tax evasion under § 7201 for the years at issue. Interest
accrued on a tax liability excepted from discharge is also nondischargeable. However, penalties
assessed for the years in issue were discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B), which provides
for the discharge of any tax penalty "imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred
before three years before the date of the filing of the petition," but because the a federal tax lien
had been properly filed before the taxpayer filed for bankruptcy, the lien, which was not
extinguished by the subsequent bankruptcy discharge, could be enforced by levy.
11.
An OIC is a prerequisite to challenging a CDP determination on the
IRS
failed to consider collection alternatives. Kohler v. Commissioner, T.C.
grounds that the
Memo. 2008-127 (5/5/08). Judge Jacob's held that the IRS's failure to consider collection
alternatives in a CDP hearing was not an abuse of discretion, because taxpayers admittedly failed
to submit an offer-in-compromise.
Claiming in a CDP hearing that a tax liability was discharged in
12.
bankruptcy is not a challenge to the underlying tax liability. Imarach v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2008-137 (5/20/08). The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held that the IRS improperly refused

to consider the taxpayers' claim in a CDP hearing that the tax liability had been discharged in an
earlier bankruptcy case. Their discharge argument was not an argument contesting the
underlying liability, but went to whether collection activity was lawful. Further, the court held
that the tax liabilities had been discharged in bankruptcy.
13.
Same year, different basis for deficiency, properly assessed this time;
taxpayer loses. Freiie v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 1 (7/7/08). In an earlier case involving the
same taxpayer for the same year, Freie v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14 (2005), the Tax Court
held that the IRS had improperly disallowed certain deductions for 1999 as mathematical or
clerical errors under § 6213(b) and barred a levy. The IRS disallowed other deductions that were
not at issue in Freije I and properly sent a notice of deficiency; the taxpayer did not file a Tax
Court petition. In reviewing a CDP determination, with respect to the deficiency, the Tax Court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the underlying tax liability associated with the
second assessment for 1999 based upon the deficiency notice. The issue of that liability was not
before the court in FreieI and the taxpayer had a previous opportunity to contest the deficiency.
14.
The IRS can't pretend a taxpayer lives at home with his wife when it
knows he's living in the Big House. Conn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-186 (8/5/08).
Under § 6330(c)(2)(B) and Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, the receipt of a notice of
deficiency, not its mailing, is the relevant event. A taxpayer who did not actually receive a
properly mailed deficiency notice in time to petition the Tax Court is entitled to challenge the
underlying liability in a CDP hearing. Because the Commissioner did not introduce into evidence
a U.S. Postal Service Form 3877, which would raise the presumption of actual receipt of the
deficiency notice, the fact that the taxpayer's wife filed a timely petition for innocent spouse
relief with respect to the tax liability to which the deficiency notice related (tax on embezzlement
income) did not establish actual receipt of the deficiency notice by the husband where his last
known address - prison - was different from his wife's.
*
The IRS should have realized this when it saw his name.
15.
Timely request a CDP hearing or forever hold your peace. Wilson v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 5 (9/10/08). The taxpayer failed to timely request a CDP hearing
with Appeals with respect to a proposed levy. Following a late request, Appeals held an
equivalent hearing and issued a form letter "NOTICE OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING
COLLECTION ACTION(S) UNDER SECTION 6320 and/or 6330." The Tax Court dismissed
the taxpayer's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that because the
taxpayer did not timely request a hearing, Appeals did not make a § 6330 determination pursuant
to the equivalent hearing, and thus the letter to the taxpayer was not a valid notice of
determination under § 6330 that the taxpayer was entitled to appeal pursuant.
16.
Present all your claims at the CDP hearing or lose your right of Tax
Court review. Brecht v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-213 (9/15/08). When reviewing a
CDP determination, the Tax Court we will not consider an issue regarding abatement of interest
under § 6404(e) if it was not properly raised at the CDP hearing and/or considered in the notice
of determination.
G.
Innocent Spouse
1.
No "plain language" limitation of the Tax Court's jurisdiction in this
case. Ewing v. Commissioner 118 T.C. 494 (5/31/02). The taxpayer and her husband filed a
joint return but did not pay all of the tax shown on the return. Subsequently, before the IRS
asserted any deficiency, the taxpayer requested equitable relief from joint and several liability
under § 6015(f). The IRS denied relief and mailed a notice of determination that was not mailed

to the taxpayer's last known address, but was actually received by the 88th day after it was
mailed. The taxpayer's petition for review was postmarked 92 days after the mailing of the
notice, and was received and filed seven days later. The Commissioner moved to dismiss on the
ground that the petition was not timely filed. The Tax Court sua sponte raised the issue of
whether it had jurisdiction under § 6015(e) to review the IRS's denial of § 6015(f) relief where
no deficiency had been asserted. [Section 6015(e), granting the Tax Court jurisdiction to review
denials of § 6015 relief, as amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, begins, "In
the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to have
subsection (b) or (c) apply..."] In a reviewed opinion by Judge Ruwe, the majority (9-4) held that
the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review a denial of § 6015(f) relief in a stand alone petition
where the taxpayer is seeking relief from liability of tax shown on the return, without a
deficiency having been asserted. The court further held that the petition was timely because it
was filed more than 6 months after the date the taxpayer submitted her request for relief [see.
§ 6015(e)(1)(A)], the IRS failed to mail the notice of determination to taxpayer's last known
address, and the misaddressed notice prejudiced the taxpayer's ability to file her petition within
90 days after the mailing of the notice. The court concluded that:
[T]he language "against whom a deficiency has been asserted" was inserted into
section 6015(e) to *** to prevent taxpayers from submitting premature requests to
the Commissioner for relief from potential deficiencies before the Commissioner
had asserted that additional taxes were owed. *** Congress was concerned with
the proper timing of a request for relief for underreported tax and intended that
taxpayers not be allowed to submit a request to the Commissioner regarding
underreported tax until after the issue was raised by the IRS.
There is nothing in the legislative history indicating that the amendment of
section 6015(e) ***, was intended to eliminate our jurisdiction regarding claims
for equitable relief under section 6015(f) over which we previously had
jurisdiction. The stated purpose for inserting the language "against whom a
deficiency has been asserted" into section 6015(e) was to clarify the proper time
for a taxpayer to submit a request to the Commissioner for relief under section
6015 regarding underreported taxes. We conclude that the amendment of section
6015(e) does not preclude our jurisdiction to review the denial of equitable relief
under section 6015(f) where a deficiency has not been asserted. In the instant
case, petitioner filed a claim for relief from joint and several liability for an
amount of tax correctly shown on the return but not paid with the return. Because
respondent has not challenged the tax reported on the return, no deficiency has
been asserted. In this situation, petitioner may be entitled to relief under section
6015(f) because subsection (f) applies where "it is inequitable to hold the
individual liable for any unpaidtax or any deficiency." [citations omitted].
Judge Laro's dissent argued that the Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction to review the denial of § 6015 relief in the absence of a deficiency, because he
considered § 6015(e)(1) to be a "clear statutory mandate from Congress" limiting the Tax Court's
jurisdiction to review denials of § 6015 relief to deficiency cases.
a.
Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (1/28/04). In a reviewed
Tax.Court held that even though the standard for reviewing the
Judge
Colvin,
the
opinion by
Commissioner's failure to grant equitable relief under § 6015(f) is abuse of discretion, the Tax

Court's review is not necessarily limited to the facts that were in the administrative record.
Judges Halpern, Holmes, Chiechi, and Foley dissented.
b.
Reversed, vacated and dismissed because the Tax Court did
not have jurisdiction over taxpayer's petition in which she claimed innocent spouse relief.
Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2/28/06), reversing 118 T.C. 494 (2002) and
vacating 122 T.C. 32 (2004). Judge Tashima held that the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to
review wife's petition for equitable relief under § 6015(f) because there was no deficiency
asserted against her and she did not elect relief under § 6015(b) or (c), as is required by
§ 6015(e) in order for the Tax Court to have jurisdiction on an innocent spouse claim. The phrase
in § 6015(e) "against whom a deficiency has been asserted" was added in 2001. The court further
held that the Tax Court could not consider evidence that was not in the administrative record.
c.
The Tax Court sticks to its position that it has broad discretion
in reviewing denial of innocent spouse relief. Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 10
(5/15/08) (reviewed, 2 judges dissenting). Judge Haines held that the Tax Court continues to
follow its holding in Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated on unrelated
jurisdictionalgrounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir.2006), that (1) its determination whether the IRS
abused its discretion in denying innocent spouse relief under § 6015(f) is made in a trial de novo,
and (2) it may consider evidence introduced at trial which was not included in the administrative
record. He rejected the IRS's argument that pursuant to the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir.2006), rev'g 123 T.C. 85, 2004 (2004), the
Tax Court's review is limited to the administrative record. Judge Haines distinguished Robinette
as involving review of a § 6330 CDP determination: "Whereas section 6015 provides that we
'determine' whether the taxpayer is entitled to relief, section 6330(d) provides for judicial
review of the Commissioner's determination by allowing the taxpayer to 'appeal such
determination to the Tax Court' and vesting the Tax Court with 'jurisdiction with respect to such
matter'. As discussed above, the use of the word 'determine' suggests that we conduct a trial de
novo."
2.
Duplicative claim for innocent spouse relief does not reopen period
for seeking Tax Court review of IRS's denial or original claim. Barnes v. Commissioner, 130
T.C. No. 14 (6/11/08). IRS Letter 3657C (which according to the IRM is used to "explain" that a
claim for § 6015 relief "has been previously disallowed") is not a "final determination" of relief
under § 6015. Issuance of IRS Letter 3657C following taxpayer's filing of a second Form 8857
seeking § 6015(o relief over 5 years after the IRS initially denied relief does not extend the
period for petitioning the Tax Court for review of the denial of relief if the taxpayer did not
timely seek review after receipt of IRS Letter 3279 denying initial petition for relief. The second
Form 8857 did not raise new grounds for relief but merely reiterated the grounds on which relief
initially was sought and denied. Judge Thornton stated, "we do not believe, the 90-day
limitations period of section 6015(e)(1)(A) should be defeated or protracted by the simple
expedient of filing a succession of duplicative claims."
3.
California community property law comes to the aid of the IRS.
Ordlock v. Commissioner, 2008-2 U.S.T.C. 50,457, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5097 (9th Cir.
7/24/08), aff'g 126 T.C. 47 (2006) (reviewed, 10-8). Even though the taxpayer spouse was
entitled to § 6015 relief, she could not obtain a refund of her husband's tax liability satisfied with
her interest in community property, because under California law creditors of either spouse could
reach all community assets and thus the federal tax lien under § 6321 attached to 100 percent of

the community property. Neither § 6015(a) nor §6015(g) preempts community property law for
purposes of the issuance of a refund to an innocent spouse.
H.
Miscellaneous
Burton Kanter got in trouble again, and this time it followed him to
1.
the grave. Investment Research Associates, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407
(12/15/99). Burton Kanter was held liable for the §6653 fraud penalty by reason of his being "the
architect who planned and executed the elaborate scheme with respect to ...kickback income
payments ......
a.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer
Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit. Ballard v. Commissioner,
321 F.3d 1037 (11 th Cir. 2/13/03), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court decision and rejected the taxpayers' argument that changes allegedly made to the
original draft opinion from the special trial judge by Judge Dawson before he adopted it were
improper.
b.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer
Kanter's Estate loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit. Estate of Kanter
v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per curiam) (2-1), aff'g in part and rev'g in
part T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The court found that the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's
original report was proper, following the Eleventh Circuit's Ballardopinion. It affirmed the Tax
Court's findings on the issues of deficiencies, fraud, and penalties, but reversed as to other
findings.
c.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated but taxpayer
Lisle's Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue in the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v.
Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 7/30/03), aff'g in part and rev'g in part T.C. Memo.
1999-407. The Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits
decisions upholding the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's original report by the Tax
Court.
d.
Justice Ginsburg to Tax Court judges: "You Article I judges
don't understand your own rules, so let me tell you what you meant when you adopted
them in 1983." Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (3/7/05) (7-2), reversing and remanding
337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) and 321 F.3d 1037 (1 1th Cir. 2/13/03). Justice Ginsburg held
that the Tax Court may not exclude from the record on appeal nor conceal from the taxpayers the
original draft reports of Special Trial Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b) or under any statutory
authority.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, joined in by
Justice Thomas, states that the "Tax Court's compliance with its own Rules is a matter on which we
should defer to the interpretation of that court."
o.
The Eleventh Circuit orders that the Special Trial Judge's
report be added to the record. Ballard v. Commissioner, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. 50,393 (1 th Cir.
5/17/05).
f.
Tax Court changes its rules. (9/20/05). The Tax Court adopted
amendments to Tax Court Rules 182 and 183, relating to Special Trial Judges' reports in cases
other than small tax cases. The Special Trial Judge's recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law are to be served on the parties, who may file written objections and
responses. After the case is assigned to a regular Judge, any changes made shall be reflected in
the record and "[d]ue regard shall be given to the circumstance that the Special Trial Judge had

the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and the finding of fact recommended by
the Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to be correct."
g.
The Eleventh Circuit remands the case to the Tax Court after reinstating the Special Trial Judge's report. Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026
(1 th Cir. 11/2/05) (per curiam). The case was remanded to the Tax Court with the following
instructions: (1) the "collaborative report and opinion" is ordered stricken; (2) the original report
of the special trial judge is ordered reinstated; (3) the Tax Court Chief Judge is instructed to
assign this case to a previously-uninvolved regular Tax Court Judge; and (4) the Tax Court shall
proceed to review this matter in accordance with the Supreme Court's dictates and with its
newly-revised Rules 182 and 183, giving "due regard" to the credibility determinations of the
special trial judge and presuming correct fact findings of the trial judge.
h.
Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 11/22/05)
(per curiam). The case was remanded to the Tax Court with orders to: (1) strike the
"collaborative report" that formed the basis of the Tax Court's ultimate decision; (2) reinstate
Judge Couvillion's original report; (3) refer this case to a regular Tax Court judge who had no
involvement in the preparation of the aforementioned "collaborative report" and who shall give
"due regard" to the credibility determinations of Judge Couvillion, presuming that his fact
findings are correct unless manifestly unreasonable [in dealing with the remaining issues of tax
deficiency]; and (4) adhere strictly hereafter to the amended Tax Court Rule in finalizing Tax
Court opinions.
i.
On remand, in a 458-page opinion Judge Haines of the Tax
Court pours out Kanter and Ballard. Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-21
(2/1/07). The Tax Court (Judge Haines) found that certain of the Special Trial Judge's findings
of fact were "manifestly unreasonable" because they were "internally inconsistent or so
implausible that a reasonable fact finder would not believe [the recommended finding]" or they
were "directly contradicted by documentary or objective evidence." Judge Haines therefore
found that the Kanter-related entities were shams, that "Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle participated in
a complex, well-disguised scheme to share kickback payments earned jointly by Kanter, Ballard,
and Lisle," and that they earned income during the years at issue which they failed to report.
0
Judge Haines found that - based upon factors such as
(1) failure to report substantial amounts of income, (2) concealment of the true nature of the income
and the identity of the earners of the income, (3) use of sham, conduit, and nominee entities,
(4) reporting Kanter's and Ballard's income on IRAs [and another entity's] tax returns,
(5) commingling of Kanter's and Ballard's income with funds belonging to others, (6) phony loans,
(7) false and misleading documents, and (8) failure to cooperate during the examination process by
engaging in a "strategy of obfuscation and delay" - the Commissioner demonstrated by "clear and
convincing evidence" that Kanter and Ballard filed false and fraudulent tax returns for each of the
years at issue.
*
Judge Haines held that the Tax Court is "obliged to review
the recommended findings of fact and credibility determinations set forth in the STJ report under a
'manifestly unreasonable' standard of review, and ... may reject such findings of fact and credibility
determinations only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, [it] conclude[s] that the
recommended finding of fact or testimony (1) is internally inconsistent or so implausible that a
reasonable fact finder would not believe it, or (2) is not credible because it is directly contradicted by
documentary or objective evidence." Furthermore, Judge Haines held that a special trial judge's

credibility determinations may be rejected under the "manifestly unreasonable" standard of review
without rehearing the disputed testimony.
*
Judge Haines further found that the appropriate standard for
determining whether the assignment of income doctrine should be applied had been appropriately
articulated in United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917, 919-920, as follows:
To shift the tax liability, the assignor [taxpayer] must relinquish his control over
the activity that generates the income; the income must be the fruit of the contract
or the property itself, and not of his ongoing income-producing activity. ... This
means, in the case of a contract, that in order to shift the tax liability to the
assignee the assignor either must assign the duty to perform along with the right
to be paid or must have completed performance before he assigned the contract;
otherwise it is he, not the contract, or the assignee, that is producing the
contractual income - it is his income, and he is just shifting it to someone else in
order to avoid paying income tax on it.
j.
And the beat goes on. Ballard v. Commissioner, _ F.3d , 101
A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1577 (11th Cir. 4/7/08). The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Fay) reversed, vacated
and remanded the Tax Court decision, T.C. Memo. 2007-21 (2/1/07), with instructions to "enter
an order approving and adopting Judge Couvillion's original report as the opinion of the Tax
Court." The reason assigned was that Judge Haines "did not presume Judge Couvillion's
findings to be correct or give Judge Couvillion's credibility determinations their due deference,"
concluding that
It is no surprise that a knowledgeable tax attorney would use numerous legal
entities to accomplish different objectives. This does not make them illegitimate.
Unfortunately such "maneuvering" is apparently encouraged by our present tax
laws and code.
k.
And on. Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 2008-2 U.S.T.C.
50,517 (5th Cir. 8/25/08). The Fifth Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit's decision and
reversed and remanded Judge Haines's decision.
2.
Long live the common law mailbox rule. Philadelphia Marine Trade v.
Commissioner, 523 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 4/15/08). The Third Circuit held that the application of
common law mailbox rule is unaffected by § 7502 where there is evidence that the document
was mailed in manner than in the normal course would have resulted in receipt before the
deadline. The taxpayer could avail itself of the mailbox rules because it produced evidence of
produced evidence of mailing the documents in question on May 8 and June 13 by overnight and
first class mail, respectively, which would have resulted in arrival well before the June 25
deadline.
*
Note there is a split in the circuits. The Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits agree with the Third Circuit that a taxpayer may rely on the common law mailbox
rule to prove that a return was timely filed, Estate of Woodv. Commissioner,909 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir.
1990); Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992); Sorrentino v. United States, 383
F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 812 (2005), but the Second Circuit, Deutsch v.
Commissioner, 599 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1979), and Sixth Circuit, Miller v. UnitedStates, 784 F.2d 728
(6th Cir. 1986) have reached a contrary result, rejecting any application of the common law mailbox
rule.

3.
Pennoni v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 522 (12/4/07). After the taxpayer
failed to file a federal income tax return for tax year 1998, the IRS sent him a Proposed
Individual Income Tax Assessment, claiming that he owed $17,764. Although the IRS eventually
agreed that the taxpayer was owed a refund in the amount of $2,801, it sent him a refund check
in the amount of $80,166. The IRS recognized its mistake after the taxpayer cashed the check,
and it sent the taxpayer a Notice of Balance Due and ultimately placed a levy on his bank
account and garnished his wages. The taxpayer sued the Government, seeking an order requiring
it to repay amounts it took from his bank account and wages, plus costs, and the Government
filed a motion to dismiss the action, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
taxpayer did not file an administrative claim for a refund before he filed suit. The court found
that the taxpayer did not have to file an administrative claim before he filed suit because he was
not seeking a tax refund. Instead, he was suing the Government for illegal exaction, and the suit
was timely under the six-year statute of limitations pertaining to lawsuits filed under the Tucker
Act, so the Government's motion to dismiss was denied.
4.
According to the Third Circuit, the Tax Court just doesn't
understand Chevron. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 101 A.F.T.R. 2d 2008-876 (3d
Cir. 2/15/08), rev'g 126 T.C. 96 (1/26/06). The Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion (12-2-3) by
Judge Laro, invalidated a regulation [Reg. § 1.882-4(a)(2) and (3)(i)] issued under § 882(c)(2),
because the statute required that a tax return be filed in the "manner" prescribed by statute and
regulations, but the regulation denied a substantive tax benefit if the return was not timely filed.
In doing so, the Tax Court analyzed the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) on the application of the
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n standard [Natl. Muffler Dealers Association v. United States,
440 U.S. 472 (1979)] for reviewing the validity of interpretive regulations issued under the
general authority in § 7805(a):
The question arises from the timing of these two decisions whether the Supreme
Court intended for [Chevron] to replace [Natl. Muffler Dealers Ass'n] in the
review of a Federal tax regulation. We have previously stated with respect to that
question: "we are inclined to the view that the impact of the traditional, i.e.,
National Muffler standard, has not been changed by Chevron, but has merely been
restated in a practical two-part test with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role
of legislative history and the degree of deference to be accorded to a regulation."
Central Pa. Sav. Association & Subs. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995)
.... Here, we conclude likewise that we need not parse the semantics of the two
tests to discern any substantive difference between them. While we apply a Nat.
Muffler analysis, our result under a Chevron analysis would be the same.
*
The court further noted that a legislative regulation, in
contrast to an interpretive regulation, when scrutinized under the Chevron standard will be upheld
"unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Nevertheless, the Tax Court held
that Reg. § 1.882-4(a)(2) and (3)(i) was invalid because it failed to pass muster under several of the
National Muffler factors: (1) the regulation was not a substantially contemporaneous construction of
the statute, (2) the regulation evolved after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Board of Tax
Appeals had held that the statute did not include a particular requirement that was imposed by the
regulations, (3) the regulations were issued after multiple reenactments of the statutory text, (4) the
regulations departed from a prior IRS interpretation of earlier regulations, and (5) the statute had
been reenacted several times without change to the governing statutory language.
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The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision on the
grounds that (1) the Tax Court erred in applying the NationalMuffler test rather than the Chevron
test, which the court of appeals held established a different standard, and (2) because the statute was
ambiguous and the regulation in question was a permissible construction of the statute, it deserved
deference under the Chevron test. The Third Circuit expressly rejected the continuing relevance after
Chevron of (1) whether regulation had been promulgated contemporaneously with enactment of the
statute it interprets, (2) the length of time the regulation had been in force, and (3). whether the
statute had been reenacted since the regulation had been promulgated, all of which were relevant
inquiries under NationalMuffler.
Our inquiry would be a simple one if, as the Tax Court suggested, the
result of this case would be the same regardless of which standard we apply. This,
however, is not the case. The Tax Court relied heavily on factors that, although
relevant to the National Muffler standard, are not mandatory or dispositive
inquiries under Chevron. As we set out above, the Tax Court reasoned that the
challenged regulation was not a contemporaneous construction of the statute; the
Tax Court found that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Board of Tax
Appeals had interpreted the statute as not including a timing element, and the Tax
Court relied on the existence of several reenactments of the statute without any
change to the governing statutory language.
Even if we were to assume that all of these observations are true,
conclusive reliance on them is misplaced. When Chevron deference is owed,
Chevron's demands are clear. If the statutory text is ambiguous, an agency is
given the discretion to promulgate rules that interpret the ambiguous provisions.
Judicial deference to an agency's rule-making authority ends only when the
agency's construction of its statute is unreasonable.
*
In addition to the Third Circuit, six other circuits have applied
Chevron to analyze the validity of Treasury Regulations. Hospital Corp. of Am. & Subs. v.
Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136 (6th Cir. 2004); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d
973 (7th Cir. 1998); Redlark v. Commissioner, 141 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Craddock, 149
F.3d 1249 (10 h Cir.1998); Beardv. United States, 992 F.2d 1516 (1lth Cir. 1993); Tax Analysts v.
Commissioner, 350 F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir.2003). Four Circuits have applied the National Muffler
standard (or National Muffler with a Chevron gloss). Snowa v. Commissioner, 123 F.3d 190 (4th
Cir. 1997) (general authority regulations get National Muffler review under Chevron); Nalle v.
Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tucker, 217 F.3d 960 (8th Cir.
2000); Schuler Indus. Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Although several courts
of appeals have applied the NationalMuffler standard rather than the Chevron standard in reviewing
interpretive Treasury Regulations, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reading of the import of
Chevron is much closer to the mainstream of administrative law generally, and one could expect the
Tax Court to be reversed in the future if it continues to apply National Muffler to invalidate
regulations that would pass muster under Chevron, as that case is generally being interpreted and
applied by the courts of appeals.
5.
Expanding equitable recoupment jurisdiction in the Tax Court.
Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner 130 T.C. No. 4 (2/19/08). Judge Marvel held that the Tax Court
has jurisdiction to apply the equitable recoupment doctrine to allow the taxpayers, an employee
[CEO of Menard, Inc.]/shareholder and his employer [Menard, Inc.] to offset their income tax

deficiencies with FICA hospital taxes they overpaid on the portion of the CEO/shareholder's
compensation that the Tax Court previously had held was a disguised dividend in Menard,Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-207 (Menard I), and Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2005-3 (MenardI). Even though the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to redetermine FICA
taxes, under the second sentence of § 6214(b), added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
[" ... [T]he Tax Court may apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment to the same extent that it is
available in civil tax cases before the district courts of the United States and the United States
Court of Federal Claims"], the Tax Court can apply equitable recoupment doctrine as ancillary to
its original jurisdiction over deficiency redetermination. Judge Marvel rejected the IRS's
argument that the Tax Court's jurisdiction to apply equitable recoupment is limited to taxes over
which it has deficiency or overpayment jurisdiction [income, estate, and gift taxes and excise
taxes imposed under chapters 41, 42, 43, and 44] on the ground that the "legislative history
underlying the recent amendment to section 6214(b) indicates Congress intended to eliminate
confusion over the Court's authority to apply the doctrine created by conflicting Court of
Appeals opinions and to provide simplification benefits to both taxpayers and the
Commissioner." Furthermore, the IRS's narrow construction of the statute was "inconsistent
with the central policy underlying the doctrine of equitable recoupment; i.e., to prevent an
inequitable windfall to a taxpayer or the Government that would otherwise result from the
inconsistent tax treatment of a single transaction, item, or event." However, in computing
Menard, Inc.'s tax liability for the year in question, it was required to reduce its deduction for the
FICA taxes with respect to which equitable recoupment was allowed.
6.
The court didn't care to hear Professor Shepard's analysis of whether
this tax shelter worked. Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 358
(4/1/08). In this tax shelter case, the government filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert
witness report and testimony of the taxpayer's expert witnesses, Professor Ira B. Shepard,
University of Houston Law Center and Stuart A. Smith, a New York tax attorney and former Tax
Assistant to the Solicitor General on the grounds that "it 'impinge[s] on the role of this Court' by
testifying as to the law or the application of the law to facts." The government characterized
Professor Shepard's report as "'nothing but legal analysis and application of his view of the law
to his view of the facts of this case,' * * * [that] 'contains lengthy descriptions of numerous cases
and sets forth in detail the manner in which [Professor] Shepard would decide this case if he
were the judge."' The government characterized Smith's report as "'legal argument dressed up
as an opinion of an expert witness' that amounts to '[n]ot only . . . a legal conclusion, [but] a
conclusion based on the wrong law."' The taxpayer asserted that Professor Shepard "'will
address whether the opinion provided by Jenkens & Gilchrist to the Welles family was an
appropriate "more likely than not opinion" at the time that it was issued such that a taxpayer
could reasonably rely on it,' and that 'Mr. Smith will testify as to the quality of the Jenkens &
Gilchrist opinion, which is relevant to the taxpayer's ability to rely in good faith on that
opinion."' After extensively discussing the nature of the experts' reports the court (Judge Miller)
granted the government's motion to exclude the expert witness reports and testimony because
"[taxpayer's] legal experts are applying the law to the facts, rather than permissibly explaining
law in a manner that could inform or assist the finder of fact."
*
See, Wolfman, Bernard. "Expert Testimony on The Law,
Twelfth Annual Erwin N. Griswold Distinguished Lecture," 57 Tax Lawyer 709 (2004), where he
stated:

In fact, expert legal testimony is usually admissible in standard-of-care cases, and
it should be. In other types of cases involving domestic law, those in which the
parties differ as to the meaning of the law applicable to a case, generally the
judge, not the jury, should decide, and generally the parties should present their
positions by argument not testimony. If, however, the case is one in which law
and fact are significantly intertwined, it may be sensible and helpful to have legal
experts offer their understanding of the law that underlies the parties dispute, and
so their testimony should be admissible and subject to cross examination.
Moreover, even in the absence of the significant intertwining of law and
fact, a trial judge should have the discretion on his own motion to appoint a legal
expert to testify on domestic law, or to allow such testimony when a party
proffers it. When the judge believes that the area of law is one that calls for highly
specialized legal expertise that he does not have sufficiently, and he thinks that a
jury will be more likely to understand the law or legal setting applicable to the
facts of the case if it hears the testimony of legal experts for both sides who
present their opinions subject to cross examination, the proffered testimony
should be admitted. Indeed, I think that serious consideration should be given to
amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 so that it will not be limited to
foreign law and will read as follows: ". . . The court, in determining foreign or
domestic law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence ......
0
One of Professor McMahon's former students was on the
government's trial team and deposed Professor Shepard in connection with the case.
7The IRS makes it easier for its agents to prepare § 6020(b) substitute
returns. T.D. 9380, Substitute for Return, 73 F.R. 9188 (2/20/08). Revised Reg. § 301.6060-1
provides that a document (or set of documents) signed by an authorized Internal Revenue Officer
or employee is a return under § 6020(b) if the document(s) identifies the taxpayer by name and
TIN, contains sufficient information from which to compute the taxpayer's tax liability, and the
document(s) purports to be a return under § 6020(b). A Form 13496, "IRC Section 6020(b)
Certification," or any other form used to identify a document (or set of documents) containing
the required information constitutes a valid § 6020(b) return. A name or title of an Internal
Revenue Officer or employee appearing on a § 6020(b) return is a sufficient subscription without
regard to whether the name or title is handwritten, stamped, typed, printed or otherwise
mechanically affixed to the document. The document(s) and subscription may be in written or
electronic form. The purpose of these changes was to reverse the result in Cabirac v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163 (2003).
a.
The IRS foot-faulted on preparing a tax protestor's substitute
return and lost the failure to pay penalty. Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163 (2003). The
taxpayer filed income tax return forms with zeros on the relevant lines for computing tax
liability. The IRS prepared unsubscribed substitute returns showing zeros, and sent a deficiency
notice based on a calculation of taxable income and tax shown in a revenue agent's report, which
had not been attached to the substitute returns. The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that the
taxpayer was liable for the § 665 1(a)(1) failure to file penalty, but not for the § 665 1(a)(2) failure
to pay penalty. The unsubscribed substitute returns showing zero taxes did not meet the
requirements for a § 6020(b) return, and the subsequently prepared notice of proposed

adjustments and the revenue agent's report, which were not attached to the unsubscribed
substitutes for return, whether viewed separately or in conjunction with the substitute return,
were not an adequate § 6020(b) return.
8.
The Tax Court's not a court! So says the Sixth Circuit in affirming
the Tax Court's own decision to that effect. Mobley v. Commissioner, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 20085133 (6th Cir. 7/8/08). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision that it lacked
authority to transfer a refund claim, over which it had no jurisdiction, to a district court under 28
USC § 1631. That provision "'by its terms applies only to a "court" as defined in 28 U.S.C. sec.
610" and ...
the Tax Court is not included among the courts listed in 28 U.S.C. sec. 610."'
a.
And the Court of Federal Claims agrees. DaCosta v. United
States, 82 Fed. Cl. 549 (7/11/08) The Court of Federal Claims cannot transfer to the Tax Court a
case filed in the Court of Claims but over which it lacks jurisdiction because exclusive
jurisdiction is vested in the Tax Court. The Tax Court is not a "court" for this purpose because
the Tax Court is not listed in 28 U.S.C. § 610 as a court to which a case can be transferred
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
9.
Why rush before April 15th! - Wait until October 15th, or is it
September 15th? T.D. 9407, Extension of Time for Filing Returns, 73 F.R. 37362-01 (7/1/08).
The Treasury promulgated final regulations relating to extensions of time to file tax returns.
Individual have an automatic 6-month extension if they file an application on or before the return
due date. Reg. § 1.6081-4. For partnerships, estates, and trusts, the automatic extension period is
only five months. Temp. Reg. §§ 1.6081-2T (partnerships), 1.6081-6T (estates and trusts).
10.
Or, wait until January 5th, if you are a Hurricane Ike survivor. IR2008-107, Sept. 18, 2008.
Specifically, the relief postpones until Jan. 5, 2009, certain deadlines for
taxpayers who reside or have a business in the disaster area. The postponement
applies to return filing, tax payment and certain other time-sensitive acts due on
or after Sept. 7, 2008, and before Jan. 5, 2009 - including individual estimated
tax returns and corporate tax returns that were due Sept. 15, and extended
individual returns due Oct. 15.
In addition, the IRS will waive the failure to deposit penalties for employment
and excise deposits due on or after Sept. 7 and before Sept. 22, 2008, as long as
the deposits are made on or before Sept. 22.
11.
Complying with IRS withholding instructions does not defraud an
employee. Nino v. Ford Motor Company, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5837 (E.D. Mich. 8/8/08).
Summary judgment was granted to plaintiff's employer in a pro se proceeding claiming that the
employer defrauded the plaintiff by wage withholding pursuant to IRS instructions to disregard
the plaintiffs claimed 99 exemptions. The court indicated that it could find no legal authority
requiring an employer to make a determination of a worker's status before withholding taxes.
12.
Beware of showing the "real books" to the guy who claims he wants to
buy your business. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 made permanent the
IRS's Code § 7608(c) authority to engage in undercover operations.
XI.

WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A.
Employment Taxes
1.
Wisdom from the Mount. Medical residents may be students for
FICA taxes. United States v. Mount Sinai, 486 F.3d 1248 (1lth Cir. 5/18/07). Section

3121 (b)(10) provides that employment taxes are not payable with respect to services performed
in the employ of a college or university by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending
classes. The Government argued that legislative history with respect to the repeal of an
exemption for medical interns in 1965 (former § 3121(b)(13)) established as a matter of law that
medical residents are subject to employment taxes. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
§ 3121 (b)(l 0) is unambiguous in its application to students and that the statute requires a factual
determination whether the hospital is a "school, college, or university" and whether the residents
are "students."
a.
The District Court finds that the Mount Sinai Medical Center
is a school and the residents are students. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of
Florida, Inc., 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5373 (S.D. Fla. 7/28/08). After the decision in Minnesota v.
Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), Mount Sinai Medical Center obtained refunds for FICA
taxes paid in 1996-1997. The United States filed suit against the Medical Center for erroneous
refunds. Following the Eleventh Circuit's direction to make a factual determination whether the
program qualifies for the § 3101(b)(10) exception, the District Court found that the Medical
Center's residency programs were operated as a "school, college, or university," that residents
were present for training in patient care, which was an intrinsic and mandatory component of the
training, that the residents were "students" who were regularly enrolled and attending classes.
The court also found that the students' performance of patient care services was incident to their
course of study.
b.
And the same holds for residents at the Mayo Clinic. Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Minn. 8/3/07). The
District Court held in 2003 that stipends paid to medical residents in the Mayo Clinic were
qualified for the student exclusion from FICA taxation, and that the Mayo is a school, college, or
university for purposes of the exclusion. United States v. Mayo Found. for Med Educ. &
Research, 282 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2003). The Treasury responded with Reg.
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c), (d), which limits the definition of a school, college, or university to
entitles whose "primary function is the presentation of formal instruction." The regulation also
limits the definition of student to provide that only services provided as incident to pursuing a
course of study and that a person whose work schedule is 40 hours or more per week is a fulltime employee rather than a student. In granting a $1.6 million refund claim on summary
judgment, the District Court determined that the regulation is invalid as inconsistent with the
plain meaning of a statute that the court finds is unambiguous and held that stipends paid to
medical residents are subject to the student exclusion.
C.
This is no April fool. The Minnesota District Court also finds
that medical residents at the University of Minnesota are students. Regents of the University
of Minnesota v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1532 (D. Minn. 4/1/08). The university's
summary judgment motion is granted by the District Court holding that medical residents at the
University of Minnesota are not subject to employment taxes under the student exclusion of
§ 3121(b)(10). The court reiterated its conclusion that the full-time employee exception in Reg.
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d), as amended in 2004, is invalid.
d.
South Dakota medical residents are also students. Center for
Family Medicine v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5626 (D. S. Dak. 8/6/08). Following
Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), the South Dakota District Court held that
medical residents in the Center for Family Medicine (CFM) and University of South Dakota
School of Medicine Residency Program (USDSMRP) were eligible for the student exception to

the definition of employment under § 3101(b)(10). The court rejected the government's assertion
that CFM was not a school, college or university because CFM was affiliated with a non-profit
hospital. The court found that CFM's work includes teaching its medical residents the skills
required to practice in their chosen profession. The court also concluded that the students were
"enrolled" in the institution and that their attendance at noon conferences and medical rounds
established that the students regularly attended classes. Tossing a small bone to the government,
the court held that chief residents in the programs, who are essentially coordinators for the
residency programs, were not students.
e.
Residents in Chicago are also students. University of Chicago
Hospitals v. U.S., 102 AFTR 2d 2008-5317 (7th Cir. 9/23/08). The court affirmed summary
judgment that medical residents are not per se ineligible for the student exemption from
employment taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The court indicates that a case-by-case analysis is
required to determine whether medical residents qualify for the statutory exemption.
2.
This one hurts. Early retirement bonuses for tenured professors are
wages subject to employment tax withholding. University of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507
F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 11/2/07). In a 2-1 decision, reversing the District Court, the Third Circuit held
that payments to early retirees to induce retirement are wages subject to FICA withholding rather
than non-wage payments for relinquishment of contract rights to tenure. The Third Circuit
follows Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185 (6th Cir. 2006), and joins the Sixth Circuit in
rejecting the holding of North Dakota State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2001).

Employment tax wage base for 2008. Notice 2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B.
1036 (11/19/07). The OASDI contribution and benefit base for remuneration paid in 2008 is
$102,000. The minimum amount that a domestic worker must earn to trigger employment tax
liability for 2008 is $1,600.
4.
Section 403(b) salary reduction agreements defined. T.D. 9367,
Payments Made by Reason of a Salary Reduction Agreement, 72 F.R. 64939 (11/14/07).
Treasury has finalized regulations, § 31.3121(a)(5)-2, defining contributions to § 403(b) plans
under a salary reduction agreement that are subject to employment taxes. Employer contributions
to a § 403(b) plan that are not made pursuant to a salary reduction agreement are not subject to
employment taxes. A salary reduction agreement exists if the employee elects to reduce
compensation pursuant to a cash or deferred election, the employee elects to reduce
compensation under a one-time irrevocable election made at or before the time of initial
eligibility to participate in the plan, or the employee agrees as a condition of employment
(whether imposed by statute or otherwise) to make a contribution that reduces compensation.
5.
Bennett v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2007-355 (12/3/07). Selfemployment income earned as a minister is subject to self-employment tax unless under
§ 1402(e)(3) the individual files a letter or Form 4361 certifying that the individual is
conscientiously or on religious principles opposed to the acceptance of public insurance. Judge
Swift rejected the taxpayer-pastor's claim for exemption in the absence of evidence that the
taxpayer had filed the requisite certification. The IRS search of its files in the Ministerial Unit
failed to discover a form filed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer was unable to produce documentary
evidence of the filing, and the taxpayer had in fact paid employment taxes in some years
subsequent to the taxpayer's claim of having filed the certificate in 1980.
6.
Vacation with pay in a sunny safe harbor, at least for the employer.
Rev. Proc. 2008-25, 2008-13 I.R.B. 686 (3/11/08). The IRS originally maintained the position
that payroll taxes for year-end wages, including accrued vacation pay, could not be deducted in
3.

the year accrued because it was unclear whether the employee would meet the payroll tax
threshold in the subsequent year when wages were actually paid. The IRS lost the issue in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252 (Ct. Cl. 1976), acq. 1996-2 C.B. 1. This
revenue procedure provides a safe harbor method of accounting under the recurring item
exception of Reg. § 1.446-5 allowing deduction of accrued FICA and FUTA taxes in the taxable
year in which all events have occurred that establish the fact of the related compensation liability
and the amount of the related compensation liability can be determined with reasonable
accuracy. The revenue procedure grants blanket permission for a change of accounting to the
safe harbor method.
7.
You're laid off (or fired), here's a benefits check, but you have to pay
your employment taxes. CSX Corp. v. United States, 2008-1 U.S.T.C. 50,218, 101 A.F.T.R.2d
2008-553 (Fed. Cir. 3/6/08). With a lengthy analysis of the statute, legislative history, case law
and prior IRS rulings practice, the court held that supplemental unemployment benefits paid to
workers (including management, temporary and unionized employees) who are voluntarily or
involuntarily separated from service are treated as wages subject to withholding under FICA and
the Railroad Retirement Tax Act.
a.
United States v. JPS Composite Materials Corp., 2008-1 U.S.T.C.
50,252 (D. S.C. 3/25/08). Summary judgment was granted to the United States in a suit to
recover an erroneous refund of FICA and Medicare taxes paid with respect to supplemental
unemployment compensation benefits. The case was being held pending resolution of the issue
in CSX Corp.
8.
Railroad ties bind a subsidiary to its related rail carrier for purposes
of railroad retirement and unemployment taxes. Trans-Serve Inc. v. United States, 101
A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1245 (5th Cir. 3/19/08). Commonly controlled subsidiary that derived 75
percent of its income from the manufacture and sale of railroad ties for its related rail carrier was
held to provide "service in connection with transportation by rail." The subsidiary was thus held
responsible for Railroad Retirement Act and Railroad Unemployment Act taxes on wages paid to
employees. The court affirmed lower court holding rejecting the taxpayer's claim that it was
required only to pay the lower FICA and FUTA taxes on wages.
9.
Rev. Rul. 2008-29, 2008-24 I.R.B. 1149 (6/15/08). The ruling provides
rules to determine withholding rates with respect to payment of supplemental wages in nine
different situations.
10.
The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 clarified
that any amount excludable from gross income under §139B [certain qualified benefits to
volunteer firefighters and emergency medical responders] is not subject to social security tax or
unemployment tax.
B.
Self-employment Taxes
1.
Edwards v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2008-24 (2/7/08). Commissions
based on insurance renewals paid to a retired insurance agent by his sole proprietorship agency
are subject to self-employment tax. The fact that day-to-day operations of the insurance agency
had been turned over to employees does not affect the result.
2.
Failure to meet mandatory electronic filing incurs penalties even
though employment taxes in the correct amount are paid on a timely basis. Fallu
Productions v. United States, 2008-1 U.S.T.C. 50,199 (S.D. N.Y. 2/13/08). Reg. § 31.6302-1(h)
requires that certain deposits of employment taxes be made electronically. The taxpayer, a film
production company owned by the actor Joe Pesci paid its employment taxes by deposit in an

approved bank, but not electronically. The court granted summary judgment imposing failure to
pay penalties under § 6656 for failure to make the deposits in the required electronic fashion.
C.
Excise Taxes
1.
Worldwide Equipment v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1089 (E.D.
Ky. 2/29/08). Summary judgment was granted to the government holding that Mack trucks
designed primarily to haul coal from the mine to the tipple are subject to the 12% excise tax on
the retail sale of heavy truck bodies and chassis. Customization activities by the dealer did not
make the trucks unsuitable for highway use.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Division C, § 504(c),
2.
provides that amounts received by taxpayer engaged in the fishing business from the settlement
of Exxon Valdez litigation are not treated as self-employment income.
3.
Ahoy mates!
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
Act§ 306, retroactively extends the $13.50 per gallon payment of excise tax to Puerto Rico (up
from $10.50) for imported rum.
4.
Benefits for Robin Hood's children hunting pork. Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 503(a), amends § 4161(b)(2)(B) to exempt from
excise tax all-natural arrow shafts measuring 5/16 of an inch that are not suited for use with
bows drawing more than 30 pounds.
XII. TAX LEGISLATION
A.
Enacted
1.
The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, P.L. 110-142, was
signed by President Bush on 12/20/07.
A "blue Christmas" package is enacted on December 26th, or is it a
2.
Christmas package for the blue states? The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2007, P.L. 110166, i.e., the one-year AMT patch, was signed by President Bush on 12/26/07.
The Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007, P.L. 110-172, passed both
3.
houses of Congress by unanimous consent on 12/19/07 and was signed by President Bush on
12/29/07. It alters the definition of the alternative minimum tax refundable credit amount as
provided in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006; changes certain rules in the Pension
Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 for tax-free distributions from individual retirement accounts to
charities; and modifies the § 355 special rule for the active business requirement as added by the
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005. It also deals with § 470 SILO
transactions for investment partnerships.
4.
The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, P.L. 110-185, was signed by
President Bush on 2/13/08. The bill contains several tax provisions, including-an increase for
2008 in the § 179 dollar limitation to $250,000 (phase-out increase to $800,000), and the
application of the § 168(k) special allowance of 50 percent to property acquired during 2008.
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, (the "2008 Farm
5.
Act"), P.L. 110-234, was enacted over President Bush's veto on 5/22/08. The portion of the
Farm Act containing tax provisions are referred to as the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and
Horticulture Act of 2008.
6.
The Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 (the
"HEART Act"), P.L. 110-245, was signed by President Bush on 6/17/08.

7.
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, P.L. 110-289, was
signed by President Bush on 7/30/08. The tax provisions in that Act are referred to as the
Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008.
8.
H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
[DivisionA], the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 [Division B], and the Tax
Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008 [Division C], P.L. 110-343 was
signed by President Bush on 10/3/08.
0
The provisions of these Acts authorize the Secretary of the
Treasury to establish a Troubled Assets Relief Program to purchase troubled assets from financial
institutions; provide Alternative Minimum Tax relief; extend expiring tax provisions and establish
energy tax incentives; and temporarily increase Federal Deposit Insurance limits.
9.
H.R. 6893, the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing
Adoptions Act, was signed by President Bush on 10/7/08
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